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This thesis, the first :, t udy of Nevile Henderson to be 
completed at doctoi', zl level in the UK, t ak'-s a fresh look at 
Henderson' s controversial L, o1., in Berlin b'-tween 1937 and 
', 939. 
It bei i:: s by r-m- oxamining Hendr rson' s controversial 
appo_nt-, e:: t to Lhe Berlin Embassy, and contends that a close 
of his earlier career (especially in Belgrade between 
1929 and ; 935) help to explain those aspects of his 
behavi- r that gave rise to criticism. 
nF`er close analysis of published and unpublished 
o eign Office documents, the thesis challenges the 
traýiý iý:: a1 ". "ieý: that Henderson favoured the Anschluss and 
the d: semberment of Czechoslovakia in 1938. It also 
re-examines the charge that he undermined British policy by 
making indiscreet remarks in Germany, and argues that his 
scepticism about the anti-Nazi opposition was fully 
justified. And that he did, to a degree, carry out his 
'warning' function in Berlin. 
Another key aspect concerns the extent to which 
Henderson's line in Berlin had support in the Foreign 
Office, and the re-consideration of his pivotal relation- 
ships with Chamberlain and Halifax. Particular attention 
is 
paid to the decision to send Henderson 
(by then a seriously 
ill man) back to Berlin in February 1939. 
The author's overall view is that, given Henderson's 
5 
flawed analysis of the Nazi regime, a totally revisionist 
analysis of his time in Berlin would be untenable. The main 
conclusions are (a) that Henderson's influence on British 
policy has been exaggerated and (b) that he has been 
unfairly treated by historians. 
This thesis seeks to redress the historical balance by 
presenting the first close analysis, and rounded account of 
what Henderson called the 'failure of a mission'. 
6 
As British Ambassador in Berlin between 1937 and 1939 
Nevile Henderson has understandably attracted the attention 
of historians analysing the causes of the Second World War. 
For most of the post-war period however, his period of 
service in Berlin has been viewed by historians with a 
surprising degree of uniformity, and this uniformity has 
been largely negative and critical. 
The trend was set in the late 1940s and early 1950s by 
Sir Lewis Namier, who castigated Henderson as 'un homme 
nefaste', a posturing incompetent, who attempted in 
unconvincing fashion to defend his role in Germany as 
Ambassador by means of the 'pseudo artistic claptrap' in his 
memoir Failure of A Mission published in 1940.1 
There has been little disposition to challenge Namier's 
conclusions amongst historians thereafter. In 1953 the 
seminal study of inter-war diplomats by Gordon A. Craig and 
Felix Gilbert accused Henderson of ignoring his own 
injunction that an ambassador should 'act as "faithful 
interpreter" of his government's instructions'. ' It also 
saw Henderson as not only an unsuccessful diplomat, but also 
a representative of 'a declining ruling class' which could 
not reconcile itself to the social transformation of the 
1920s and 1930s. 3 The hostile theme continued in 1963 with 
the savage critique of appeasement presented by Martin 
Gilbert and Richard Gott in The Appeasers which depicted 
7 
Henderson in much the same way as Namier as 'our Nazi 
ambassador in Berlin', a diplomat who failed disastrously 
either to convey British views accurately to Hitler or to 
avoid showing overt sympathy for the Nazi regime. 4 The 
Appeasers coincided with the publication in the previous 
year of the former Foreign Secretary Lord Avon's first 
volume of memoirs Facing the Dictators, in which the former 
Anthony Eden described Henderson's appointment in 1937 as 
'an international misfortune' and regretted the fact that he 
had sent him to Berlin. (Henderson's selection for this key 
post was a surprise both to himself and others in the 
diplomatic service. )' A decade earlier, Craig and Gilbert 
had speculated on why it was that Henderson had insisted on 
behaving like 'a "great ambassador" in the style of the 
eighteenth or nineteenth century', ' and highlighted 
Henderson's own belief that 'God had granted him a special 
mission' to save the peace and create a long-lasting Anglo- 
German entente. ' 
The implementation of the Thirty Year Rule in 1968, 
which opened many Foreign Office files hitherto unavailable 
(including Henderson's own personal file) did not in the 
opinion of Professor Paul Kennedy require any revision of 
the way in which Henderson's diplomacy had been portrayed by 
earlier historians. This conclusion was supported in 1976 
by Edward Ingram, who compared Henderson's lack of 
competence and professionalism with that of Shirley Temple 
Black. ' As recently as 1996 Professor D. Cameron Watt in an 
essay entitled 'Chamberlain's Ambassadors' reiterated the 
charge that Henderson had failed in his duty to warn the 
Germans effectively about the likely consequences of 
8 
aggression on their part. " 
Henderson also aroused unfavourable comparison with his 
subordinates in the Berlin Embassy. Both Professor Watt and 
Bruce Strang, writing in 1989 and 1994 respectively, argued 
that Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, the then Counsellor at the 
Embassy, was both more realistic and more robust than 
Henderson in his attitude to the Nazis (particularly in 
1938-9 when he stood in for him during the latter's absence 
on sick leave) . 
lo 
Another accusation, put forward in Patricia Meehan's 
1992 monograph, 'The Unnecessary war, is that Henderson 
failed miserably to take seriously the German opposition to 
Hitler, or to encourage his government to do so. Meehan 
supported the charge that Henderson had been guilty of 
fawning acquiescence to the Nazi regime's aspirations. " 
Attempts to rehabilitate Henderson have been few and 
far between. One attempt in 1958, very much in the teeth of 
the received wisdom about Henderson at the time, was made by 
the Irish historian T. Desmond Williams. Williams suggested 
that the prestigious British Foreign Policy Documents series 
had been edited in such a way as to deliberately show 
Henderson in a poor light. "` There was no equivalent 
attempt to rehabilitate Henderson in the 1960s, but a cogent 
analysis of his diplomacy is in the US historian Vaughan B. 
Baker's unpublished Ph. D. thesis in 1975, and a subsequent 
article in 1977. Baker's view is that Henderson laboured 
heroically to represent Britain in Berlin despite the 
confusion created by the existence of a large faction 
in the 
Foreign Office, led by Sir Robert Vansittart and Orme 
Sargent, which was critical of the Government's appeasement 
9 
line towards Germany. 
Henderson, according to Baker, was a Wilsonian idealist 
who had always believed that the aspirations of ethnic 
Germans had been cruelly crushed by the Versailles Treaty 
and its associated treaties, and subsequently ignored. But 
Henderson's idealism, in Baker's view, was also blended with 
a strong streak of realism. Henderson consistently warned 
against pointless military posturing against Germany in 
1938-9, when in his judgement, Britain lacked the military 
muscle to carry out its threats. " 
A subsequent article in The Journal of British Interna- 
tional Studies (1980) by Aaron Goldman, while acknowledging 
Henderson's flaws as an ambassador, questioned why it was 
that he had been sent to Berlin in the first place in 1937, 
and why, when a very sick man in 1939, he had been sent back 
to his post after four months' sick leave, by Halifax and 
the Foreign Office. Goldman was critical of Vansittart's 
attitude to Germany which he compared to Henderson's (noting 
that Vansittart was not always as anti-German as his 
reputation suggests), but did not adopt the more revisionist 
position of Baker about the practicality of Henderson's 
position, and his sympathy for German grievances. " 
Amongst the very few monographs which adopted a more 
sympathetic attitude to Henderson's diplomacy was Maurice 
Cowling's The Impact of Hitler, published in 1975, and John 
Charmley's Chamberlain and the Lost Peace, which appeared in 
1989. Unusually, Cowling believed that: 'Before the 
Anschluss Henderson was not optimistic. Nor did he want it 
to be the Nazis who brought it about. ' Neither did he 
actually advocate, Cowling argued, the dismemberment of 
10 
Czechoslovakia in 1938. Cowling recognised that Henderson 
'held no brief for the Nazi system', whereas other 
historians had accused Henderson of just that offence. 
Crucially Cowling recognised that Henderson was 'ill, in 
touch, and overworked', factors curiously ignored by his 
many critics. Conversely, Cowling was critical of 
Henderson's former friend, and admirer, Vansittart, whom he 
believed to be inconsistent and contradictory. " 
Charley, who devoted the first chapter of his book to 
the key relationship between Henderson and Neville 
Chamberlain, saw Henderson as someone in the tradition of 
British diplomats who had not regarded Eastern Europe as a 
vital British national interest in the context of German 
demands for territorial revision after the 1919 settlement. 
Charmley pointed out that Neville Chamberlain's own half- 
brother Austen said, when Foreign Secretary in 1925, that 
the Polish Corridor (with its large population of ethnic 
Germans) was not worth 'the bones of a British grenadier' 
Thus Henderson, Charmley argued, was in the same tradition 
as Sanderson before the First World War, who did not regard 
Germany as a menace, as Vansittart was in that of Sir Eyre 
Crowe, who suspected German intentions and insisted on a 
forward policy to safeguard British interests. 16 
On the German side there has been some significant 
evidence that Henderson did in fact, contrary to the 
assertions of Professor Watt and others, pass on serious 
warnings that German aggression against Czechoslovakia or 
Poland would mean war. The Von Hassell Diaries, first 
published in German in 1946, show this to have 
been the case 
in 1938, and How We Squandered the Reich, the memoirs of 
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Reinhard Spitzy, an aide to Ribbentrop, published in an 
English translation in 1997, show that Henderson did carry 
out this function in the summer of 1939.1' Spitzy went so 
far as to dedicate his book to Henderson as a man 'who 
risked both himself and his reputation' in the process of 
trying to prevent war in 1939.1' 
The reactions to Henderson's period as Ambassador in 
Berlin seem to have left little room for neutrality. The 
historiography portrays him as either an incompetent, 
prejudiced bungler or as a high-minded, patriotic idealist. 
One of the central contentions of this thesis is that 
there has been, amongst historians, a tendency to ignore 
Henderson's earlier career and especially his period in 
Belgrade between 1929 and 1935. This has distorted the view 
of his time in Berlin and his capacity for unorthodox 
diplomacy, both in terms of his relationship with the 
Foreign Office and his relationships with foreign leaders 
like King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Hermann Göring in 
Germany. He was, after all, sent to Berlin in 1937 because 
of his ability to 'hit it off' with authoritarian rulers. 19 
There were also more nuances to Henderson's diplomacy 
than traditional analyses have allowed (as the thesis will 
show). A more detailed scrutiny of even the published 
British Foreign Policy Documents, shows that Henderson tried 
to preserve both Austrian and Czechoslovak integrity in 
1938, but that he was badly shaken by the events of the so- 
called 'May Scare', the weekend of 20-21 May. Thereafter 
Henderson, in one sense laudably, was desperate to preserve 
the peace at almost any cost. 
Henderson was never an apologist for the Nazi system, 
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although he undoubtedly sympathised with German grievances 
because he had always believed (from the period when he 
worked in the Paris Embassy in 1919) that the Versailles 
Treaty was unjust. Hence his insistence on the importance 
of morality in Britain's dealings with Germany. Making sure 
that Britain, and not Hitler, took the moral high ground was 
an essential part of Henderson's approach to Anglo-German 
relations. Yet at the same time he could be brutally 
realistic about Britain's military weakness in 1938-9, while 
failing to perceive the ultimate objectives of Nazi foreign 
policy. 
13 
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Nevile Meyrick Henderson was born on 10 June 1882, the 
third child of Robert and Emma Henderson of Sedgwick Park 
near Horsham, Sussex. Sedgwick was to play a central role 
in Nevile Henderson's life thereafter, as he himself noted 
many years later while awaiting his own death from the cruel 
cancer that killed him. 'Each time that I returned to 
England, ' Henderson wrote, 
the white cliffs of Dover meant Sedgwick for me, and 
when my mother died in 1931 and my home was sold by 
my elder brother's wife, something went out of my 
life that nothing can replace. ' 
The Hendersons were of Scots ancestry (Nevile wore the 
kilt at home until he went to preparatory school) and his 
grandfather Alexander moved to England from Leuchars in 
Fife, leaving on his death a vast fortune for those days of 
half a million pounds, and three substantial estates. One 
called Park, was on the Clyde south of Glasgow, and the 
second, Randell's Park, was near Leatherhead in Surrey. As 
the eldest son, Robert Henderson received Sedgwick Park in 
his father's will, a vast estate of up to 5,000 acres. 2 
It is clear that Henderson had a privileged and largely 
secure childhood. Robert Henderson was a Director of the 
Bank of England, who did well out of the family firms of 
R&I Henderson and the Borneo Company. His sudden death, 
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when Nevile was thirteen and had barely entered Eton, preci- 
pitated a minor crisis in the family's fortunes. But Emma 
Henderson was a formidable woman (who had gone on a tour 
around the world at the tender age of twenty-four) and she 
rose to the challenge. Henderson wrote in his memoirs of 
how Emma, a tenacious and conservative property-owner, 
staved off disaster by selling a farm and shooting rights on 
the estate . His mother also made the gardens at Sedgwick 
sufficiently famous for them to be photographed for the 
magazine Country Life in 1901. Henderson appears to have 
been somewhat in awe of 'the presiding genius of Sedgwick', 
who was 'a wonderful and masterful woman if ever there was 
one'. She lived on to be eighty-one and died in 1931, 
eleven months before Henderson's work for the Diplomatic 
Service was acknowledged with a KCMG. ' By coincidence, the 
sale of Sedgwick in 1931 happened in the same year that the 
Henderson family also lost Park and Randell's Park. Too 
much can be made of the subsequent decline in the Henderson 
family's fortunes. Henderson may, as one authority notes, 
have been 'something of a snob', but it is surely reading 
too much into the loss of the family estate in 1931 to 
pronounce definitely that 
Henderson is more than merely a diplomat who failed. 
He is, rather, typical of the helplessness with 
which members of declining ruling class faced the 
social transformation of the 1920s and 1930s. 4 
Plainly, however, Henderson was a member of the ruling 
class which provided the narrow circle of public school and 
Oxbridge entrants from which future diplomats were selected. 
He was at Eton with George Lloyd, who was to be 
his chief in 
17 
Egypt in the 1920s, and Alexander Cadogan, who was to be his 
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office in the 
1930s. And he acquired all those social and sporting skills 
required by a Victorian or Edwardian gentleman. Even his 
garb for long-distance rail travel underlines this point. 
It consisted, somewhat bizarrely, of 
an old coat, a pair of flannel trousers, and that 
much abused and maligned article, an old school tie, 
generally the old Etonian cricket colours known as 
the Eton Ramblers or that of I. Zingari. 
Above everything else in Henderson's gentlemanly image was 
his obsession with hunting and shooting to which all three 
of his memoirs frequently refer. 5 He spent much time 
shooting game in the company of foreigners like King 
Alexander of Yugoslavia and Hermann Göring. ' The gentle- 
manly image was carefully cultivated. For Adolf Hitler, 
Henderson became 'the man with the carnation', while the 
contemporary political diarist Chips Channon noted how 
Henderson was as usual, faultlessly dressed'. 7 
Henderson's mother was a major influence upon him, and 
his Dictionary of National Biography entry (not the work of 
an admirer) noted that 'affection for his mother played a 
large part in his life, as did also certain female friend- 
ships' (a reference perhaps to Henderson's proclivity for 
platonic relationships with society ladies like Princess 
Olga of Yugoslavia). There might be a tendency in the 1990s 
to make assumptions about Henderson's sexual preferences 
from the fact that he was a bachelor (although unmarried 
status was common enough for diplomats in his era). The 
German diplomat von Weizsäcker described Henderson as 'a 
18 
ladies' man' and it is clear that women played an important 
role in his life. Henderson is described as 'a tall, slim, 
good looking man with fine features" and someone who 
'displayed a careless elegance, was never without a real 
carnation in his button-hole, was a sportsman, especially 
keen on blood sports, hated crowds ... j10 
Henderson was an open air man, not an intellectual. On 
his own admission he was a moderate scholar at Eton, he did 
not go to university, and he would have preferred a career 
in the Army. Indeed he passed the examination for the Royal 
Military Academy at Sandhurst, and was only prevented from 
taking it up by family pressure upon him after the near 
death of his brother Evelyn from enteric fever during the 
South African War. Henderson himself was puzzled that for 
, some unknown reason, always a mystery to me, I had been 
destined from earliest days to the Diplomatic Service' . 
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He was also a fatalist. Was the quirk of fate which 
prevented him from joining the military in 1900 the root of 
the fatalistic belief, more than thirty years later, that he 
'had been specially selected by Providence for the definite 
mission of, as I trusted, helping to preserve the peace of 
the world' in Berlin?, ' Diplomatic colleagues of long- 
standing noted a 'fey' streak in Henderson's character which 
seemed to predispose him to fatalism. Interestingly, 
Henderson himself recognised this flaw. " 
After leaving Eton in 1900 Henderson was to spend four 
years abroad improving his German, French and Italian 
together with periods in examination crammers 
in London. He 
failed the Foreign office examination in French the first 
time around, but did not regret this failure as 
it 
19 
compelled me to study that language so useful in diplomacy 
far more intensively than I would otherwise have done. '` 
In his memoirs, he relates with some pride the fact that he 
passed out first in French in the next round of examina- 
tions, although his German was considerably weaker. 
The Foreign Office which Nevile Henderson entered in 
May 1905 was a closed, intimate society, almost entirely 
male (apart from a few female typists) and socially exclu- 
sive. In those days the Foreign Office was divided from the 
Diplomatic Service, although it was normal for new entrants 
to spend a year at the Foreign Office in London before being 
posted abroad. In Henderson's own case even this short 
period was truncated, as he was posted to the Saint Peters- 
burg Embassy as early as November 1905. In his memoir water 
Under the Bridges Henderson regretted the fact that he had 
not had the opportunity to have a longer stint at the 
Foreign office (he worked there again for a brief period in 
1915). He was to be abroad continuously from 1905 to 1939, 
and was aware of the disadvantages of the separation of the 
Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service. And of the 
strange life pattern of the professional diplomat: 
A man who lives abroad all his life becomes a 
stranger in his own country and loses touch with 
his 
own people and the personalities in it ... The 
Foreign office, moreover, has its own habits, 
methods and idiosyncrasies and it is 
better that 
HM's representatives abroad should be familiar with 
them. Otherwise there is friction and misunder- 
standing and a mutual lack of sympathy which 
is 
prejudicial to the best possible results ... 
I have 
20 
always regretted that I never came back to work at 
the Foreign Office for a spell of at least a year or 
two. " 
The corollary was also true. Henderson's colleague and 
superior Orme Sargent, who was a leading critic of his 
diplomacy in Berlin, never held a major diplomatic post and 
rarely left the Foreign Office in London. 
Nevertheless, even during his short period at the 
Foreign Office in 1905, Henderson was forging some of the 
central relationships of his professional career. Most 
crucially that with Lancelot Oliphant, a future Ambassador 
to Brussels and Head of the Eastern Department, who was 
effectively Henderson's mentor and source of solace in his 
(not infrequent) moments of depression later in his career. 
Oliphant, Henderson wrote later, was a 'kindly and competent 
teacher, and I have a lifelong affection for him' . 
16 
When Henderson was sent to Saint Petersburg as an 
attache in 1905 he served under Sir Arthur Nicolson, and 
remained in Russia until 1909. Thereafter he served in 
Tokyo between 1909 and 1912, where Horace Rumbold, another 
significant influence on Henderson's own career, was 
Counsellor, before returning for a second stint at Saint 
Petersburg in 1912. During this second tour in Russia, the 
First Secretary at the Embassy was Eric Phipps, who was to 
be Henderson's predecessor at the Berlin Embassy from 1933 
to 1937. " Then, during a period of home leave in 1913, 
Henderson, rather recklessly, became involved in running 
guns into Ulster with his brother-in-law Lord Leitrim, one 
of the most fanatical of Ulstermen' 1e at the 
height of the 
1912-14 Home Rule Crisis. Henderson was often to make 
21 
references to the Ulster case for separation from the South 
in his despatches, especially in the 1938 Czechoslovak 
crisis, when the issue of Sudeten autonomy was so crucial. 
Repetitive themes were to be a feature of his career. 
From June to October 1914 Henderson was posted from 
June to October to Rome, where Sir Rennell Rodd (later Lord 
Rennell of Rodd) was Ambassador. But when war broke out in 
August 1914, he made the first of several unsuccessful 
attempts to join the British Army. This first attempt 
resulted in his being posted by an irritated Foreign office 
to the Serbian capital Nish, the seat of government after 
the Austrian occupation of Belgrade. Following the joint 
German/Austrian/Bulgar attack on unoccupied Serbia, Hender- 
son was forced to return to London, and spent his second 
brief spell working at the Foreign Office. There his 
colleagues included Orme Sargent and Hugh Knatchbull- 
Hugessen, a future Ambassador to Turkey. 19 
The next posting was to be a highly significant one for 
Henderson, for in February 1916 he was posted to Paris, 
where he served initially under Lord Bertie of Thame and 
then under Lord Derby. 2° It was important for two reasons. 
Firstly, Henderson showed his obstinate streak and personal 
bravery, while annoying Lord Bertie, by refusing a posting 
in Athens. He still had hopes of joining the Army. The 
Foreign Office was also angered by Henderson's refusal to go 
to Athens, the Diplomatic Secretary to Sir Edward Grey, Theo 
Russell, telegraphing Henderson that 'with the utmost diffi- 
culty we have succeeded in finding someone to 
take your 
place at Athens' . 
21 This sort of behaviour was later to 
obtain for Henderson something of a reputation 
for being 
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pig-headed. He relates that Lord Bertie refused to allow 
him inside his house for a year after the Athens episode. 22 
But once he had made up his mind to follow a certain course 
of action, Henderson could be mulish and obdurate. 
The second reason why Henderson's stay in Paris is 
significant is that he was First Secretary and Head of 
Chancery at the time of the 1919 Peace Conference. One 
analyst has accurately described how Henderson 'objected to 
the Versailles Treaty from its inception and had been an 
ardent advocate of revision'. " Recalling his own reaction 
to the signature of the Treaty in the Galerie des Glaces at 
Versailles, Henderson wrote that 
one sensed a feeling of deception and disillusion- 
ment and a suspicion that the great opportunity 
which all the world at that time sought so ardently, 
and had the right to anticipate, had been lost ... 
The Germans were left bitter and resentful. 24 
This was evidence of the birth of a prototype appeaser, for 
time after time in his telegrams to the Foreign Office, 
after his appointment as Ambassador in Berlin in 1937, 
Henderson was to stress the justice of German grievances 
against Versailles. While at the same time complaining 
about the 'national artificiality of states created by 
Versailles like Czechoslovakia. " 
Henderson's posting in Paris ended in November 1920, 
when he was sent as First Secretary to serve under Sir 
Horace Rumbold in Constantinople, a highly responsible post 
as it turned out, because the Ambassador was to be away for 
lengthy periods at the Lausanne Peace Conference. Henderson 
was an admirer of Sir Horace, whom he saw as 'a representa- 
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tive who would take no rot from anybody'. 26 This was a 
period of extreme tension between the new regime in Turkey 
under Kemal Ataturk, the Greeks, who had territorial aspira- 
tions in Asia minor (and especially Smyrna) and the Allied 
powers Britain, France and Italy. 
Henderson seemed to cope well. Rumbold offered quali- 
fied endorsement of his protege. Henderson, he told the 
Foreign Office, was not 'a strong man', but someone who 'by 
his own personality can influence the Ministers with whom he 
has to deal'. He was a diplomat, Rumbold opined, who used 
'jujitsu methods in diplomacy' but would in certain circum- 
stances take the line of least resistance which could, 
Rumbold conceded, sometimes pay quite well. 27 
The most important event of Henderson's period at 
Constantinople was the Chanak crisis of 1922. Chanak was 
the main defensive position of the Allied powers (Britain, 
France and Italy) outside Constantinople and it was menaced 
by the forces of Kemal Ataturk. The prospect of war alarmed 
Henderson, but he warned (as he was to do many times in 
Berlin) about the dangers of bluff if Britain was not really 
prepared to fight. 
The Turk is rattling his sabre [Henderson wrote to 
Rumbold] and I wish I could feel certain that he 
does not mean to draw it. I can hardly conceive the 
possibility of war when the two sides to the quarrel 
both want peace so badly. 2e They think [Henderson 
went on] we are bluffing nor 
is it astonishing that 
they think so for we certainly are making no pre- 
parations for war. We think on the other 
hand that 
they are bluffing. 
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But Henderson was no supine appeaser over Chanak, and 
he wanted to make British intentions absolutely clear. 
I fear trouble [he told Rumbold] unless we make it 
quite clear that we mean war if the Turk won' t 
yield. Can 't we make it clear? Send 10,000 men to 
Malta or something. It will be necessary in the 
end. 19 
Henderson was therefore prepared to use force if need be. 
He also noted the essentially pacific mood of British 
public opinion. 'The nation wants peace so badly, ' he wrote 
to Rumbold on 8 January 1923, 'that neither it nor Bonar Law 
want to take even the slight risk of war which the prepara- 
tion for war would entail. j30 Henderson was convinced that 
if Britain showed it would fight, the Turks would give in. 
But the Turks had to be taken seriously, as 'there is 
more than bluff in them ... The ominous part is the apparent 
thoroughness of Turkish preparations'. " He admired 
Rumbold's steadiness throughout the Chanak crisis, and the 
manner in which he argued his own case even when it 
disagreed with the line taken by the Cabinet. When the 
Cabinet wanted to send an ultimatum to Kemal warning of the 
perils of attacking Chanak, Rumbold supported the unwilling- 
ness of the military commander General Harington to do so. 
When Henderson was in Berlin he was frequently to query his 
own instructions in the same manner, and given his admira- 
tion for Rumbold, it is likely that he was influenced by his 
mentor's independence of mind. 
Henderson was disgusted by the way in which Britain was 
deserted by its French and Italian allies at Chanak, leaving 
a tiny British force to confront Kemal alone. He 
became 
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convinced that all alliances were 
a snare and a delusion and that it is impossible to 
count on Allies who do not speak the same language 
as oneself. I felt this very strongly when I went 
to Berlin in 1937. " 
His anti-French prejudice in particular grew stronger, based 
as it was on his experience at the Paris Embassy during the 
Paris Peace Conference. He wrote to Oliphant in November 
1922, at the height of the Chanak crisis wishing 'we could 
get rid of Poincare [the French Prime Minister who had a 
notoriously poor relationship with the British Foreign 
Secretary Lord Curzon] ." Henderson was extremely suspi- 
cious of the influence of the press in international 
relations. He followed up his attack on Poincare with an 
attack on the French press, which he believed to be 'in the 
grip of the international financier or Jew who only cares 
for French financial interests and nothing else'. 
The Turkish press fared no better. On 13 February 
1924, Henderson sent an article from Constantinople to 
Oliphant at the Foreign Office which he said was 
a typical example of the sort of trash, incorrect in 
nearly all the facts which Turkish press perpe- 
tuates. The general idea is however one which is 
commonly held by those misguided barbarians. " 
To judge from these extracts, Henderson would appear to 
have been xenophobic in his attitude towards both the French 
and the Turks. He was certainly critical of the Turks in 
his despatches in the manner of his Ambassador (who was also 
known to refer to the French as 'cads and apes'). But this 
impression would be misleading, as Henderson's colleague, 
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Andrew Ryan, noted. Writing about Henderson's period as 
Acting High Commissioner during Rumbold's absence at the 
Lausanne Conference (November 1922 to July 1923), Ryan 
observed that 
the impression prevailed in Turkish circles that 
leading British people concerned in their affairs 
might be divided into two anti-Turkish Rs, Rumbold 
and Ryan, and two pro-Turkish Hs, Harington and 
Henderson. This was not wholly without foundation, 
but the difference was one of general outlook and 
approach to the question under discussion at the 
Conference . 
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In Constantinople, as in Berlin, Henderson was prone to be 
over-sympathetic to the government to which he was 
accredited. But in Constantinople Ryan did not believe that 
this distorted Henderson's judgement, and Rumbold was 
impressed by his work. In a crisis Henderson was quite 
prepared to put considerable diplomatic pressure on the 
Turks, as the record shows. 
Henderson learnt much from Rumbold about crisis- 
management during the Chanak crisis. After the successful 
resolution of the problem by diplomacy, Rumbold wrote to 
Henderson on 2 January 1923 about the lessons which could be 
absorbed. He had seen over and over again, he told Hender- 
son, how situations arise 'from which one would think that 
there was no escape except a conflict, and yet in the end a 
formula has been found which averts the impending catas- 
trophe'. 36 Henderson was to seek just such a formula in his 
desperate struggle to preserve peace in the Czech crisis of 
1938 and the Polish crisis of 1939. Indeed it is possible 
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that Henderson, whose initial reaction to Turkish behaviour 
was to want 10,000 men to be sent to Malta, became a convert 
to Rumbold's more emollient approach as a result of the 
Chanak crisis. He certainly admired the way in which 
Rumbold kept his head, while the Cabinet in London (Curzon 
apart) were losing theirs. He would have learnt too, about 
the dangers of sabre-rattling when the military means to 
back up a policy of armed intervention were not available. 
Chanak would also have taught Henderson a valuable 
lesson about the reliability of the Empire. Only New 
Zealand of Britain's white dominions was willing to send 
troops to defend Chanak in 1922, a situation which was to be 
almost exactly duplicated in September 1938. Sixteen years 
later Australia, Canada and South Africa were to find the 
Czech Sudetenland no more attractive a cause than the 
Straits in 1922. 
Here then was the gist of Henderson's later approach in 
Germany. Be prepared to negotiate with your opponent, 
however brutish and unpleasant, but avoid threats and bluff 
that could not be backed up with force. Henderson followed 
this line with unwavering consistency from Chanak to Danzig. 
Arguably there would have been less surprise in the Foreign 
Office about his behaviour in Berlin in 1937, if more 
serious attention had been devoted to his earlier career. 
Henderson the rebel, who often queried his Foreign 
Office instructions and complained about his postings, was 
clearly in evidence in Turkey. The issue of Mosul, which 
remained in British hands after the 1923 Lausanne 
Conference 
against Turkish protests, was an especially thorny one, and 
in July 1924 Henderson wrote to Oliphant worried lest 
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the FO may think I am always querying their instruc- 
tions... respecting Mosul. But I do not want to 
leave any doubt in a matter in which it is of the 
utmost importance that we should be absolutely frank 
and explicit. " 
Henderson also admitted to what his critics regarded as a 
besetting sin, a tendency to exceed his brief when talking 
to representatives of the host government. 'I said 
privately, ' he informed Oliphant, as much as I could - 
perhaps more than I should. '" Three weeks later, on 
4 August, Henderson was complaining to Oliphant about 
confusing instructions from the Foreign Office about a 
frontier dispute between Britain's mandate Iraq and Turkey. 
He had no desire to be fractious', Henderson informed his 
old mentor 'though I felt so last Saturday'. Oliphant 
replied tactfully the next day that 'your views are always 
welcome'. Others would not be so tolerant in the 1930s. 39 
It is therefore possible to see Henderson as something 
of a stormy petrel in Foreign Office ranks: argumentative, 
indiscreet and on occasion self-righteous. But colleagues 
appreciated his good qualities. Horace Rumbold clearly had 
considerable faith in Henderson's abilities when he wrote to 
Oliphant on 5 March 1923 observing that 'there is very 
little danger of trouble here and Henderson could very well 
look after the show during the three or four weeks during 
which the discussions are likely to last' [a reference to 
the Lausanne Conference] . 
40 And Andrew Ryan was to write of 
Henderson in his memoirs 'He was a capable diplomat ... We 
were very good friends, though I think he leaned more to the 
Turkish cause than either Rumbold or myself. 141 These 
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comments, while calling into question the legend that 
Henderson was a fractious colleague, do seem to provide 
evidence for the accusation that Henderson was inclined to 
'go native' in post, and forget his own injunction that a 
diplomat should 'faithfully ... interpret the views of his 
own Government to the Government to which he is accredi- 
ted'. 'ý It is worth noting that Ryan, who had come to know 
Henderson well in Constantinople, added a caveat, 'he hardly 
seemed cast for the important role he played in Berlin on 
the eve of war'. " Yet Lord Derby, Henderson's former 
Ambassador in Paris, wrote to him in a personal letter in 
1922 about the 'good opinion expressed by my fellow-members 
in the Cabinet about your handling of all the difficult 
questions with which you have to deal in Constantinople'. °` 
Henderson, then, was deemed to be a capable career diplomat, 
and was chosen as Minister Plenipotentiary in Cairo under 
the High Commissioner Lord Allenby, when Sir Lee Stack, the 
Sirdar, was assassinated in the streets of Cairo in 1924.45 
Henderson was carefully briefed prior to his departure 
by the Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, and the then 
Permanent Under-Secretary Sir Eyre Crowe, for what was a 
sensitive and difficult post. The parting shot from Walford 
Selby, a friend of the Henderson family, and Chamberlain's 
Private Secretary, was 'For goodness' sake do not lose your 
temper with Allenby' (Allenby was the conqueror of the Turks 
in Palestine and suspicious of Henderson, whom he thought 
the Foreign Office had sent out to undermine his authority 
as High Commissioner) . 
'6 But Henderson was able to cope 
well enough with 'the Bull'. 
On his own admission it was the complexities of 
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Egyptian politics which he found most daunting; for the 
country, after being virtually a colony between 1914 and 
1918, had reverted to its quasi-independent status after- 
wards. Britain was granted a special role in the Nile 
Valley, and Egypt was to avoid an anti-British stance in its 
foreign policy but otherwise the country was supposedly 
independent under King Fuad. The agreement of 1922 had 
however left the exact relationship between Britain and 
Egypt somewhat unclear, and this was resented by Egyptian 
nationalists like Zagloul Pasha who regarded Egypt's 
position as humiliating. The constitutional monarchy was 
supported by the Conservative Party led by politicians such 
as Ziwar Pasha and the Liberals led by Sidky. 
Henderson saw his task as being the achievement of an 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty which would put relations on a proper 
basis. But the replacement of Allenby as High Commissioner 
by Lord Lloyd, Henderson's old Eton school-friend, put this 
objective in jeopardy. Henderson acknowledges this fact in 
a key passage of Water Under the Bridges. Lloyd's lifetime 
ambition had been to become Viceroy of India, and in Hender- 
son's view he was too inflexible for the post of High 
Commissioner in Egypt. 
All the time we were in Egypt together [Henderson 
wrote] we remained personal friends, but politically 
we were poles apart, and in the end he short- 
circuited me and worked entirely through the First 
Secretary Wiggin. Nor could I, nor did I take 
exception, somewhat galling though it might 
be, for 
I would have done the same myself ... He 
[Lloyd] 
came out to Cairo with the definite 
instruction of 
31 
HM Government to endeavour to conclude a bi-lateral 
agreement and alliance with Egypt. That entailed 
appeasement and concession and both were anathema to 
George Lloyd. " 
Henderson claimed to have been publicly loyal to Lloyd 
despite their differences, but this claim is disputed by 
Lloyd's biographer, Charmley. He notes that Henderson and 
Lloyd had kept up 'a detailed correspondence' about Egypt 
between 1918 and 1925 but accuses Henderson of sniping at 
Lloyd behind his back with Foreign Office officials. "' 
There is some substance in this charge. On 31 July 1926 
Henderson wrote to his old friend Walford Selby, 
Entre nous I do not see eye to eye on many things 
with Lloyd. What I find hardest is to do good work 
and loyal service with a man who is set on a policy 
which though it may promise kudos for a while and 
the praise of the Daily Mail and the Diehards, I 
regard as contrary to our ultimate advantage. I 
mean going back on the Milner Report and the 1922 
declaration (the Milner Report of 1920 advocated the 
regulation of Anglo-Egyptian affairs by means of a 
treaty] ." 
Superficially all was well between the two men. 
Henderson wrote on 21 May 1925 of his pleasure at having 
Lloyd as his chief and promising to 'help in any way I can 
if you will let me know your views'. He warned Lloyd (in 
familiar style) against the Egyptians shortly afterwards. 
'Among Egyptians 98% are influenced solely by personal 
interest. Convictions are "rarae ayes"! ' and lectured him 
about diplomatic virtues, saying that the 'one indispensable 
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quality of a diplomat is that they should be gentlemen'. 
was glad that Lloyd was interested in duck-shooting, and 
characteristically wanted the High Commissioner to come to 
Egypt in a warship (presumably to overawe the natives). So 
But underneath all this lay a very serious difference of 
opinion on Britain's imperial role, Lloyd's die-hardism 
(Churchill was a friend and supporter) versus Henderson's 
He 
belief that concessions to the Egyptians were essential, if 
Britain was to safeguard the Suez Canal and her regional 
security . S1 
John Charmley accuses Henderson of siding with the 
Foreign Office against his superior. Lloyd's fears about 
the Foreign Office did not, he argues, 'extend to Henderson, 
the man he left in charge of the residency' on visits to 
London, who let him down. " Yet, despite Henderson's 
alleged treachery, Lloyd was to write of him in the warmest 
terms to Austen Chamberlain on 6 May 1928, as his term as 
High Commissioner came to an end. Lloyd referred to the 
gratitude which I feel I owe to him for all the loyal and 
efficient help he has given me since I have been here'. 53 
Lloyd would have wished Henderson to be awarded a KCMG, but 
knew that in Foreign Office career terms this would have 
been premature. But Chamberlain agreed with his high regard 
for Henderson writing in a personal letter on 15 May, 
Your tribute to Nevile Henderson has given me much 
pleasure. You are right in believing that I think 
highly of him and your testimony to his loyalty and 
usefulness is therefore very welcome... I was just 
sitting down to write to you when I heard that he 
himself was in the Private Secretary's room 
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(Henderson was en route to Paris as Counsellor]. I 
had the pleasure, therefore, of telling him of your 
praise. On his side he spoke most warmly of you, 
and not only with the loyalty which is characteris- 
tic of him, but with a real regard for you and a 
quick appreciation of the inevitable difficulties of 
the High Commissioner's position. " 
Two more striking endorsements of Henderson's abilities 
would be difficult to imagine. 
It is true that later in his career Lord Lloyd did 
exhibit some bitterness towards Henderson in a talk with a 
member of the anti-Nazi German resistance in the summer of 
1939. Fabian von Schlabrendorf was to write later of how 
Lloyd 'made some scathing remarks about Henderson's abili- 
ties and qualifications'. " By 1939 however, Lloyd had been 
out of public office for a decade, because his intransigence 
on Egypt meant that the 1929 Labour Government refused to 
employ him, and their view was endorsed by the Conservative 
leader Stanley Baldwin. 
Henderson's conflict with George Lloyd shows him in an 
unusual light as the Foreign Office loyalist who supported 
British policy when the die-hard Lloyd would not, in 
contrast with his image as the pariah of the late 1930s. 
Nevertheless by the end of his tour in Egypt Henderson 
was an exhausted, disillusioned man. He had failed to get 
the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty he had fought for, and wrote in 
dispirited fashion to his friend Walford Selby, 
Do send me a line Walford, to tell me if my plan of 
getting up to Paris early in May is OK and if I can 
go ahead here accordingly. I am feeling very 
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depressed so forgive this disjointed scrawls` 
Throughout his career Henderson was to be prey to black 
moods of despondency, although in 1927/8 he was also con- 
cerned about the poor health of his mother who was in her 
seventy-eighth year, and had been the major influence in his 
life. This concern may have been behind the decision to 
return to Paris a second time, which he subsequently recog- 
nised to have been a mistake, as he was only paid at 
Counsellor grade and could have asked for an independent 
legat ion .' 
In Egypt, as in Turkey, Henderson had been unorthodox. 
One of his last duties in Egypt had been to attend the 
funeral of Zagloul Pasha, although he had not cleared this 
action with the Foreign Office first. 5° Privately Henderson 
had been critical of Zagloul's exile to Gibraltar and the 
Andaman Islands by the British Government. He was always 
seeking a modus vivendi which would allow moderation to 
triumph (he persisted in his search for 'moderates' even in 
Nazi Germany). Thus in writing to a Foreign Office 
colleague Mark Patrick on 24 October 1927 (a letter copied 
to Lloyd), Henderson stated his view that 
Egypt is becoming more clearly divided into two 
camps, moderates and extremists. The Wafd [The 
Nationalists] is tending towards a split into a 
moderate section which will include its Old Liberal 
adherents and an extreme party. 59 
Henderson was a convinced supporter of moderation and con- 
stitutional government. But he had no intellectual problem 
with authoritarian rule as such. Strong government was 
necessary at times, just as was strong diplomacy 
(what 
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Henderson liked to call the 'velvet glove on the iron 
hand') 
. 
`o 
Henderson's own verdict on his stay in Egypt showed 
that same strain of fatalism that future colleagues, like 
Ivone Kirkpatrick, were to notice in Berlin. Henderson 
expressed his disappointment as 'not getting the Treaty 
through ... It will be a tragedy. Kismet'. 61 
Henderson's stay in Paris, which he had lobbied for as 
a posting, was to be brief. " It coincided with the signing 
of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, whereby states renounced 
'war as an instrument of policy', but Henderson was resolu- 
tely sceptical. 'What a mockery! ' he wrote in his memoirs. 
'I can well recall thinking at the time how utterly 
dishonest and unfair it was to delude the British public by 
eyewash of that kind'. " This comment, albeit after the 
event, reflected Henderson's long-standing belief in 
nationalism rather than internationalism. 
A year after his arrival in Paris, Henderson was 
'shocked and horrified' to be told by the Foreign Office 
that he was to be posted to Belgrade as Minister. " As he 
subsequently admitted, Henderson made every effort to avoid 
being sent to Yugoslavia, but to no avail. He arrived in 
Belgrade in December 1929 although he kept on his Paris 
flat. 
Belgrade was outside the inner circle of desirable 
postings like Paris, Berlin or Washington, and as a senior 
diplomat Henderson would have expected better. " But he was 
determined to make a success of his new posting. 66 
Henderson's key relationship in Yugoslavia was with 
King Alexander, whose personal dictatorship (1929-34) 
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coincided with his tenure of the Belgrade Embassy. Even 
Henderson's strongest critic Vansittart had to admit in his 
memoirs that 'Nevile Henderson, our Minister in Belgrade, 
made such a hit with the dictator by his skill in shooting 
that he was ultimately picked for Berlin'. 67 But he did 
Henderson less than justice, for he was able to forge a very 
close relationship with the King which was unusual for a 
foreign ambassador. Some found the relationship verging on 
the obsessive, and Henderson wrote later (following the 
assassination of King Alexander in 1934), 'I felt more 
emotion at King Alexander's funeral than I had felt at any 
other except my mother's. j6° At the time Henderson wrote to 
a Foreign Office colleague, 
My sixth winter in the Belgrade trenches is the 
worst of all. The zest has gone out of it with King 
Alexander gone. It interested me enormously to play 
Stockmar to his Albert and that made all the 
difference . 
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It was in Yugoslavia therefore, that Henderson showed 
the strongest evidence of a tendency to hero-worship which 
was replicated in Germany in his relationship with Göring. " 
And his close relationship with, and sympathy for, King 
Alexander made him notoriously and tenaciously pro- 
Yugoslav. " Thus infringing his own dictum about faithfully 
representing his own country's views and those of the host 
country. "' 
This partiality had some striking consequences. 
Previously Henderson had complained about the French and 
Turkish press, now he began to complain about the British 
press for not being pro-Yugoslav enough (a characteristic 
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repeated in Berlin). " His tendency to be indiscreet, in 
this instance in the Yugoslav cause against the Italians 
(who were in dispute with Yugoslavia over Trieste and 
Fiume), was marked enough to earn rebukes from Vansittart. 
The most celebrated example of indiscretion came in January 
1935 when Vansittart was disturbed by a secret letter which 
Henderson had written to King Alexander's successor, the 
Regent Prince Paul, appearing to support Yugoslavia's 
hostile attitude to Italy (Henderson sent a copy of this 
letter to the Foreign Office). Henderson had, Vansittart 
thought, given Prince Paul the impression that the British 
Government agreed that the Italians had followed a disrup- 
tive policy towards Yugoslavia, and a protectionist policy 
towards neighbouring Albania. 'Are we convinced, ' 
Vansittart went on, of this, and do we wish Prince Paul to 
think that we are convinced of it? ' Henderson had 
complained about Italy's backing for separatist Croatian 
terrorists, but Vansittart believed Mussolini would expel 
any on his territory. 
Whatever our private convictions [Vansittart wrote 
to Henderson] was it really wise to suggest even by 
implication to Prince Paul that His Majesty's 
Government share the views which he presumably holds 
himself about the inherent mischievousness of 
Italian policy? " 
Characteristically, Henderson tried at first to defend 
his action replying, 'My dear Van, I am sorry if you think I 
went further than I was entitled to do in writing to 
Prince 
Paul. ' Henderson claimed, however, that he had not 
distorted British views and that if he had talked about 
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Italy's disruptive policy vis ä vis Yugoslavia or 
her protectionist policy vis A vis Albania, it is 
the Yugoslav point of view that I am referring to; 
not mine and still less that of His Majesty's 
Government. It distresses me [Henderson went on] 
that you, as I gather you do, should even imagine 
that I take any other line with the Yugoslavs ... He 
[Prince Paul] knows that His Majesty's Government 
does not hold these views from what I told him of 
yours and the Secretary of State's opinions. " 
This despatch prefigures the defence Henderson was to offer 
for his diplomacy in Berlin, when criticised by the Foreign 
Office for being unduly partial towards the Germans. 
But he remained unrepentant in a letter to his 
colleague Eric Phipps in Berlin, complaining that he could 
not 'get the Foreign Office to appreciate that Italy must be 
persuaded to make the first step, and make it soon, towards 
Yugoslavia'. ' This was a typical response. 
Vansittart had occasion to reprimand the errant 
Minister again on 13 February 1935, when Henderson had 
written in a tart manner to Sir Edward Boyle of the Treasury 
about the latter's efforts to counter IMRO (a Macedonian 
terrorist organisation) activities around Yugoslavia's 
frontiers. Henderson's language had been strong and 
Vansittart felt obliged, after looking at the papers, to 
warn Henderson as an old friend, as an admirer, and as a 
sharer of many of your views'. In this instance Henderson 
accepted the rebuke and wrote back to Vansittart penitently 
'Peccavi. And the more readily because I had fully recog- 
nised my asperities myself. ' Vansittart was appreciative in 
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his reply and went out of his way to reassure Henderson 
about the value of his services. 
You know (he wrote] that I was only prompted to 
write, as I should always be prompted to write to 
you, as a friend. You have done splendidly in 
Belgrade and made a great name for yourself, but of 
course it has been done at great expense to 
yourself. 
Vansittart agreed with Henderson that it was time he 
had a new posting because as much and more than is fair has 
already been demanded of you and fully paid. And now it is 
time to have some of your life in the sun and in the First 
Eleven' ." The contrast between this effusive tribute and 
Vansittart's later castigation of Henderson's work could not 
be sharper, and seemingly calls his judgement into question. 
Yet he was far from being alone in the 1930s. Oliphant was 
to tell Henderson that his record in Yugoslavia had been 
'quite excellent' and that he hoped to see him 'in one of 
the very biggest posts'. " And one of Henderson's political 
masters, Hugh Dalton, as Under-Secretary of State at the 
Foreign Office, was equally complimentary. His diary entry 
for 12 December 1930 read 
Talk with Nevile Henderson, our Minister in 
Belgrade. Very pro-Yugoslav. Uncle [Arthur Hender- 
son, the Foreign Secretary] thinks he has more 
vitality than most of our ministers abroad. I 
agree. I also think he has more intelligence. 79 
These high opinions of Henderson's work were to be particu- 
larly relevant in 1937, when the question of sending him to 
Berlin arose. The golden words from Vansittart demonstrate 
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very clearly that Henderson was held in high regard in the 
Foreign Office, and offer a significant insight into why he 
was in the running for a major post in 1937.80 They also 
demonstrate that the two men had a close, friendly relation- 
ship which was severed by Henderson's performance in Berlin 
between 1937 and 1939 and Vansittart's reaction to it, which 
was fiercely critical. 
Familiar patterns reappear during Henderson's period of 
service in Belgrade. Henderson was critical of French 
policy in Yugoslavia, and wanted Britain to be more pro- 
active both in commercial and military terms. He was 
alarmed in May 1935 when the French secured an order for 
their aircraft, and complained to O'Malley in the Foreign 
Office, 'I quote you this as an instance of habitual unfair 
competition here on the part of the French. It only makes 
me still more anxious that our Air Ministry should raise no 
difficulties .j 
01 
Henderson's anti-French bias resulted in lapses into 
racial stereotyping as well. Although he was sure that the 
French wanted 'Italy and Yugoslavia to make friends [Yugo- 
slavia was after all a member of the pro-French Little 
Entente] the female side of the French mind can never resist 
making mischief between them. j' 
Henderson retained his sympathy for German grievances, 
and his conviction that they must be addressed within the 
context of a substantial revision of the Versailles Settle- 
ment. He did in fact warn the Foreign Office against the 
dangers of German economic penetration of the Balkans, but 
also believed that to a degree German hegemony over the 
region was both natural and inevitable. 
" He was also con- 
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vinced that both Austria and Czechoslovakia were unviable, 
and of the need for both naval and air pacts with Germany. 
And the political realism on which Henderson prided himself 
also came into play. 'It is a question of hard facts, ' 
Henderson wrote to Orme Sargent, 'which have got to be faced 
and what is practical. '°' 
These points were reiterated in a further letter to 
Vansittart on 24 June 1935. 
How far Czechoslovakia is really a viable State as 
it is at present constituted is a very hard question 
to answer, though I fancy Joseph Addison [the 
British Minister in Prague 1930-6] would give you a 
definite expression of opinion. And it is the same 
with Austria. Nazism is maybe a passing phenomenon 
but Deutschtum is not (q. v. the Saar). The 
Yugoslavs do not blink at the fact that nearly 70 
million Germans in Central Europe are an expansio- 
nist force and they have made up their minds that no 
dam will permanently contain it. " 
There was a degree of bias present in Henderson's thinking 
about Central Europe. Realism was applied in Germany's 
favour to accommodate her territorial revisionism, but 
Henderson fully supported Yugoslavia's attempts to defend 
herself against aggressive Italian nationalism and wanted 
the Foreign Office to be active on the Yugoslav side. Thus 
the Italians should make concessions to Yugoslavia, but the 
Austrians and Czechs should make concessions to Germany. In 
Yugoslavia, as in Berlin, Henderson was to be accused of 
undue indulgence of his hosts' views and prejudices. No one 
in the Foreign Office could pretend however, that 
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Henderson's views on policy towards Germany and Central 
Europe were not known. They were there in his letters and 
despatches for all to see. As was his tendency to place too 
much faith in the importance of friendships with key foreign 
leaders, which sometimes gave him an inflated view of his 
own importance. Writing just before his death in 1942 
Henderson observed that in 1939 on his return from Berlin, 
he had volunteered to return to Belgrade as minister. The 
Foreign Office had turned him down, a decision which Hender- 
son deplored as 'however competent the British minister, he 
could never have exercised the same influence as I could 
have done'.  
In the winter of 1934-5, following the assassination of 
King Alexander in October 1934, Henderson's spirits were at 
a low ebb. He was offered a posting to Lisbon and seemed to 
be enthusiastic, writing to a colleague about his difficult 
experiences in Yugoslavia, 'It is just what I wanted after 
all these years sitting on a volcano. Please God it does 
not erupt before I am safely away'. " Subsequently he had 
second thoughts and asked the Foreign Office if he could 
stay on in Belgrade while the situation in Yugoslavia 
remained unsettled. The Department then offered Henderson 
the Embassy in Buenos Aires instead. 
This was a devastating blow. Buenos Aires was 
certainly not 'in the First Eleven', to use Vansittart's 
phrase, and Henderson regarded it as a demotion. He poured 
out his distress to Lancelot Oliphant in a personal letter, 
who replied by saying that he was 
only more than grieved that your recent selection 
hurts so much ... Try to cheer up, old 
man. I hope 
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I live to see you in of the very biggest posts. 
Your merit is really appreciated. 
Henderson's bitter disappointment is glossed over in his 
memoir with just a reference to the fact that he was 
'exceedingly loath to leave Europe'. '" 
Henderson's time in Argentina was largely uneventful. 
He met Franklin Roosevelt when the US President visited 
Argentina, and enjoyed the company of the large Scots 
community, but as he noted the post was largely an economic 
one. @9 
One area of British interest in which Henderson was 
involved during his spell in Buenos Aires was the long- 
standing Anglo-Argentinean dispute over the Falkland 
Islands. Henderson was stoutly patriotic on the issue in 
1935. He wrote to Craigie in the Foreign Office on 
12 December observing that for one reason or another 
incomprehensible to me, British lawyers consider our legal 
title weak'. He wondered whether a commercial treaty 
between Britain and Argentina could recognise the 
legal sovereignty of Argentina ... it 
is the shadow 
which appeals to Argentine sentiment and which might 
serve a considerable purpose in overcoming final 
difficulties and one which it might be worth 
exploring. 
As ever, Henderson favoured the emollient approach, which 
recognised the aspirations of his host country. But the 
Falklands dispute remained unsettled. 9° 
Then in January 1937 came the surprising news that 
Henderson had been selected by the Foreign Office to replace 
Eric Phipps in the Berlin Embassy. 91 When this news came 
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through, Nevile Henderson was fifty-five, in post in some- 
thing of a diplomatic backwater, and on the face of it 
destined to serve out the rest of his diplomatic career on 
the periphery of the great events which were taking place in 
Europe. He was a hard-working, competent diplomat with a 
flair for personal friendship. But he was also, as his 
record showed, prone to the sin of identifying himself too 
closely with the countries to which he had been accredited, 
and cutting diplomatic corners when it suited him. 
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Nevile Henderson's appointment to the Berlin Embassy 
came as a surprise. He had, after all, seemingly been cast 
out of the 'charmed European Inner Circle' of the Foreign 
Office and been 'moved very much to the periphery in Buenos 
Aires'. ' At the time he recorded his reaction in his 
memoirs, recognising 'a sense of my own inadequacy for what 
was obviously the most difficult and most important post in 
the whole of the diplomatic service'. Henderson also 
believed that he had been 'specially selected by Providence 
for the definite mission of, as I trusted, helping to 
preserve the peace of the world' .2 In this messianic spirit 
Henderson came back to Britain, reading Hitler's Mein Kampf 
in its original German on the way home. While awaiting his 
transfer to Berlin, Henderson had an interview with Neville 
Chamberlain the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Prime 
Minister designate, who 
outlined to me his views on general policy towards 
Germany, and I think I may honestly say that to the 
last and bitter end I followed the general line 
which he set me, all the more easily and faithfully 
since it corresponded so closely with my private 
conception of the service which I could best render 
in Germany to my own country. ' 
There has been a degree of controversy about exactly 
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what Chamberlain said to Henderson in this interview in 
April 1937, and the gloss that Henderson subsequently put on 
the future premier's remarks. According to one authority, 
Henderson did not think of 'his mission as urgent' until 
Chamberlain talked to him in October. ' This interpretation 
rather plays down the importance of the April interview to 
which Henderson refers in his memoirs. Yet according to the 
British Foreign Policy Document series, 'Henderson worked 
out for himself' the line he would follow in Berlin. The 
editors note that Henderson said nothing in Failure of A 
Mission about a Foreign Office briefing prior to his depar- 
ture, or indeed what the Foreign Office thought about the 
current state of Anglo-German relations. Henderson did, 
though, claim to have told the Foreign Secretary Anthony 
Eden that 'he would probably incur the appellation of pro- 
German'. ' 
T. P. Conwell Evans, the maverick English professor who 
taught at Königsberg University, and had links with the 
Berlin Embassy, subsequently claimed however, that Henderson 
had offered him an alternative explanation for his line. 
This was that it was based on 'instructions constantly 
received from Downing Street and not on the views of the 
Permanent Head of the Foreign Office'. ` This explanation is 
in line with the account given in Henderson's memoirs. His 
task was to improve Anglo-German relations, which had 
allegedly suffered at the hands of his predecessor, Sir Eric 
Phipps. In carrying it out Henderson saw himself as the 
personal envoy of the Prime minister. 
Dissatisfaction with Phipps's performance was at the 
root of the decision to move Henderson to Berlin. A 
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whispering campaign was initiated against Phipps, who was 
judged to be too anti-Nazi in his approach. Vansittart was 
sufficiently concerned about the attacks to write to 
Baldwin's Private Secretary on 31 March 1936, although 
Phipps was not actually moved for another year. Eden 
assured Baldwin that the rumours about Phipps' excessive 
anti-Nazism were untrue, but that members of the Diplomatic 
Service (and he referred especially to the Berlin posting) 
'should be posted to best advantage'. ' In December 1936, 
Baldwin's 'eminence grise', Tom Jones had also advised the 
Prime Minister that if it is our policy to get alongside 
Germany, then the sooner Phipps is transferred the better'. B 
Phipps had to go, but why was Henderson selected as his 
successor? 
Part of the explanation is provided by the analysis in 
the previous chapter. Henderson was well thought of by 
Vansittart, who valued his qualities. So did Austen 
Chamberlain, Lord Derby, Horace Rumbold and Lancelot 
Oliphant. Yet being posted to Buenos Aires had represented, 
on the face of it, a demotion. 
In his own memoir The Mist Procession (which tantali- 
singly ends at the close of the year 1936) Vansittart 
remarked acidly: 
It was hard to find a corner of the earth sensibly 
governed. In this one [Yugoslavia] Nevile Hender- 
son, our Minister in Belgrade, made such a hit with 
the dictator by his skill in shooting that he was 
ultimately picked for Berlin. 9 
This comment is strikingly similar to a remark made by 
Stanley Baldwin to Thomas Jones on 15 February 1937 about 
.. ý® 
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why Henderson had been appointed. Jones asked Baldwin 'Why 
did you appoint Henderson to succeed Phipps at Berlin? Why 
not Willingdon? ' Baldwin replied that he had gone into the 
matter with Eden and Vansittart and they could find no one 
in the Service better than Henderson, 'who was a man and 
good shot' . 
10 Baldwin, who was notorious for his indif- 
ference to foreign affairs, could be excused for making such 
a remark. Vansittart plainly could not. 
Eden could at least put forward the excuse that he had 
not met Henderson prior to his appointment. " But Vansit- 
tart knew his man, and may have been influenced by a desire 
to avoid a political appointment of the sort Tom Jones was 
advocating (apart from Willingdon, a former Viceroy of 
India, he had also thought of Lord Halifax). When Henderson 
made contentious comments about Anglo-German relations at 
Windsor Castle after his appointment, Eden's Private 
Secretary, Oliver Harvey, observed that his new post 
seems quite to have gone to his head ... I hope we 
are not sending another Ribbentrop to Berlin. 
Nevile Henderson may steady down when he sees what 
he is up against, and there really is not anybody 
else to send. " 
The suggestion that there was 'not anybody else to 
send' does not stand up to serious examination. Eden 
admitted in his memoirs that: 'The most fancied alterna- 
tives were Sir Miles Lampson and Sir Percy Loraine, and I 
deeply regret that I did not choose either of them. 113 But 
the reason that Henderson was chosen rather than Lampson or 
Loraine (or indeed Willingdon, Halifax and a fifth possibi- 
lity, Sir Ronald Lindsay) was the fault of Vansittart, who 
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heavily influenced the appointment. " 
Throughout the latter half of 1936', his biographer 
writes, Sir Percy Loraine 'had been tantalised by the many 
rumours that he was to be assigned either to Berlin or to 
Paris, a change-over in both capitals being known to be 
imminent'. Loraine was then 'stunned and disheartened' in 
January 1937 to be told by Eden that the Foreign Office 
wanted him to stay in his existing post in Ankara. " 
Lampson in Cairo, who harboured similar hopes about Berlin, 
was also kept in post by Eden and Vansittart. " 
In retrospect it does seem astonishing, as one analyst 
has written: 
that a diplomat with such a long and illustrious 
career as Vansittart (he joined the diplomatic 
service in 1903 and had served as head of the FO 
since 1930) should have been responsible for having 
chosen as the envoy to the most sensitive and 
difficult and potentially dangerous post abroad a 
man whom he and most of the important figures in the 
Foreign Office shortly came to consider a 
disaster . 
17 
Eden wrote later that no one foresaw the opinions Henderson 
was to hold' . 
1' 
The historical record does not support such a view, 
particularly in the light of Vansittart's reference (cited 
in the last chapter) about Henderson's fitness for the 
Diplomatic 'First Eleven', and the golden opinions obtained 
from others. In the nineteen fifties Vansittart got into a 
bitter dispute with the former British minister in Vienna, 
Sir Walford Selby, about references in Selby's memoirs which 
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suggested that Vansittart, like Henderson, had effectively 
supported the Anschluss in 1938; but in his anger the 
former Permanent Under-Secretary also took a sideswipe at 
Henderson's appointment. writing to the historian Robert 
Blake (now Lord Blake), Vansittart wrote: 
As to Nevile Henderson himself, he was not my pre- 
ference. My first choice was Sir Percy Loraine but 
there was a consensus the other way, particularly of 
course with Mr Chamberlain, so that Henderson got 
the post. We were always at loggerheads. 19 
This is a curious statement by any standards. Eden, as 
indicated above, had never met Henderson, so he was bound to 
be swayed by the opinion of such an experienced diplomat as 
Vansittart. And Henderson received the Foreign Office 
letter offering him the Berlin post in January 1937, five 
months before Neville Chamberlain became Prime Minister. 
Chamberlain, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, could not 
have been involved in Henderson's appointment. Vansittart's 
comments in his memoirs seem to suggest that Henderson was 
appointed to carry out Chamberlain's policy of appeasement 
with Germany, but there is no evidence to support such an 
assertion. 
Vansittart's post-war feud with Selby is of particular 
interest, because Selby knew Henderson well, and Henderson 
had been a frequent visitor to the Vienna embassy while he 
was posted to Belgrade between 1929 and 1935. According to 
Selby, Henderson made no secret of his sympathy for German 
aspirations. Selby claimed to have been 'staggered' when 
Henderson was sent to Berlin. 20 
Various other suggestions have been put forward to 
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explain Henderson's appointment. One is the 'Buggins turn' 
argument, as Henderson had been in the Diplomatic Service 
since 1905 and was in line for a major post (although the 
posting to remote Buenos Aires had been a disconcerting 
career blip for him). But more convincing is the argument 
that Henderson had shown himself to be successful at getting 
on with dictators like King Alexander, and that this 
capacity clinched his appointment. 
Vansittart has been accused of inflating the importance 
of personal relationships in diplomacy, and may have 
believed that a strong character like Henderson would be at 
an advantage in dealing with men like Hitler and Göring. " 
He may also have feared a political appointee being sent to 
Berlin to push the appeasement policy. Henderson was at 
least a career diplomat and one whom Vansittart, for all his 
later declarations of detestation, knew well. There is 
plenty of evidence to show that Vansittart was well aware, 
throughenderson's service in Yugoslavia and before, of his 
strengths and foibles. His behaviour in Berlin therefore 
should not have been an entire surprise to Vansittart, even 
if it was a shock for Eden. 
Vansittart was of course himself, a possible choice to 
replace his brother-in-law Phipps in the Berlin embassy. " 
But he used his wife's ill-health as an excuse to resist 
Eden's plan to send him to Paris, so that Phipps was 
ultimately sent to Paris, and Henderson to Berlin. 
Apart from his appreciation of Henderson's good 
qualities, and promise of a key post in 1935 (cited in the 
previous chapter), Vansittart may have had another motive 
for the promotion. For at the time of the Abyssinian crisis 
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of 1935-6 and the ill-fated Hoare-Laval Pact, which would 
have conceded much of Abyssinia to Mussolini, Henderson had 
been conspicuously loyal to the plan's author Vansittart. 
Deploring the way Vansittart was under attack for his role 
in formulating the plan, Henderson wrote from Buenos Aires 
in January 1936 to support Foreign office policy. 'War to 
prevent war, ' Henderson told Vansittart, 'is a reductio ad 
absurdum', and Britain should certainly not risk all-out war 
in support of Abyssinia. ' Vansittart may well have wished 
to reward such loyalty by granting Henderson a senior post. 
All in all, however, the most convincing explanation 
for Henderson's surprising elevation is that he had been a 
conspicuous success in Belgrade and that this was 'the 
strongest element in determining his selection for Berlin', 
together with 'Vansittart's knowledge of, and admiration 
for, the qualities Henderson had shown in Belgrade'. ' By 
contrast, at least one Foreign Office colleague thought Eric 
Phipps 'more suited to Paris salons'. 25 
Certainly Vansittart knew Henderson's record. The 
protestations of incredulity about Henderson's behaviour in 
Berlin hardly ring true therefore. Henderson believed in 
the force of twentieth century nationalism and he always 
thought that the Versailles Treaty dangerously ignored 
German nationalism and the need for self determination in 
those parts of Europe containing large concentrations of 
ethnic Germans. 
He was also inclined to go in for hero-worship as his 
relationship with King Alexander, and later with Hermann 
Göring show all too clearly. Henderson's partiality for 
Yugoslavia was after all notorious, so that Hugh Dalton 
59 
could easily irritate him on meeting by remarking 'Hallo, 
here's the pro-Yugoslav' . 
'6 It was reasonable to conclude, 
therefore, that Henderson might 'go native' in Berlin as 
well. Yet Vansittart chose to overlook such tendencies, 
because he apparently believed that Henderson would get on 
well with dictators and had no in-built prejudices against 
Germany. Henderson's unattractive desire to suppress 
criticism of Germany in the British press, lest they upset 
the state to which he was accredited, was equally 
discernible in Yugoslavia. ' 
It is legitimate to ask in the context of Henderson's 
appointment whether the alternatives would have proved any 
better. Percy Loraine has the reputation of being a tough 
diplomat, who stood up to Mussolini, but he clearly 
supported Chamberlain's appeasement policy at the time of 
Munich, arguing that 'another gruesome and futile slaughter 
had been avoided'.. ' Later when in Rome, he was to be 
criticised by Churchill for not taking a robust enough line 
with Mussolini, and his hero-worship of Kemal Ataturk was in 
the same class as Henderson's obsessive regard for King 
Alexander of Yugoslavia. Loraine claimed somewhat unconvin- 
cingly that Kemal was not a dictator, as were Hitler and 
Mussolini, because he was deliberately 'trying to create a 
system of government that would survive him'. 29 
There is always a danger that an ambassador will become 
over-sympathetic to the regime to which he is accredited, 
and Loraine seems to have been a case in point, at least 
while in post in Ankara. Precisely the same accusation was 
to be levied against Henderson in Berlin. 
Loraine's colleague Miles Lampson in Cairo certainly 
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did not seem to be out of step with the appeasement policy 
either. He wrote to Henderson (with whom he had served in 
the Tokyo embassy from 1910 to 1911 when both were Third 
Secretaries) early in 1938, stating his view that the solu- 
tion of Britain's problems in Egypt and the Mediterranean 
'lies ... through Berlin'. Lampson also bemoaned the fact 
that Britain was 'tied to France's chariot'. 10 
The question remains as to why Henderson was not 
content with the ordinary ambassadorial role and 'aimed at 
being a "great ambassador" in the style of the eighteenth or 
nineteenth century,. " His obsession with the idea of 
personal fate which had reserved this mission for him, 
provides only a partial answer. For he seems to have been 
convinced that he was acting as the personal agent of 
Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy. His authority for 
this conviction is difficult to pin down, as there is no 
evidence for it in Chamberlain's papers: Henderson's own 
personal papers disappeared in mysterious circumstances 
after the outbreak of war in September 1939. " 
What can be asserted with some confidence is that 
Henderson's appointment in 1937 was not part of any grand 
diplomatic design to aid Chamberlain's appeasement policy, 
as Vansittart misleadingly suggested after the war. 
At best Henderson's appointment was occasioned by a 
Foreign Office hope that his proven ability to hit it off 
with dictators, and his absence from the great European 
capitals while posted to the Near East, Balkans and Latin 
America (which suggested that he had no intrinsic anti- 
German or pro-French bias), would make him better able to 
get on with the Germans than Rumbold and Phipps had been. 
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But his Foreign Office superiors had no grounds for later 
complaining that Henderson's behaviour came as a surprise, 
for it was his known qualities in post which precipitated 
his selection in the first place. 
Once in post, Henderson's relations with the Foreign 
Office worsened rapidly. His reported remarks at Windsor 
Castle on 22 April prior to departure had already irritated 
Eden whom Harvey reported as being 'rather aghast at the 
nonsense that he was talking about what he was going to do 
in Germany'. " In his memoirs Eden was to write that 
Henderson's appointment was to prove to be an international 
misfortune' ." 
Within weeks of arriving in Berlin Henderson was making 
his view of Anglo-Germans relations plain to Bruce, the 
Australian High Commissioner in London, a known sympathiser 
with the policy of appeasement. Austria (banned from union 
with Germany by Article 80 of the Versailles Treaty) was 
'bound to go back to Germany one day' Henderson wrote and 
one might equally well argue on the same lines as 
regards the so-called Sudentendeutsche in Czecho- 
slovakia. It is exasperating to think of the folly 
of 3% million Germans in that Slav state, especially 
living as they do on the frontier of Germany proper. 
Henderson concluded by saying that Austria and Czechoslo- 
vakia were not something 'for which the British Empire 
should risk either its peace or even its existence'. 
35 
Two major disputes with Vansittart arose within two 
months of Henderson's arrival in Berlin, which highlighted 
both Henderson's capacity for indiscretion (demonstrated by 
the Prince Paul of Yugoslavia letter episode), and his 
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tendency to make decisions without Foreign Office authority. 
First of all, Henderson infuriated Vansittart by 
telling the French Ambassador Andre Francois-Poncet, that 
unlike his predecessor Phipps, he intended to attend the 
annual Nazi Party Rally at Nuremberg in September. 
Vansittart minuted his objections to Eden on 5 June and 
expressed his concern that 
Sir N Henderson should not only (a) take an impor- 
tant decision like this off his own bat without 
giving us a chance of consultation ... but also (b) 
announce it to a foreign colleague as a decision. 
Henderson's behaviour, complained Vansittart, was both 
irregular and dangerous, and it was extraordinary that 
Henderson had told the Foreign Office about his decision in 
a letter to your Private Secretary [Oliver Harvey] about his 
leave, '. 36 
Henderson was sharply rebuked by Vansittart in a 
following letter, but the tone was still friendly in that he 
began it 'My dear Nevile. ' It was quite wrong, Vansittart 
pointed out, for Henderson to have spoken in this off-the- 
cuff manner, which would incur a great deal of domestic 
criticism and leave the Foreign Office. to clear up the 
mess'. Thus 'consultation with us is absolutely necessary 
before anybody in so high a position as the Ambassador takes 
or announces such a decision'. 
As in the case of his unauthorised private letter to 
Prince Paul about Yugoslav-Italian relations in 1935, 
Henderson appeared to be contrite. But he denied that he 
had told Francois-Poncet that he would go to Nuremberg 
without prior Foreign office permission beforehand (angrily 
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Vansittart wrote in the margin against this comment 'No, he 
did not say this in his letter' [to Harvey]). Henderson 
went on to assure Vansittart that 
I don't love the Nazi system any more than you do - 
but it has come to stay ... Nobody wishes to cause 
the Foreign Office less bother than I do, and the 
fact that I have already given the Secretary of 
State bother in the House of Commons weighs heavily 
on my conscience. 
(Eden had been forced to try and defend Henderson's decision 
to go to Nuremberg in the Commons. ) Characteristically 
Henderson still thought he should go to Nuremberg, and saw 
the episode as a breach of procedure rather than a deviation 
from fundamental government policy. His assurance about the 
Nazi system, which showed that he was not pro-Nazi, would 
not satisfy his critics when he seemed to them to be going 
out of his way, and beyond his brief, in accommodating the 
Berlin Government. Henderson also had some typical reflec- 
tions in this instance about the doleful life of the 
unfortunate Ambassador who has willy-nilly to work with 
those people however objectionable their creed'. " But 
those were absolutely consistent with his behaviour fifteen 
years before in Constantinople, when he wrote home about the 
Turks being 'uncivilised brutes', while also (as outlined in 
the previous chapter) acquiring a reputation both with 
embassy colleagues and his hosts alike, for being pro- 
Turkish. 
At this early stage Vansittart was prepared to take his 
old friend's reassurances at face value, and he replied that 
he would look again at the issue nearer the time of the 
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Party Rally, but that Henderson's letter dated 15 June 
'entirely relieves us of apprehensions'. " In the end 
Henderson did go to Nuremberg. 
Apprehensions however, were again to be raised in 
November 1937 when Henderson wanted to come back to London 
and speak to the Anglo-German Fellowship (a notorious pro- 
Nazi lobby group). Eden refused his request, pointing out 
that it was not normal practice for ambassadors to make such 
speeches outside the states to which they were accredited. 39 
Neither was it normal practice for diplomats to attend the 
funerals of leading foreign leaders without Foreign Office 
clearance, but Henderson had done this in the case of Saad 
Zagloul in Egypt in 1928. Throughout his career Henderson 
demonstrated a marked tendency to ignore regulations and 
convention when it suited him (conversely he had been 
equally capable of arguing points of etiquette such as 
whether embassy servants in Constantinople should be allowed 
to wear swords) . '° 
Vansittart was to be still more infuriated by another 
apparent transgression by his subordinate in June 1937. 
Henderson claimed in his memoirs that in his meeting with 
Chamberlain in April he had secured the Prime Minister 
designate's permission to commit calculated indiscretions. " 
He now proceeded to take full advantage of such largesse (in 
the eyes of his Foreign Office critics) in an interview with 
the Austrian Minister to Berlin Tauschitz, in which he 
appeared to support the idea of Austro-German union. Again 
Vansittart complained angrily to Eden, telling him that the 
Austrian Minister in London had come to see him about Hender- 
son's comments. 'I am bound to say, ' minuted Vansittart, 
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, that I cannot recollect any previous instance of an 
ambassador talking in this astoundingly indiscreet manner. ' 
Henderson's language, went on Vansittart, would create the 
impression that Britain approved of the idea of Anschluss, 
which was in flagrant contradiction with the attitude of 
HMG'. " Henderson's comments to Bruce, cited above, had 
already shown his sympathy for the idea of Austro-German 
union. 
Eden wrote to Henderson on 22 June telling him that the 
Austrians were quoting a comment he allegedly made about 
Austria being 'just as German as Germany'. Eden was 
'disinclined to think that you could really have spoken in 
this vein, and I feel sure that there has been some misunder- 
standing'. Eden was sure that Henderson could not have used 
such language 'when the views attributed to you do not 
correspond with the policy of the Government'. The 
Secretary of State had felt obliged, however, to draw the 
matter to Henderson's attention in a private and friendly 
manner'. ' The facts behind this episode must now be 
examined more closely. 
When Henderson replied on 28 June, his reply took two 
different tacks. First of all he said that he had spoken to 
his Austrian colleague, Tauschitz, about the matter. 
Tauschitz had denied attributing the remarks to Henderson, 
and said that he personally had just returned from Vienna 
where there had been no mention of it. 
Subsequently, though, Tauschitz had claimed that 
Henderson had described the Austrians as Germans. Henderson 
agreed in his despatch to Eden that he did indeed call the 
Austrians 'a German people', but claimed that the late 
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Austrian dictator Dollfuss (assassinated by Austrian Nazis 
in 1934) had often used the phrase 'unser deutsches volk'. 
Henderson went on to tell Tauschitz, he told Eden, that 
while on a visit to Vienna in 1935, he thought 40 per cent 
of the population may have been Nazi but that 
I much doubted now, as the result of Catholic and 
Jew persecution and of the political and economic 
situation in Germany, if the percentage was as much 
as 25%. That did not sound like failing to under- 
stand why Austria desired to remain independent. 
Tauschitz, according to Henderson had been forced to agree 
with this observation, but Henderson went on to ram the 
point home. 'Quite frankly, ' Henderson told Tauschitz on 
the subject of Anschluss, 'I would hate it ... I earnestly 
hoped that Austria would always remain independent. '" This 
appeared to be a ringing endorsement of Austrian indepen- 
dence, and Tauschitz promised to pass on Henderson's 
comments to Vienna. But Henderson added a caveat, telling 
his Austrian colleague that if ever the day came 'when 
Austria herself, of her own volition, decides to unite with 
Germany, I personally do not see on what moral grounds her 
right to do so could be contested'. " 
In many respects this was a classic exposition of Hen- 
derson's ambiguous style of diplomacy in Berlin, and indeed 
earlier in his career. He had been rebuked by the Foreign 
Secretary, albeit in the politest of terms, and responded by 
trying to water down the significance of the offence. The 
reference throughout the despatch to personal, as apart from 
Foreign Office, or British Government views, was characteri- 
stic, as was the reference to 'moral grounds'. References 
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to morality were extremely common in Henderson's despatches, 
especially where such references allowed him to use morality 
as a stick to beat the Versailles Settlement. Here too is 
Henderson's constant reiteration of the right of ethnic 
Germans to self-determination, even when he concedes that in 
1937 the majority of Austrians did not want Anschluss. 
Henderson sent a copy of this despatch to Walford 
Selby, British minister in Vienna, who was obviously kept 
informed about the Tauschitz episode by the Foreign Office. 
Given Selby's views about Henderson's pro-Germanism, as 
expressed in his memoirs, Selby would hardly have been 
surprised by Tauschitz's accusations. But he wrote in a 
tactful manner to Henderson, telling him that the Austrians 
had not spoken to him personally about it, but that they did 
look to the British Government for support and were 
extremely susceptible to even the remotest suspicion 
of our weakening. Perhaps you will be able to bear 
this in mind should the question of Austro-German 
relations ever arise in discussion with your German 
friends - In the mean time no harm has been done. `" 
The Tauschitz episode is, on the face of it, one of 
several gaffes perpetrated by Henderson in Berlin in 1937 
alone. But there is a whiff of a storm in a teacup about 
it, for it is significant that the Austrians had not seen 
fit to raise the matter with Selby. Vansittart too had a 
tendency to go in for histrionics, which much irritated his 
colleague and successor Alex Cadogan, and this needs to be 
taken into account in any evaluation of Henderson's 
behaviour. " Some consideration also needs to be given to 
Henderson's linguistic skill, for although Henderson liked 
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to speak German 'he was not exactly a master of it'. `a The 
potential for a misunderstanding was therefore present. 
Nevertheless Henderson had not attempted, even in his 
defence of his conduct in the Tauschitz interview, to 
disguise his sympathy for German aspirations (or indeed 
Austrian ones) about an Anschluss. His critics would argue 
that this was one of several instances where Henderson 
exceeded his brief, and undermined existing British policy. 
Further trouble had been caused on 1 June 1937 by a 
speech which Henderson had made to the Deutsche-Englische 
Gesellschaft. 'In England, ' he told the diners, who 
included both Himmler and Rosenberg, 'far too many people 
have an erroneous conception of what the National Socialist 
regime really stands for. ''9 Henderson went on to say that 
more notice should be taken of the great social experiment 
that was going on in Germany, and given the opportunity, 
Britain could prove to be a valuable friend to the Reich 
Government. 
The speech was badly received in many quarters at home, 
and in the House of Commons Arthur Henderson, the former 
Labour Foreign Secretary asked tartly whether it was 
an erroneous conception of what the National- 
Socialist party in Germany stands for to allege they 
have oppressed the Jews, suppressed all political 
opposition, placed many of their opponents in 
concentration camps and destroyed free trade- 
unionism. " 
But Henderson had allies in his search for Anglo-German 
accommodation. One of them was his former superior Lord 
Derby, who wrote to Neville Chamberlain on 16 June about 
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Henderson's speech to the Deutsche-Englische Gesellschaft, 
saying that to his mind 
the speech he made was just the one we wanted. It 
was well received in this country. It was equally 
well received in Germany ... instead of being 
thanked for the speech, as I feel he ought to have 
been, Henderson had been snubbed by Eden. The 
result is that this speech, instead of doing the 
good it would have done - indeed had done - to the 
drawing together of Germany and ourselves has, owing 
to its disavowal, done harm. " 
A pattern was being established whereby Henderson felt 
increasingly isolated in the Foreign Office (although he had 
some supporters there) and looked elsewhere for support. 
One of Henderson's Foreign Office supporters was Owen 
O'Malley, the newly appointed Ambassador to Mexico, who 
wrote to him at some length on 9 June. O'Malley told 
Henderson that for the last ten years' he had felt doubtful 
about the wisdom of Foreign Office policy towards Germany 
and France and that 
even though I might be wrong and my masters might be 
right, yet it was good for them that there should be 
someone in the Office ready to put up an opposition 
view. 
Naturally I cannot suppose that they shared 
these feelings, and for all I know the afterthought 
may have been present in their minds when they 
appointed me to Mexico, that their critics would now 
be silenced for good. 
Holding the opinions about the Germans which 
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you expressed when I saw you in the Foreign office, 
I have never had any illusions about the diffi- 
culties which you were likely to meet with here 
[O'Malley told Henderson] nor I am sure have you. 
am, however, friends with some of the highest 
authorities outside the Foreign Office whom saw you 
I 
before leaving for Berlin (a tantalising reference - 
was O'Malley talking about Chamberlain? ] and I was 
glad to find there was a weighty body of opinion 
ready to support you. 
O'Malley assured Henderson that 
those who think like me will watch your work in 
Berlin with the deepest sympathy and solicitude. We 
shall not think that because you try to make friends 
with the Germans that you have illusions about them, 
and we shall not expect you to work miracles. 
O'Malley and those who thought like him detected a change of 
atmosphere in Anglo-German relations since Henderson had 
gone to Berlin, and they hoped for a continuance of this 
situation. 
The closing section of the letter hints at factional 
in-fighting, and distrust, inside the Foreign Office at this 
time, for O'Malley refers to an 
enclosed paper [missing from Henderson's personal 
papers at the Public Record Office] which I meant to 
give you when you were in London. I rather think 
Secretary of State never read it, but I got Van's 
permission to let Warren Fisher and the C. I. G. S. 
read it and there cannot therefore be no [sic] to 
your seeing it also. It would however be better if 
71 
you treated it as a paper which you had read when 
you were in my room here and do not refer to it in 
any letters or despatches. A lot has happened since 
it was written but, but parts of it are I think 
still applicable. " 
This intriguing letter leaves open the question of what 
exactly was in O'Malley's paper (or indeed why Vansittart 
allowed it to be circulated to Fisher and C. I. G. S., as he 
can hardly have approved of its contents), and who 
O'Malley's contacts in the Government were. But its timing, 
just as Henderson was running into severe criticism from 
Vansittart, can only have been an encouragement. A high- 
ranking colleague was prepared to put his career at some 
risk to support Henderson's approach in Berlin. He remained 
secure, at least for most of his period of accreditation to 
Germany, in the knowledge that the Prime Minister also fully 
supported him. 
Henderson's stock at the Foreign Office sank even lower 
as a result of a despatch he sent on 5 July. Vansittart's 
irritation with his appointee was already great, when 
Henderson proceeded to attack his entire perception of how 
British foreign policy should be run. 
'The aim of German policy, ' Henderson wrote was 'to 
induce Great Britain to dissociate herself, not from France, 
but from the French system of alliances in Central and 
Eastern Europe' (that is with Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia and Rumania). " This coincided exactly with 
Henderson's own view that 'coalitions are a snare', and 
reflected his suspicion of French policy. He wrote later of 
his horror in arriving in Berlin and learning that 'the 
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British embassy there was popularly regarded as a branch of 
the French embassy'. " In Henderson's view German and 
British policy should be in accord about the danger posed by 
France's alliance system. 
Vansittart's pro-French sympathies were well known, and 
he was further angered by Henderson's suggestion that 
Germany's natural sphere of expansion lay to the east where 
'her future lies by means of the realisation of aspirations 
which are in her opinion vital to her well-being, legitimate 
and not in conflict with any direct British interest'. SS 
July was also an equally difficult month for Hender- 
son's relations with the Foreign Office. On 14 July 
Henderson wrote to Maxwell Garnett of The League of Nations 
Union about a pamphlet the latter had written concerning the 
effectiveness of the League. Henderson's letter was phrased 
in his usual trenchant style He had no faith in the 
League, Henderson told Garnett, unless all European states 
belonged to it, and where Germany was concerned Henderson 
was even more blunt. 'Forgive me if I say that I think you 
are completely mistaken, ' Henderson wrote. 'I doubt if the 
Germans know themselves what their policy is. ' (Vansittart 
minuted furiously here 'This will be thought very thin (And 
it is) '. ) 
Henderson went on to assert that German unity (an 
obvious reference to Anschluss) was inevitable providing 
that it was desired by the 'peoples themselves and with 
due 
regard to the intangibility of truly national frontiers and 
to the independence of other nations who have a right to 
exist just as much as Germany'. 
Henderson's Foreign office superiors lined up to 
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express their disapproval of the errant Ambassador. William 
Strang minuted that it was a mistake for 'HM Ambassadors to 
air their views like this, especially when their views are 
unorthodox'. Orme Sargent agreed. He thought Henderson's 
letter to Garnett 'both uncalled for and regrettable', in 
his minute of 29 July. 
Vansittart's response the next day was as withering as 
it was predictable. Henderson's letter was in his view an 
act of folly and completely improper', and Vansittart linked 
it to the Tauschitz affair, and complaints about Henderson 
by the US Ambassador William Dodd (to the effect that he was 
too pro-Nazi). 
Vansittart went on in scathing fashion about his old 
friend's behaviour: 
This kind of thing cannot go on. Sir N. Henderson 
seems to have failed to grasp the responsibilities 
of his position. It seems incredible that he should 
have sent us a copy of the letter like this without 
apparently realising what he has done ... In 35 
years' experience I cannot recall such a series of 
incidents created by an Ambassador - and in so short 
a while. He is exceeding his functions and 
exceeding them lightheartedly. 
Henderson, concluded Vansittart, was misrepresenting British 
policy to the Germans, and the Foreign Office would have to 
look at this series of incidents ' and try and find means 
for improving his judgement'. 56 
This celebrated attack on Henderson by Vansittart shows 
Henderson in the worst possible light. Yet were the views 
expressed so outrageous? For the thinly veiled reference to 
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the likelihood of an Austro-German Anschluss was qualified 
by the reasonable observation that such an event was not 
possible without the consent of the parties involved, peace- 
ful means, and the absence of any threat to the independence 
of other states. 
Strang should not have been surprised either, that 
Henderson was behaving in an 'unorthodox' manner. He had 
been unorthodox throughout his career, but this had not 
prevented his obtaining golden opinions inside the Foreign 
Office. And from Vansittart in particular. 
Henderson was also in this instance almost naively 
honest. He conducted no covert correspondence with Maxwell 
Garnett, but copied it to the Foreign Office, so that Vansit- 
tart's tirade about Henderson 'exceeding his functions' 
seems inappropriate. If Vansittart faulted his judgement, 
he had found little wrong with it in earlier years. Hender- 
son's view of his functions was almost certainly influenced 
by the wide brief he believed Neville Chamberlain had given 
him before he went to Berlin. The Maxwell Garnett episode 
seems to show that Henderson still imagined he might be able 
to influence his Foreign Office superiors. 
This may also have been the intention behind the memo- 
randum which Henderson wrote to Orme Sargent on 10 May 1937. 
This memorandum was thirteen pages long, and laid down what 
Henderson thought should be the parameters of British policy 
towards Germany. Henderson told Sargent that: 'Germany 
herself impinges on no British possession: Great Britain is 
excentric [sic] to Europe, whereas Germany is practically 
entirely central. ' Vansittart, whose marginal comments are 
to be found on every page of the memorandum, asked at this 
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point 'What about colonies? ' 
Henderson went on to observe that British friendship 
with Germany 'could and would serve British national policy' 
by restraining Russian ambitions in Asia or the Near East, 
as well as curbing Italian aspirations in the Mediterranean 
(at this point Vansittart minuted angrily 'This is German 
doctrine'). When Henderson went on to talk about Joseph 
Chamberlain's attempts to secure an Anglo-German alliance in 
1899, Vansittart remarked that this was precisely what 
Henderson had said to US Ambassador Dodd, who said that 
Henderson had suggested that such an alliance was desirable 
and natural. 
This sparring between the Permanent Under Secretary and 
his Ambassador went on for page after page. When Henderson 
wrote that if France would not renounce her relationship 
with the Little Entente powers in Eastern Europe (Czecho- 
slovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia - Henderson had always 
been critical of French influence when in Belgrade), 
Vansittart retorted again 'This is full acceptance of the 
German attitude'. 
The battleground then shifted to Austria. Henderson 
thought that the Austrians would wish to be reunited with 
Germany'. Vansittart here detected the malign influence of 
Lord Lothian, who had visited Germany in April 1937 and 
spoken to several Nazi leaders including Hitler. (On his 
return Lothian sent Henderson a copy of a memorandum about 
the visit. ) 
Henderson felt that Britain should be prepared to 
'submit ... without too great 
discomfort to the surge and 
swell of restless Pan-Germanism'. This, according to 
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Vansittart was 'Lord Lothian again and in full'. And when 
Henderson opined that Britain should have no objection in 
principle 'to German economic and even political predomi- 
nance in Eastern Europe' Vansittart minuted tartly 'What 
does that mean exactly? ' 
Close reading of the memorandum of 10 May provides a 
coherent scenario for British policy as Henderson thought it 
should operate towards Germany. In Henderson's view, there 
were two options if no accommodation could be reached with 
the Nazi regime. One would be to 'protest vehemently' but 
do nothing in the event of an enforced Anschluss with 
Austria or seizure of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. 
The other was to revert to what Henderson called the 'Block 
System' of pre-war alliances and prepare for war, in less 
favourable conditions than those of 1914. In Henderson's 
opinion both alternatives were 'counsels of despair' . 
s' 
Henderson was not as naive as Vansittart's numerous 
angry interventions may suggest. He fully recognised the 
difficulties involved in securing an Anglo-German under- 
standing and described them indeed as 
extraordinarily formidable. Quite apart from 
Germany itself, the Nazi regime, her traditional 
mentality and her inevitable urge towards unity and 
expansion it is not in the interests - for obvious 
reasons - either of Italy or of Russia to witness 
its consummation. 
Henderson was sympathetic in the memorandum to colonial 
revision but argued, as he was often to do in Berlin, that 
Britain should take the moral high ground. Hitler ought to 
be bound to the undertaking he had given on 21 May 1935 that 
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he would unconditionally respect the remaining articles of 
the Versailles Treaty (a somewhat forlorn hope) in his 
conduct of Germany's international affairs. 
'However little faith, ' Henderson argued, 'one may have 
in German promises, an agreement would increase our 
influence over Germany and it is surely better than none. ' 
This after all was why Henderson had been sent to Berlin, to 
mend the fences allegedly broken by Rumbold and Phipps. If 
on the other hand Hitler persisted in his illegal behaviour, 
and broke his 1935 pledge, Henderson believed that 'the 
moral disapproval of the world had some weight'. Foreign 
Office critics could perhaps have argued that for someone 
who spoke so much about morality, Henderson's scepticism 
about the League (as shown in his letter to Maxwell Garnett) 
was surprising. He did, however, share such scepticism with 
Chamberlain. 
One historian sees in the debate between Henderson and 
Vansittart in 1937 an echo of the pre-1914 arguments between 
Sanderson and Crowe and the relevance of the balance of 
power in the conduct of Britain's foreign relations. " 
Henderson was decidedly in the Crowe tradition, broadly 
supported by Vansittart, in his argument that Britain's 
national interest must be the predominant factor in policy- 
making. This ran parallel with Henderson's belief that 
British Governments must be aware of their limitations and 
not engage in pointless threats and sabre-rattling. At the 
root of some of Henderson's indiscretions and cutting of 
diplomatic corners, was the belief that on some occasions in 
Turkey, Egypt and Yugoslavia as well as in Berlin, obfus- 
cation gave foreign governments the wrong impression. In 
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Belgrade he had despaired about getting the Foreign Office 
to see that Italy must make concessions to the Yugoslavs. 
Whereas in Berlin he feared that the British were becoming 
Job's comforters to those, like the Austrians and the 
Czechs, whom they could not help. 
Henderson was vigorous, indeed zealous, in his efforts 
to improve Anglo-German relations from the moment he arrived 
in Berlin in April 1937. Yet already there were indications 
that his health had been fatally weakened, and the whole 
issue of his health had been neglected. 
On 21 June Henderson had written to Eden about his 
health saying: 
I have known something was wrong for nearly a year 
and had originally meant to come back peacefully 
from Buenos Aires and deal with it this year. The 
worst of Berlin is that crises are endemic. 
He went on to report that he had been to see a German 
doctor, who insisted that he go to the health spa at 
Marienbad. 'The trouble is chiefly lungs - but I am letting 
nobody but you know that. ' 
Eden was solicitous. He was 'most distressed' he wrote 
back on 28 June to hear what you had to say about your 
health. I do hope the trouble will prove amenable to prompt 
treatment ... of course we 
have every confidence in Ogilvie 
Forbes' (Henderson did not get on well with his Counsellor 
Ogilvie-Forbes and preferred to work with the First Secre- 
tary Ivone Kirkpatrick) . 
59 These were early inklings of the 
serious cancer which was to force Henderson to take four 
months' sick leave in 1938-9, and ultimately kill him at the 
age of sixty in 1942. Historians have tended to understate 
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the pain and suffering which Nevile Henderson endured in 
Berlin and which must have had an effect on his perfor- 
mance. 60 Berlin was a stressful enough post for a diplomat 
without the double burden of a serious illness as well. 
Nevertheless in those early days of his mission in 
Berlin, Henderson was zealous in trying to attract influen- 
tial adherents to his cause. On 24 October 1937 he was a 
weekend guest of the Astors at Cliveden, those well-known 
supporters of Chamberlain, and also found himself in the 
company of Geoffrey Dawson, the pro-appeasement editor of 
'The Times', Lord Lothian and Anthony Eden. The ubiquitous 
Tom Jones was also staying at Cliveden and was impressed by 
what Henderson had to say, writing in his diary: 
I sat between him [Eden] and Henderson after the 
ladies left last night and found they differed 
widely in policy. Henderson struck me as sensible 
and informed without distinction. He has lived in 
the countries we talked about and Eden has not and 
this was apparent. " 
Lord Astor found that although he had not seen Hender- 
son since they were schoolboys at Eton, he 'liked him very 
much' "2 Since Astor was a strong supporter of 
Neville 
Chamberlain's appeasement policy this was hardly surprising. 
Henderson told his audience at Cliveden that he was 
'sticking courageously to his policy of trying to arrive at 
a settlement between ourselves and Germany. 63 This won 
Astor's approval as well as that of the influential Geoffrey 
Dawson, whose newspaper was often regarded abroad as the 
official organ of the British Government. Henderson's 
thoughts were incorporated into 'The Times' leader which 
I 
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appeared on 28 October. Henderson was proving adept at 
building up a circle of sympathisers in establishment 
circles in Britain, for he was also in correspondence with 
Lothian about Anglo-German relations. "` 
Allies like Astor, Dawson and Lothian were important to 
Henderson's cause. But the pivotal relationship, as far as 
Henderson was concerned, was with Chamberlain. For if Hen- 
derson retained the good opinion of Chamberlain, he could to 
a considerable degree override the opposition of Vansittart, 
Orme Sargent and their supporters in the Foreign office, who 
thought him far too accommodating to German views. 
It is clear from the record that Henderson did indeed 
have Chamberlain's confidence. The Prime Minister's res- 
ponse to Lord Derby's comments on Henderson's controversial 
speech to the Deutsche Englische Gesellschaft was to assure 
Derby that there was 'every confidence in Henderson'. " 
Chamberlain himself had little confidence in the 
Foreign Office, which he believed was peopled by poets and 
dreamers. " So there is good ground for thinking that he 
saw in Henderson a useful diplomatic weapon for by-passing 
the reputedly pro-French Foreign Office, just as Sir Horace 
Wilson (who had no foreign policy background whatever) was 
to be later. Chamberlain's persistent distrust of the 
Foreign Office was well demonstrated in a letter he wrote to 
his sister Hilda on 24 October 1937. 'But really, the FO! 
I am only waiting for my opportunity to stir it with a long 
pole. '67 
Chamberlain's faith in Henderson is clearly implied by 
remarks made by the Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign 
Office, R. A. Butler, to the German Ambassador in 1938. The 
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Germans should be aware, Butler opined, that: 
Baldwin as Prime Minister had concerned himself with 
foreign policy only to the degree that was absolu- 
tely necessary, and consequently the predominant, 
pro-French element in the Foreign Office had been 
able to exert its influence to the fullest extent. 
The generation which had come up in the Foreign 
Office in recent years on the other hand, was free 
from any pro-French leaning. But this group in the 
Foreign Office had never really made much headway, 
the first real break in the French line had come 
with Sir Nevile Henderson. 68 
Leaving aside the chronological inaccuracy of Butler's 
statement (Henderson had after all joined the Diplomatic 
Service in 1905, just two years after Vansittart), this 
statement probably gives an accurate enough insight into 
Chamberlain's views about Henderson, as Butler was very much 
his master's voice. Although Henderson denied being anti- 
French, there is no doubt that he was critical of French 
policy. 69 This was totally compatible with his strong 
belief in Britain's old 'blue water' strategy. He, like 
Chamberlain, was appalled by the carnage of the Great War. 
As a result of his strong commitment to better Anglo- 
German relations, Henderson became even more obsessed with 
the need to ensure that the British media was friendly 
towards Germany, or at least even-handed. This was to be a 
consistent characteristic of his tenure of the Berlin 
Embassy, and one which immediately brought him into sharp 
conflict with his Foreign office superiors. 
This first became a major issue when Lord Halifax, Lord 
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President of the Council, visited Germany in November 1937 
(although the visit itself caused controversy in Government 
circles). Halifax had received an invitation from Göring to 
attend a hunting exhibition (he was a master of hounds in 
Yorkshire), and Chamberlain was keen that he should accept 
and use the occasion of the visit to improve Anglo-German 
relations. 70 The perception in Whitehall was that Göring 
was a 'moderate' who could be used to mollify Hitler's 
excesses. This view, which proved to be erroneous, was 
subscribed to by Henderson himself. 
Initially Henderson had doubts about whether a visit by 
Halifax would be fruitful. But his doubts were resolved 
after a personal interview with Chamberlain on 28 October. 
As Henderson told Halifax, 'The way in which the PM put it 
to me yesterday, your visit there takes a quite different 
aspect. And in its new light I am definitely more enthusia- 
stic than I was at first about it., 7 ' Henderson concluded 
his private letter to Halifax by saying that 'I do really 
believe that the PM's idea, as outlined to me, opens a new 
door on to a road along which progress is really 
possible' . 
72 Chamberlain saw Halifax's visit as 'an 
opportunity for making contact with the Nazi leaders at a 
high level' and he doubted the Foreign Office's commitment 
to achieving this end. " 
Controversy also surrounded the invitation to Halifax 
and whether it had Foreign Office approval. This is signi- 
ficant, because it underlines the tensions within Whitehall, 
with which Henderson had to contend throughout his period in 
Berlin. On the one hand, the Prime Minister supported the 
visit, and on the other, predictably Vansittart opposed it. 
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Vansittart found Halifax 'boring and his subservience to 
Chamberlain an act of treason'. " Eden, according to the 
traditional account, opposed the visit because Halifax might 
encourage Hitler to hope for concessions. " 
But after the war, Halifax himself alerted the Foreign 
Office to the fact that at the time, he himself had 'pooh- 
poohed the idea, but he (A. E. ) stuck to it', and that his 
decision to take up Göring's invitation was a result of 
'their (A. E. and N. C. ) joint exhortation to me to take the 
opportunity' . 
'° Chamberlain also wrote at the time that 
Eden seemed 'quite happy'. ' 
What Eden did oppose was a visit by Halifax to Hitler 
personally for, he told Henderson, 'a visit by a leading 
Cabinet Minister could arouse such publicity and speculation 
as would almost certainly defeat its purpose'. " while it 
was true that Halifax's inexperience in foreign affairs 
might have caused him to make some indiscretion, as when he 
paid a scheduled visit to Hitler at Berchtesgaden, the real 
reason for Eden's concern may well have been that Halifax 
was not part of Eden's personal cabal, 'he was too close to 
the Prime minister and could not be relied upon to put over 
a Foreign Office rather than a No. 10 line'. " Exactly the 
same could have been said about Henderson, but the 
Ambassador found himself in the middle of the Eden, 
Vansittart, Chamberlain feud over the visit. 
Nevertheless, Henderson was keen to push the visit, 
writing privately again to Halifax on 4 November to express 
his view that 'We are on a rising market and if we miss it 
we shall have much more to pay in the end. I am utterly 
convinced of that. ' As so often, Henderson was concerned 
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about the moral dimension of policy and the inequalities 
created by Versailles and the post-war settlement. 
'Morally, ' he wrote, 'even we cannot deny the right of 
Germans living in large blocks on the German frontier to 
decide their own fate .. we should not oppose peaceful 
evolution . ," 
A week later Henderson was expressing to the Foreign 
Office his concerns about press behaviour. He had spoken to 
Goebbels about Halifax's impending visit, which Goebbels 
supported, but Goebbels was worried about the possible tone 
of the British Press. Henderson had to explain that it was 
'not controlled', but expressed his hope that British press 
coverage would not undermine the visit. 8' Later Henderson 
was to write that the British Press had 'handicapped my 
attempts in 1937 and 1938 to contribute to the improvement 
of Anglo-German relations, and thereby to the preservation 
of peace,. '- 
In Henderson's view, the British Press misbehaved from 
the outset. On the very day he spoke to Goebbels in fact, 
on 14 November, 'The Evening Standard' came out with what, 
from Henderson's perspective, was a provocative article. 
This speculated on whether Hitler would be given a free hand 
in Central Europe if he agreed to drop Germany's claim for 
the restoration of colonies. Hitler was furious, because he 
had wanted the visit and its agenda to be kept secret, and 
so was Henderson. He cabled London angrily that 'The 
Evening Standard' piece was an 'almost incredible attempt to 
poison the atmosphere ... which even the 
history of western 
journalism has seldom hitherto approached'. 
So angry indeed was Henderson that he asked for 
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Halifax's visit to be postponed until the Press 'evinces 
that calm which is usually called decency and trustfulness 
in our countries'. " This rather splenetic outburst was 
clearly unfair, because 'The Times' had carried a series of 
letters (from leading figures like Gilbert Murray, Arnold 
Toynbee and George Lansbury) which largely favoured a sympa- 
thetic response to German claims for colonial revision. It 
was another example of Henderson's propensity to get carried 
away into special pleading, but others in the Foreign Office 
shared his hostility to the British Press. " 
Henderson used strong language about the Press, but it 
was no stronger than his strictures on it when he was posted 
to Belgrade. Rightly or wrongly, Henderson saw himself as a 
proselytizer for the country to which he was accredited. 
His previous record was there for all to see in the Foreign 
Office files, and no one could legitimately claim that they 
had not been warned. However unsound Henderson's attitude 
to the Press might have seemed in a democracy, it was a 
consistent one which was echoed by Chamberlain himself, who 
tried to use the Press Office at 10 Downing Street to muzzle 
the newspapers. 
In the event, the Halifax visit was not postponed. 
Chamberlain decided to make the best of a bad job, and 
follow up 'The Evening Standard' leak by disclosing the real 
purpose of the visit. Stories printed by 'The Times' and 
'The Daily Telegraph' allowed Henderson to report on 15 
November that the Germans regarded them as 'very satisfac- 
tory', although by early December he was again complaining 
about 'The Daily Telegraph'. 85 
The contingent thinking on Press policy by Henderson 
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and Chamberlain is underlined by the fact that the Prime 
Minister instructed his Press Secretary, George Seward, to 
approach Fritz Hesse, the Press Attache at the German 
Embassy, in order to disavow 'The Evening Standard' piece. 
Not only was the paper insignificant in the ranks of British 
papers, Hesse was told, but the article had made Chamberlain 
very angry. Downing Street's Press line was exactly the 
same as Henderson's, both were anxious that German suscepti- 
bilities were not to be hurt. 
This was not, of course, the Foreign Office line. 
Henderson believed that as 'The Evening Standard' diplomatic 
correspondent Poliakoff had received 'first information of 
the visit from the FO, he is continuing to receive informa- 
tion from the same persons for the same purpose'. 86 The 
finger of suspicion pointed at Vansittart, although Seward 
tried to persuade the Germans that the leak came from the 
Italian Embassy. 
This was what Vansittart told Henderson, claiming that 
the accusation that the Foreign Office had leaked the news 
of Halifax's visit was 'wholly unjustified'. Without a 
trace of irony, Vansittart went on to assure his Ambassador 
that 'there are no persons in the FO who were against the 
visit, nor as you are well aware are these our methods'. 
This was nonsense. Vansittart had developed, 'particu- 
larly during his last two years as Permanent Under-Secretary 
(1936-7), his own "private detective agency" dealing in 
German intelligence. j67 He had also been responsible for 
helping to set up the so-called 'Z organisation' for 
channelling secret intelligence back to London, without the 
knowledge of SIS headquarters staff other than its leader 
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Sinclair. 
One of the members of the Z organisation was Frederick 
Voigt, the Central European correspondent of 'The Manchester 
Guardian' in Vienna. Voigt, the doyen of Central European 
correspondents in the 1930s, was firmly convinced that 
Poliakoff had got his information from 
a high official in the FO who told him that this was 
the actual German plan for the talks but did not 
reveal the fact that the plan had been accepted as a 
basis for the conversations in Berlin. " 
The high official, Voigt was convinced, was Vansittart 
himself, who masterminded a plot to publicise the German 
invitation to Halifax and force Berlin to deny its exis- 
tence. The visit might then be the victim of unfavourable 
publicity and be cancelled. But as Vansittart's memoirs do 
not cover the year 1937, we cannot be sure that he would 
have preserved the version of events given to Henderson. 
This episode is particularly relevant because of the 
many caustic criticisms minuted on Henderson's despatches by 
Vansittart for disregarding his instructions. In this 
instance, Henderson's most trenchant and consistent critic 
(yet erstwhile friend), is found to have been effectively 
undermining official policy while holding the most senior 
post in the Foreign Office. Vansittart's behaviour almost 
certainly involved a breach of the 1911 Official Secrets 
Act, and he was not empowered to leak official information 
to the Press, whatever he may have thought about Chamber- 
lain's policy. " 
The confusion surrounding the visit is striking, there- 
fore, both in the wider context, and in the manner in which 
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it affected Henderson. Here was an ambassador who, whatever 
his faults, had a Prime Minister and a service chief who 
were hopelessly at odds with one another, and were prepared 
to be quite unscrupulous in their tactics. 9° To make 
matters worse, Eden himself both disliked Chamberlain's 
penchant for running foreign policy (having previously 
deplored Baldwin's passivity), and resented Vansittart's 
overwhelming dominance in the corridors of the Foreign 
Office. '- 
Eden had grudgingly agreed to Halifax's visit, provided 
that Halifax adhered to the guidelines given to him and did 
not encourage the Germans to demand concessions. Just to 
compound the confusion, Halifax did just that when he saw 
Hitler on 19 November, in respect both of colonies and a 
change in the Central European Settlement, thus ignoring 
Eden's guidelines. Any ambassador who had to operate in a 
context of such internal warfare was in an unenviable 
position. 
While he was in Germany, Halifax met the Foreign 
Minister, von Neurath (whose visit to London had been 
cancelled in June), as well as Göring (who struck him as 
being a cross between a film star and a gangster), Goebbels 
and Hitler. Henderson thought subsequently that Hitler 
could not fail to 'have been - and in fact so I heard was - 
impressed by the obvious sincerity, high principles, and 
straightforward honesty of a man like Lord Halifax' . 
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Henderson wrote again to Halifax, after his return from 
Germany, on 23 November. He was convinced that the next 
initiative after the Halifax visit should come from the 
British Government. He referred to an article by J. L. 
89 
Garvin, editor of 'The Observer' who broadly favoured the 
appeasement of Germany. Yet here Henderson's tone was 
circumspect, and he thought Garvin had gone too far in his 
article. 
HMG cannot go as far as to wash their hands of 
Austrians and Sudetendeutschen: that would look too 
cynical and immoral. Ultimately however if our last 
state is not to be worse than the first we shall 
have to fall back on the line of self-determination 
under suitable guarantees that it is freely exer- 
cised. It would be a world tragedy if Austria were 
to be incorporated at any early date into the German 
Reich, for the fact is that Vienna is today the only 
real centre of independent German culture. The 
Nazis have temporarily killed free thought and 
independent science and learning. 
Henderson followed this rare venture into the cultural realm 
by saying that until German culture recovered its freedom I 
personally do not want to see Austria swallowed up'. 
"' It 
was unlikely that German cultural freedom would ever be 
recovered under the Nazis. 
This passage, which was approved by Neville Chamber- 
lain, to whom Halifax had copied Henderson's private letter, 
contrasts strongly with what Henderson had written to the 
Australian High Commissioner Bruce in May. 94 Then Austria 
and Czechoslovakia were not worth risking the British Empire 
for, since Austria was 'bound' to return to Germany one day 
(it had of course never been part of Germany), and the fact 
that 3% million Germans lived in a Slav state was 'exaspe- 
rating' . 
95 It could be that the tone of Henderson's letter 
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to Halifax is more temperate than that of the letter to 
Bruce, because Henderson was writing to a Cabinet Minister 
who would, after all, be Foreign Secretary less than four 
months later. But the two letters do highlight a persistent 
difficulty with Henderson, in determining which particular 
diplomatic nuance he favoured at any given moment. Taken at 
its face value, the Halifax letter of 23 November shows 
Henderson, contrary to his traditional reputation, being 
against the annexation of Austria, or the dismemberment of 
Czechoslovakia. Like his Prime Minister, Henderson felt 
sure that the Halifax visit had been a great success and 
would prove to be 'a turning point'. 
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The other dimension to Henderson's work in Germany 
centres on his relationship with the Nazi leadership. 
Henderson was sent to Berlin specifically because he was 
expected to get on better with the leadership than Rumbold 
or Phipps had been able (or willing) to do. 
For Henderson the pivotal relationship was with Göring, 
although he was also to develop a close relationship with 
Ernst von Weizsäcker the State Secretary at the Wilhelm- 
strasse. Significantly Henderson devoted a whole chapter of 
Failure of A Mission to Göring. Göring was for Henderson 
'by far the most sympathetic of the Nazi leaders' and he 
admitted that he had 'a real personal liking for him'. 97 
Göring, like Henderson, was a keen sportsman, and a first 
class shot, and they went stag shooting together when 
Henderson stayed at Göring's hunting lodge at Romintern. 
The two men first met on 24 May 1937, when Göring 
stressed the importance and need for Anglo-German co-opera- 
tion, but pointed out the dangers of allowing Germans to 
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continue to see Great Britain as an enemy. Eden wanted this 
remark by Göring challenged, as it inferred that the British 
Government had been following an anti-German policy, and 
Henderson was told to seek another interview with Göring, 
which he duly did. Eden further instructed Henderson to 
obtain an explanation about why Britain was regarded as an 
enemy in Germany. " 
Henderson reported back that he had told Göring that it 
was as fallacious as it was miserable' to think of Britain 
as an enemy, and that British policy was peaceful in its 
intent and not obstructive. Henderson went on to stress, 
however, that France's security was also vital for Britain, 
and that although Britain recognised Germany's right to 
discuss colonial revision, real practical problems were 
involved. 99 
Eden had hoped to discuss these issues with the German 
Foreign Minister von Neurath during his planned visit to 
London in June 1937, but the visit was cancelled at Hitler's 
express command in the wake of the alleged torpedo attack on 
the German cruiser 'Leipzig' . 1°° Neurath, like Göring, was 
regarded as one of the 'moderate' faction in the German 
leadership, with whom rational debate was possible. Hender- 
son never wavered from this view as far as Göring was 
concerned. The two men continued to meet at a variety of 
venues such as Romintern, Karinhall (GÖring's massive 
country estate), the Party Rallies at Nuremberg, and as he 
told Eden on 21 June 1937, on the neutral ground of a race 
course,. "' 
One of Henderson's problems in Berlin was that it was 
not easy for him to get access to Hitler personally, since 
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Hitler's work habits were notoriously unpredictable. But he 
did manage to get an interview at the 1937 Party Rally. 
According to Henderson Hitler 'was undoubtedly pleased at 
the attendance for the first time of the British, French and 
American representatives, and he indicated that he attribu- 
ted this innovation to my initiative"02 Hitler's personal 
pleasure on this occasion may, though, have misled 
Henderson, as other eyewitnesses detected Hitler's personal 
aversion to the diplomat he called the man with the 
carnation' . 101 
The Nuremberg Rally issue had got Henderson into a row 
with Vansittart at the Foreign Office in 1937, and it is 
evident also that not all his fellow members of the 
Diplomatic Corps in Berlin were happy with this particular 
initiative by Henderson. Neither were they happy with his 
general line towards the Nazi regime. 
On 23 June the US Ambassador William Dodd met 
Henderson. He reported him as saying 'My Government has 
been unwise in its attitude towards Germany. ' Henderson 
went on to say, alleged Dodd, that 'Germany was following 
Bismarck's policy of annexing all European peoples of German 
descent, Austria, Czechoslovakia and other countries'. 
Dodd thought Henderson far too pro-German, but it is 
unlikely that his British colleague's knowledge of modern 
European history was quite as bad as Dodd suggested (it was 
not Bismarck's policy to create a Greater Germany). Hender- 
son vehemently denied making these comments when Dodd's 
Diaries were published in 1941. He wrote to the publishers 
saying that it was quite inconceivable' that 
he would have 
spoken in such terms. 104 And it is pertinent to point out 
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that Henderson had a much better personal relationship with 
Dodd's successor, Hugh Wilson, who thought highly of him. '°5 
Another critic was the French Ambassador Andre 
Francois-Poncet, to whom Henderson had allegedly made the 
offending remarks about the Nuremberg Rally which so enraged 
Vansittart, and which Henderson denied making. Henderson's 
superior at the Foreign Office, when he was in Belgrade, 
Hugh Dalton, spoke to the French politician Leon Blum on 14 
September 1937, and recorded his comments in his diary. 
Blum had passed on to him, Dalton wrote, Francois-Poncet's 
complaint 'that he could not get the same intimate relation- 
ship with Sir Nevile Henderson which he had with Phipps. He 
thought Henderson leaned too much towards the Nazis'. 1°' 
There would seem to be a simple explanation for Hender- 
son's behaviour in this instance, which was his acknowledged 
fear that the British Embassy was perceived by the Germans 
to be hand in glove with the French in Phipps' time, so that 
Henderson made a point of keeping his distance. As it was, 
Francois-Poncet's role as Hitler's favourite Ambassador 
opened him to exactly the same accusation of partiality. 10' 
Too much has been made by the traditional anti-appeasement 
lobby of other ambassadors' opinions about Henderson, when 
their own records were undistinguished in this regard. 
The year 1937 ended with the disappearance of Hender- 
son's protagonist Vansittart from any position of any real 
influence in the Foreign Office. To the surprise of many, 
Vansittart accepted the post of Chief Diplomatic Adviser to 
the Government (which effectively meant that he had been 
'kicked upstairs'), while Alexander Cadogan replaced him as 
Permanent Under Secretary. Vansittart's old friendship with 
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Henderson had been irrevocably sundered, and the latter 
wrote to Halifax to express his relief. 'I shall feel 
happier, ' he said, 'with Alec Cadogan as head of the Foreign 
Office .j 
1O8 
On a superficial reading, Henderson's balance sheet for 
1937 looks catastrophic. He had angered Vansittart and Eden 
on several occasions, offended the Austrians over the 
Tauschitz episode, and upset domestic opinion because of his 
remarks to the Deutsche-Englische Gesellschaft. 109 Yet his 
behaviour in Berlin was entirely predictable in the light of 
his previous record, and in the Tauschitz affair at least, 
Vansittart showed a propensity for hysteria. 
If Henderson's assessment of Göring turned out to be 
wrong, it has to be recognised that he was sent to Berlin to 
cultivate what was thought to be moderate opinion, as the 
British Government, especially when Chamberlain became Prime 
Minister, tried to improve Anglo-German relations. This was 
the rationale for Henderson attending the Nuremberg Rally, 
which occasioned the row with Vansittart, and where 
Henderson obtained one of his rare personal interviews with 
Hitler. The policy of scornful aloofness had after all been 
tried by Rumbold and Phipps, and a more emollient one at 
least deserved a try. Henderson was attempting to meet the 
requirements laid down by Tom Jones when he was advising 
Baldwin about Phipps' replacement. The new Ambassador, 
Jones said, should be able 'to enter with sympathetic 
interest into Hitler's aspirations'. This was precisely 
what Henderson was attempting to do in the early months of 
his Ambassadorship in Berlin. "' 
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In the early months of 1938 Henderson's attentions were 
to be focused on two major issues, the possible restoration 
of German colonies which had been confiscated at Versailles, 
and the status of the Austrian Republic. As events turned 
out, the second issue was to overshadow the first as 
independent Austria, a fragile creation of the 1919 Treaty 
of Saint Germain, disappeared from the map of Europe as an 
independent state in March 1938. 
Ever since Hitler came to power in January 1933 his 
intentions towards his homeland were plain for all to see, 
in that he wanted a closer relationship between Austria and 
the Reich. In July 1934 Hitler was implicated in the failed 
Austrian Nazi coup which resulted in the assassination of 
Chancellor Dollfuss. This also brought about the threat of 
Italian intervention which forced Hitler to hand over the 
assassins of Dollfuss, who had fled to Germany after the 
murder. 
But neither the illusion of unity between Britain, 
France and Italy nor the ban on Austro-German unity 
enshrined in Article 80 of the Versailles Treaty could 
prevent growing pressure on the regime of the new Austrian 
Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg. This culminated in the so- 
called Austro-German 'Gentleman's Agreement' in 1936 which 
brought two crypto Nazis Glaise-Hortenau and Guido Schmidt 
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into the Schuschnigg Government. The agreement also forced 
Austria to recognise herself to be a German state, and 
allowed Nazi German newspapers to circulate in Austria 
again. 
The Gentleman's Agreement was also clearly a conse- 
quence of the great power realignment which followed 
Mussolini's attack on Abyssinia in the autumn of 1935. The 
Austrian Government could no longer rely on Italy for 
protection. German pressure on Austria reached its extreme 
point with Hitler's bullying interview with Schuschnigg on 
12 February., 
At the beginning of 1938, both Eden and Chamberlain had 
been instructing Henderson to seek out the German view on 
colonial readjustment, and on 26 January Henderson saw the 
German Foreign Minister von Neurath to ask him whether the 
Reich Government would engage in discussions about Germany's 
former colonies in exchange for an exchange of views on 
rearmament. 
Neurath responded by saying that the colonial issue 
'could not be the subject of bargaining' and that Germany 
would await a concrete offer from Britain on the subject. 
Ominously the issue of Austro-German relations was also 
raised when von Neurath told Henderson that English inter- 
ference would not be tolerated. ' 
Henderson was following up Chamberlain's initiative at 
the Cabinet Foreign Policy Committee meeting on 24 January 
when the Prime Minister had stressed that a colonial settle- 
ment could only be a result of a more general settlement. 
Nevertheless he was personally convinced that any satis- 
factory settlement would involve the handing over of 
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Tanganyika'. Chamberlain was gratified when his scheme was 
'accepted promptly and even enthusiastically' by the 
Committee. ' After his rather negative experience with von 
Neurath, Henderson was to be less sanguine than his Prime 
Minister about the prospects of colonial appeasement, and 
did indeed warn the Foreign Office on 26 January that 
Germany would demand 'full sovereignty' over her former 
colonies. Henderson had also stated his belief that, for 
the moment, Italy would offer a better prospect for 
rapprochement than Germany. ' Chamberlain was also 
encouraged in this belief by his sister-in-law Lady Ivy 
Chamberlain, Austen Chamberlain's widow, an admirer of the 
Duce who happened to be staying in Rome. This was an early 
example of what became a persistent characteristic of 
Chamberlain, the use of unorthodox diplomatic channels (even 
Henderson was to be by-passed by unofficial intermediaries 
by 1939) . 
Henderson was recalled to London at the end of January 
1938 for consultations, and actually attended the meeting of 
the Foreign Policy Committee on 3 February (a rare privilege 
for an ambassador). The Committee decided to go ahead with 
this colonial initiative, although Henderson had warned that 
the Reich Government would be unenthusiastic about Chamber- 
lain's offer to accommodate German colonial grievances. ' 
During this visit to London Henderson also had the 
opportunity of a discussion with the Permanent Under- 
Secretary Sir Alexander Cadogan who had succeeded Vansittart 
after the latter's 'promotion' to the rather meaningless 
post of Chief Diplomatic Adviser in the New Year. Cadogan 
knew Henderson well in social circles, and recorded his 
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opinion of his old schoolmate (they had both been at Eton) 
in his diary: 'Nevile Henderson dined. I think he's very 
good., ' This opinion differed rather sharply from that of 
his disgruntled predecessor, who was now excluded from the 
day to day running of the Foreign Office. 
Henderson returned to Berlin on 4 February to find 
himself in the middle of the Blomberg crisis, when the Reich 
Defence Minister was discovered to have married a former 
prostitute after Hitler had been a witness at his wedding. 
This mysterious episode (for the evidence suggests that the 
Gestapo were well aware of Frau Blomberg's dubious past) 
provided Hitler with an excuse to rid himself of moderates 
like the Foreign Minister von Neurath, as well as the 
Reichswehr Chief of Staff von Fritsch, who was falsely 
accused of having been involved in a homosexual affair, and 
Blomberg himself. ' 
As far as Henderson was concerned, the Blomberg affair 
had two immediate consequences. A planned meeting with 
Hitler was deferred until 3 March, but much more importantly 
von Neurath was replaced as Foreign Minister by the former 
German Ambassador in London, Joachim von Ribbentrop, who 
rapidly became Henderson's bete noire. In Failure of A 
Mission Henderson wrote that he had no personal quarrel 
with Herr von Ribbentrop' but went on to attack him for his 
'vanity, his resentments, and his misconceptions of England 
and the English mentality', which Henderson believed were a 
serious obstacle to the achievement of the task he had set 
himself, the improvement of Anglo-German relations. ' The 
tone of a letter which Henderson wrote to King George VI 
later that year, casts serious doubt on Henderson's claim 
107 
that there was no personal animosity between Ribbentrop and 
himself. Ribbentrop, Henderson told the King 
is eaten up with conceit and, if he can make himself 
out in his new position to be the author of better 
relations with Great Britain, he may sincerely work 
to that end. An understanding with Great Britain 
would at least give him that great prestige and 
popularity with Germany which he seeks - London's 
gain has been Sir Nevile Henderson's loss and that 
is the most he cares to say about Ribbentrop for the 
moment. ` 
There is plenty of contemporary testimony about the extre- 
mely poor relationship between Henderson and Ribbentrop. 
From the diplomatic point of view this made Henderson's job 
even more difficult, as Ribbentrop attempted to block his 
already limited access to Hitler. 1° According to von 
Ribbentrop's aide Reinhard Spitzy, Ribbentrop, much 
influenced by his wife and his experiences in London, had 
abandoned any hope of an Anglo-German accommodation, and saw 
Henderson as a threat because he worked hard to achieve just 
such an agreement. Ribbentrop therefore 
did everything in his power to discredit Henderson 
in Hitler's eyes. For instance, he pointed to Sir 
Nevile's friendship with the Rothschilds ... and he 
even asserted that Henderson turned up improperly 
dressed for discussions in the Chancellery. How on 
earth could anybody take seriously a man who wore a 
blue pin-stripe suit with a claret pullover and a 
red carnation? " 
When ultimately Henderson did see Hitler on 3 March, he 
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spoke for about ten minutes about the need for agreement on 
the limitation of armaments, a restriction on aerial 
bombing, the colonial question, and the Austrian and Czecho- 
slovak issues. According to Henderson, during his presenta- 
tion of the British position Hitler 'remained crouching in 
his armchair with the most ferocious scowl on his face, 
which my firm, but at the same time conciliatory remarks 
scarcely warranted'. " At the time, Henderson had been 
pessimistic about the outcome of the interview, because it 
occurred while the crisis over Austria was intensifying, but 
he had been instructed to seek such an interview through 
Ribbentrop, during which he would pass on a message from 
Chamberlain about the colonial issue in particular. 
Henderson 
put to the Chancellor the questions whether Germany 
(1) was ready in principle to take part in a new 
colonial regime as outlined in the English proposal 
and (2) what contributions she was ready to make for 
general order and security in Europe. " 
Hitler's reply was intemperate and aggressive. Henderson 
later wrote that, 'As for colonies, he did not seem the 
least interested in them, and the sum of his reply was that 
the colonial problem could wait for four, six, eight or even 
ten years. ' Hitler did not consider the colonial question 
ripe for solution since Paris and London had set themselves 
so strongly against a return. For this reason he did not 
want to press the question'. " 
As a mechanism for examining the colonial issue, the 
Hitler-Henderson interview of 3 March 1938 has been 
accurately described as 'a complete disaster'. ls The 
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British had been encouraged by the overtures made by Dr. 
Hjalmar Schacht, the German Minister of Economics, in August 
1936 about colonial readjustment (Schacht resigned his post 
in 1937 after conflicts over policy), and by statements made 
by Ribbentrop to the Anglo-German fellowship in London in 
December 1937.16 But British hopes on the colonial issue 
were rudely shattered by Hitler's attitude on 3 March. 
Henderson was convinced that this was because the 
Austrian question was now predominant in Hitler's mind. And 
he also came to believe that the Blomberg incident had 
imposed on Hitler as a dictator the need to obliterate its 
memory by some striking external success' which accelerated 
the pace of events leading to the Anschluss in March 1938.1' 
But in retrospect Hitler's reaction to the British initia- 
tive seems predictable. Henderson had been forced to tell 
Hitler that Britain did not wish to return former German 
East Africa (Tanganyika), and South Africa could not be 
persuaded to give up former German South-West Africa. This 
meant that either Belgium or Portugal would have to be 
persuaded to cede colonial territory to Germany. " Hitler 
was understandably sceptical about likely Belgian or Portu- 
geese reaction, and he was right to be so, as the Portuguese 
in particular were horrified by the prospect of a German 
return to Africa, and told the British Ambassador in Lisbon 
(Henderson's old friend Walford Selby) that Portugal would 
'surrender nothing in the matter of colonies'. " 
As far as Austria was concerned, Henderson's later 
belief was that the Germans 'desired ... the consolidation 
of National-Socialism with the Reich and the fulfilment of 
Greater Germany by the incorporation in it of Austria'. In 
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the view of the German Government, he wrote later, Austria 
was already Nazi to the core, and if a free plebiscite were 
held there, unhampered by the 'Schuschnigg tyranny', the 
vote would reflect this. 2° This was a cunning cocktail of 
German revisionism and propaganda designed to touch on that 
sensitive British nerve of guilt about the 1919 Peace 
Settlement. Henderson, who believed, like other appeasers, 
that Germany had been sinned against at Versailles, was 
undeniably susceptible to this approach. 
This became clear when Henderson saw Hitler on 3 March 
(in the presence of Ribbentrop). He did pass on in this 
interview his Government's concern about the recent inter- 
view between Hitler and Schuschnigg on 12 February (when 
Hitler had terrorized the unfortunate Austrian leader with 
threats about what would happen if he did not co-operate 
with German policy). And he went on to warn the Germans 
that the British Government could not conceal from itself 
the fact 'that recent events have aroused apprehension in 
many quarters which must inevitably render more difficult 
the negotiation of a general settlement'. Hitler in turn 
accused Britain and France of obstructing his efforts to 
achieve a settlement with Schuschnigg. Henderson denied 
this but allegedly said later in the conversation that 'he, 
Sir Nevile Henderson, had himself often advocated the 
Anschluss'. 21 On the face of it this was another classic 
example of Henderson acting as a Nazi dupe, allowing his 
personal opinions to carry him outside his brief. 
Henderson, however, disputed the German record of the 
conservation on 3 March when it was made available to him 
and did so in strong terms. 'I never said, ' he told 
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Ribbentrop, 
that I had spoken here in favour of the Anschluss. 
What I did say was that I had sometimes expressed 
personal views which may not have been entirely in 
accordance with those of my Government. ' 
Expressing such personal views was of course precisely what 
had got Henderson into trouble with Vansittart in the summer 
of 1937. But in this instance Henderson did show that he 
fully realised that the British Ambassador in Berlin ought 
ng. t, to be talking in such terms to the Germans. His anxiety 
to set the record straight shows that he was at least aware 
that the Germans must not be encouraged to think that 
Britain would approve of an Anschluss. Vansittart and Orme 
Sargent had already expressed their view that an ambassador, 
especially in such a sensitive post as Berlin, should never 
be heard to make statements which were not in accordance 
with British policy, either on the Anschluss or on anything 
else. " 
But those critics of Henderson who accuse him of deli- 
berately encouraging German aspirations about Austria have, 
in this instance, to account for his anxiety to clarify his 
position. It was the German documentation about the Hitler 
interview which Henderson wanted amended, which his Foreign 
Office superiors in London would not have been able to see 
until the end of the Second World War. According to the 
German version of the interview, Henderson also denied 
claims by both Hitler and von Ribbentrop that the British 
press was hostile to Germany (even though he was himself 
critical of it at times) by rejoining that the German press 
itself had made violent and unjustified attacks on 
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Britain. " Subsequently in a telegram to Henderson on 
10 March it was Halifax who played down the press issue, 
saying that it would be resolved by better Anglo-German 
relations. " 
Having battled with the Germans about what was or was 
not said on 3 March, Henderson was soon embroiled once again 
with the Foreign Office. The issue this time was Chancellor 
Schuschnigg's decision on 13 March to ascertain whether the 
Austrian people wanted union with Germany or not. 
Henderson's colleague in Vienna, Michael Palairet, 
supported Schuschnigg's decision, saying 'my own view is 
that the risk is worth taking. Chancellor would lose his 
authority if the present atmosphere of alarm and uncertainty 
were to continue'. " So did Halifax, who told Ribbentrop in 
an interview that it seemed a pretty tall order to say that 
the Head of a State could not have a plebiscite if he wanted 
to, . 
Henderson disagreed. He conceded that German methods 
were 'indefensible' but thought Schuschnigg's action 
'precipitous and unwise', when he telegraphed Halifax on 
11 March. 2' On the same day he saw the Austrian minister in 
Berlin and said that although he had every sympathy for 
Schuschnigg's predicament he thought this plebiscite ... 
provocative and agreed that in the event of bloodshed in 
Austria Herr Hitler would be unable to hold back his 
extremists' (showing Henderson's susceptibility to the 
theory that Hitler was influenced by extremists, when he 
himself was the most extreme of all). 28 
Henderson's next telegram on 12 March went even 
further. He had spoken to Göring, who denied that Germany 
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had sent any kind of ultimatum to Austria, and gave Hender- 
son his word that the German troops which had entered 
Austria over the night of 11-12 March would be withdrawn 
when the situation was stable. This would be followed, 
Henderson was assured, by free elections. Henderson had 
agreed with Göring he told Halifax, that 'Dr Schuschnigg had 
acted with precipitate folly'. '9 
The 'precipitate folly' remark has been held up by 
historians as one of Henderson's most notorious gaffes. 3° 
He was rebuked for it by Halifax in his telegram on 
12 March, and for giving personal opinions to Göring. 'I 
cannot help feeling, ' Halifax telegraphed tartly. 'that by 
the admission to General Göring quoted above you cannot have 
but diminished the force of the protest you were instructed 
to make in my telegram No. 79'. " Although Henderson tried 
to defend himself in a further telegram on 13 March, it is 
difficult to account for his behaviour in this interview 
(and his admission of the transgression), after the passage 
of arms with Ribbentrop about what he said to Hitler on 
3 March. 32 It was clearly foolish of Henderson to have 
spoken in such terms to Göring, at a moment when Germany had 
flagrantly broken the Versailles Treaty. 
There are various explanations which could be put 
forward for such behaviour. One is that in talking to 
Göring, whom he liked and regarded as an anti-war moderate, 
Henderson forgot himself. Throughout his career, he had a 
predisposition to allow personal relationships to influence 
his behaviour. In Yugoslavia this was a strength, in Berlin 
dealing with people he himself called 'gangsters', it was a 
weakness. But Henderson's estimate of Göring, which was 
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shown to be wrong in March 1938 when he helped to precipi- 
tate the Anschluss, was vindicated by Görings behaviour in 
August-September 1939 when he did strive to prevent war. 
Henderson may also have believed, not unreasonably, 
that Schuschnigg's decision may actually have precipitated 
the event which British policy was striving to prevent. For 
it is clear from the record that Hitler was beset with 
nervous anxiety over the weekend of 11-12 March, and that it 
was Göring, Henderson's 'moderate', who made the running, 
not Hitler himself. It was Göring for example, who master- 
minded the device of Seyss-Inquart's (the crypto-Nazi in the 
then Austrian Government) fictitious telegram asking for 
German assistance. " 
Hitler by contrast was in a state bordering on hysteria 
and was later to pay tribute to Görings resolve, saying 
that he was 'ice cold in crises. In time of crisis you 
cannot have a better adviser than the Reich Marshal'. In 
Hitler's confused state at the time of the Anschluss it was 
by no means certain that the forceable incorporation of 
Austria into the Reich was inevitable. Hitler did not 
actually decide on Anschluss until 'under the impact of the 
triumphal ride from Branau to Linz, the cheers, the flowers 
and the flags'. " Before this Hitler had appeared to opt 
for an internal Gleichshaltung in Austria. This would have 
involved 
a constitutional or pseudo-constitutional transfer 
of power within Austria to a man who had his 
confidence. This was the procedure he had used in 
Bavaria and Danzig and had previously tried in 
Austria with Theo Habicht. 's 
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Thus Henderson's reaction to Schuschnigg's decision about 
the plebiscite may not have been as maladroit as it has 
traditionally been presented. Without Italian support (and 
Mussolini had made it clear that he regarded the issue of 
the Anschluss as a 'German problem') Austria's best change 
of survival was as a satellite of Germany, but retaining its 
domestic autonomy. " 
If this perspective on the Anschluss is accepted, then 
Henderson's 'precipitate folly' comment loses its heretical 
sound, because Schuschnigg's decision may well have precipi- 
tated a short, sharp, shock solution instead of the gradua- 
list one which Hitler seems to have previously favoured. As 
it was, Henderson's sin was not that he had expressed such a 
view, but that he had done so publicly in a conversation 
with Göring, and allegedly undermined the stance on Austria 
which the British Government was trying to take. 
This raises the issue of what British intentions were 
in March 1938. It is clear from a variety of sources that 
the British Government never intended to fight to preserve 
Austrian independence. Cadogan's comment in his diary on 
15 February that 'Personally I almost wish Germany would 
swallow Austria up and get it over ... I shouldn't mind 
if 
Austria were gleichgesschaltet, '7 was a fairly typical 
Government and Foreign Office response at the time of the 
Austrian crisis. Neither did Halifax privately show any 
greater backbone over the issue than did Cadogan. His 
rebuke to Henderson on 12 March was justified, in the sense 
that the Ambassador was open to the accusation that his 
remark might appear to convey British approval for the 
Anschluss. But the fact remains that it was made after the 
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event, when Halifax's bluff had been called as he surely 
knew it must be. Indeed when Schuschnigg sought out British 
support on the eve of the Anschluss, Halifax instructed 
Palairet to give a blunt, unsympathetic response. 
His Majesty's Government [Halifax telegraphed 
Palairet) cannot take the responsibility of advising 
the Chancellor to take any course of action which 
might expose his country to dangers against which HM 
Government are unable to guarantee protection. 78 
This tortuous phraseology provided a fig leaf for the naked 
fact (which Henderson fully recognised) that there was 
nothing the British Government could do anyway, although in 
the event the message was never passed on to the Austria 
Government because Schuschnigg's resignation was known to be 
imminent. 
Halifax's behaviour in March 1938 prefigured the 
British line six months later over the Sudeten crisis. 
Hitler was to be bluffed about any likely British response 
to aggression, a policy which Henderson always found to be 
both dangerous and uncongenial. " He never believed that 
threats should be made, unless they could be backed up, and 
Halifax's language to von Ribbentrop in the interview of 
9 March contained at least an inference of British disap- 
proval of German policy towards Austria. But British policy 
did contain an element of sinuous ambiguity. On the one 
hand the Germans were being told that an independent state 
had a perfect right to hold a plebiscite if it wished. On 
the other, Schuschnigg was warned not to take any action 
which 'might expose his country to dangers' which Britain 
could not protect Austria against. Henderson, and others, 
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might reasonably feel that the plebiscite, planned for 
13 March, which Halifax seemed to endorse on 9 March, came 
into exactly this category. 
Henderson's anxiety about British policy was, in fact, 
shared by Cadogan, who confronted Vansittart, as ever the 
apparent apostle of intervention, about the hypocrisy of 
creating an impression that Britain might intervene, when 
she had no intention of doing so. 
'It's easy to be brave in speech, ' Cadogan told 
Vansittart. 
'Will you fight? ' Cadogan said. 
'No, ' Vansittart replied. 
'Then what's it all about? To me it seems a 
cowardly thing to do to urge a small man to fight 
... if you won't help him. ' 40 
This was Nevile Henderson's view writ large. Even Palairet, 
who had robustly defended Schuschnigg's decision on 9 March, 
reflected on 13 March that 'his tactics may have been 
mistaken' . `1 This remark showed the element of inconsis- 
tency which ran through British policy at the time. 
Just a month before the Anschluss, Henderson's superior 
at the Foreign Office, Orme Sargent, a persistent critic of 
Henderson's despatches, summarised his views on the Austrian 
situation in a memorandum: 
I think we are all convinced [Sargent wrote] 
that the process of absorption of Austria by Germany 
has now begun and will continue steadily to its 
appointed end. Nothing that we can say is going to 
prevent this process, and any further protests by 
France and ourselves may merely encourage 
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Schuschnigg and his followers in Austria to prolong 
the agony unnecessarily, while at the same time 
revealing our impotence to alter or even delay 
events. In fact ... we should begin to withdraw, 
from a position which has now become untenable. " 
In the light of such defeatism about Austria's future 
Henderson's comment to Göring seems a venial offence indeed, 
and has to be seen in a different light. Schuschnigg would 
be guilty of folly unless there was a real alternative to 
Austria's incorporation into the Reich. Evidently his 
colleague, Sargent, did not believe there was, and had long 
given up the ghost. 
In the context of Sargent's comments, it is hard to see 
why Vansittart railed so loudly against the Henderson's 
comments on Austria in his notorious memorandum of 10 May 
1937. In the memorandum Henderson had warned about the fact 
that it was conceivable in the near future Austria might 
wish to 'want to be united with Germany'. " Whereas in May 
1937 Henderson was using a tentative 'conceivable', Sargent 
on 16 February 1938 was talking of Anschluss as Austria's 
'appointed end'. 
Ultimately, then, Henderson's behaviour during his 
interview with Göring on 12 March may be susceptible to a 
third interpretation. He realised that independent Austria 
was dead, but regretted the fact that Schuschnigg's action 
might bring upon Austria the very absorption that Austrian 
nationalists whether of the Right or the Left sought to 
avoid. Yet at the moment that Henderson spoke to Göring, 
this fate for Austria was not certain, and it was just 
conceivable that a gradualist solution under a different 
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Austrian Head of State might be possible. Hence the tone of 
his remark to Göring. 
Henderson never condoned Germany's use of force over 
the weekend of 11-12 March. This is demonstrated in another 
telegram he sent to Halifax on 12 March, which historians 
have chosen to ignore. It concerned a policy statement made 
by the Propaganda Minister Goebbels, in which the Germans 
disingenuously attempted to deny that any ultimatum had ever 
been sent to Schuschnigg about the plebiscite, and that 
Seyss-Inquart's procured request for the 'assistance' of 
German troops was genuine. 
Doctor Goebbels [wrote Henderson] to the general 
disappointment did not explain why, if the Nazis 
enjoyed the enthusiastic support of the Austrian 
people as stated in Herr Hitler's proclamation, it 
was necessary to send troops to help them. " 
The important point about this telegram is that it was sent 
before Halifax's telegram of reproof for the 'precipitate 
folly' remark, and could not have been part of an attempt to 
ingratiate himself with an irritated Foreign Secretary. The 
same Foreign Secretary, however, who told his Private 
Secretary Oliver Harvey that he too thought Schuschnigg's 
decision to hold the plebiscite 'foolish and provocative' 
(identical language to that used by Henderson himself). " 
At the same time, Henderson showed his disapproval of 
German action by boycotting the annual Heroes' Memorial Day 
parade on 13 March, which was normally attended by all 
ambassadors and envoys. He also planned to drive to the 
Austrian Mission in the Embassy Rolls-Royce (with Union 
Jacks displayed) to express his sympathy, but this gesture 
120 
was sabotaged by the Austrian Minister himself, who was 
already on his way to the Heroes' Day parade where he gave 
the Hitler salute. 4b 
Shortly after the Anschluss on 16 March, Henderson 
wrote in scathing terms to Cadogan about the former Austrian 
Foreign Minister Guido Schmidt, who was attempting to 
procure a German diplomatic post for himself. 
Talk of Judas [Henderson wrote in this private 
letter]. He has lost no time in coming for his 
thirty pieces of silver. He has long been the Nazi 
spy in Schuschnigg's camp all the time. It was 
undoubtedly from him that Göring got all his 
information about what being said not only in Vienna 
but in London. " 
Rather uncharacteristically when he wrote to Halifax on 
the same day, Henderson was even prepared to concede that he 
might have been 'unjust to Schuschnigg' (Palairet had 
accused him of being so). But he felt that the fallen 
Austrian Chancellor had underestimated the forces against 
him and exaggerated the degree of support he did have. 
He had 'never believed' Henderson told Halifax, 
that it would be possible to preserve Austria's 
independence either wholly or indefinitely: but 
there was a half-way house which seemed feasible 
namely that Austria's policy should be German, but 
her independence Austrian even if it were only in 
the form of a pre-war Bavaria. 
Henderson went on to admit that he 
was sorry that I telegraphed that as I had agreed 
with Göring as to Schuschnigg's precipitate folly. 
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I did not use those words though I certainly felt 
them. As a matter of fact I could not have put them 
into German. 
Having made this admission, Henderson then reverted to 
character, in trying to absolve himself of blame. 
What I did say to Göring himself may have meant more 
or less the same thing but in a less direct form and 
in a manner by which I hoped to strengthen rather 
than diminish the force of our protest. 
This torturous style can hardly have done much to enlighten 
Halifax about what was really said on 12 March to Göring. 
But his comments about Guido Schmidt, and the consistency of 
his attitude to the Austrian problem over the years, do not 
smack of the Nazi apologist so commonly presented. 'The 
methods which Hitler has employed in making Austria one, ' 
Henderson had also told Halifax, are indefensible ... The 
plebiscite will be a farce. ' (This prediction about 
Hitler's plebiscite in Austria proved to be only too 
accurate). Above all Henderson was deeply depressed by the 
events of the Anschluss, telling Halifax in the letter that 
'All the work of the past eleven months had crashed to the 
ground. '" Henderson's propensity for melodrama is apparent 
again here, underlaid as it was by his conviction that he 
had been specially selected by Providence to improve Anglo- 
German relations, and save the peace. Nevertheless the 
letter does offer evidence that Henderson was not an 
advocate of the outright absorption of Austria, just as he 
was to oppose the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. 
Henderson's essential problem at the time of the 
Anschluss and thereafter was that British policy was based 
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on bluff and obfuscation, which suited Halifax more than his 
Ambassador, who preferred more clear-cut tactics. But any 
British policy at this time faced peculiar difficulties 
because of the character of its most dangerous adversary. 
For Hitler had, on the one hand, a certainty that the 
British were in a position of weakness, while on the other, 
showing symptoms of acute nervousness and indecision at 
times of crisis in 1936 and 1938. The Führer's amoral 
policy and bewildering switches of mood defeated attempts to 
read his mind, and Henderson was further hindered by 
attempts to undermine him because he was 'extremely anxious 
lest the new Ambassador should make a favourable impression 
in Berlin'. " According to Ribbentrop's own aide Spitzy, 
Henderson was, throughout his stay in Berlin, 'systemati- 
cally hounded, hindered and denounced by the Ribbentrops' 
(Frau Ribbentrop being perceived as some soft of 'eminence 
grise') . 
S0 
In this context Henderson's old mentor Horace Rumbold 
was quite right in rejecting the validity of the title 
'Failure of A Mission' for Henderson's first memoir in 1940. 
You have described your book [Rumbold wrote] as 'the 
failure of a mission' but for two reasons nobody 
could have succeeded at Berlin. These reasons are 
a) the nature of the character of the beast with 
which any British representative would have to deal 
and b) the fatuous belief of Chamberlain and, 
presumably, of his Government that in 1937, it was 
possible to achieve anything by a policy of appease- 
ment of Germany. Hitler [went on Rumbold] is an 
evil man and his regime and philosophy are evil. 
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You cannot compromise with evil. " 
Rumbold also believed that at the time of the Anschluss 
Henderson had been guilty of 'rushing his fences'. In 
particular he thought Henderson 'rather stupid in identi- 
fying himself with Göring, from whom he can get nothing and 
whom he can't influence'. " 
These views were stated in Rumbold's usual forthright 
manner but there was, as always, another perspective. 
Reinhard Spitzy wrote in his memoirs: 
Had there been a more intelligent and more energetic 
British ambassador in Berlin during the early years 
of the Third Reich, it is probable that he would 
have been able to exercise a more positive 
influence, and might even have succeeded in pre- 
venting many of the disastrous developments which 
subsequently befell us. Henderson arrived too 
late... " 
No one could accuse Henderson of lacking energy but 
Spitzy almost certainly exaggerates the power and influence 
of any ambassador in the 1930s (as did Henderson himself). 
Hitler, after all, admired Francois-Poncet, and despised 
Henderson. " This affected his foreign policy not one jot. 
Ultimately, then, Henderson's infamous Anschluss 'gaffes' 
though indiscreet, did not affect the course of events in 
any measurable way. Hitler's policy was set either towards 
absorption of Austria, or towards a gradualist solution of 
some sort. At no point was Britain prepared to fight for 
Austrian independence, and even Palairet in Vienna had 
thought Schuschnigg's plebiscite 'a very dangerous card to 
play'. " 
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From the Anschluss to the 'Max Scare' 1938 
Writing to Lord Lothian some six weeks after the 
Anschluss, Nevile Henderson remained bleak about the pros- 
pects of Anglo-German accord. 
The British attitude to Austria [Henderson wrote] 
however justified and honourable on moral grounds 
and in our own eyes, has undone the good of the 
Halifax visit and of my own year's work here and the 
Germans are more convinced than ever that England 
alone refuses to understand this urge for unity. 
Knowing that he had a sympathetic correspondent in Lothian 
(who as Philip Kerr had served in Paris at the same time as 
Henderson in 1919, and was a prominent appeaser), the 
Ambassador went on to trace the story of his own conversion 
to the view that 'the Greater Germany urge is irresistible'. 
Henderson was convinced that: 
Had we been prepared to face facts or to see them in 
their true light, Austria could have been liquidated 
differently. It is we who have proved to Germany 
that she can only settle matters by a display of 
overwhelming force. The Sudeten afford us a last 
chance. ' 
Henderson with his acceptance of the vital force of 
Pan-Germanism and the iniquities of Versailles, also 
accepted the right of the three million strong German 
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majority in the Czech Sudetenland to greater autonomy, and 
ultimately, perhaps, if circumstances decreed it, outright 
secession to the Reich. 
Unless [Henderson wrote to Lothian] the Sudeten can 
be made into willing citizens of Czechoslovakia it 
is useless to try to force them to remain unwil- 
lingly there. It may be hard for the Czechs, just 
as it was hard for the Austria which we created 
after the war to exist as a practicable entity. But 
the alternative is quite impossible in the long 
run. 2 
Henderson was apparently willing to concede the justice of 
the German demands which the Germans were still in the 
process of formulating. 
Henderson had no qualms about criticising the consti- 
tutional position of Czechoslovakia as a unitary rather than 
a federal state and said, 'Czechoslovakia is a state of 
nationalities, not a national state and in the former there 
can be no minorities but all equals'. In Henderson's view 
(which coincided exactly with Chamberlain's), if Britain 
insisted on the no minority policy and carried it 
through regardless of the Czechs or the French or 
the Soviets, we would for once have solved a really 
big and thorny problem by peaceful negotiation and 
to cut (for the first time) the ground under the 
German view that nothing is ever arranged except by 
force or the display of it. 
Henderson linked the Sudeten question with the issue of arms 
limitation, which he was convinced Germany would not address 
'until the Sudeten problem is settled'. 
-I1 -1 -- -- - 
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Henderson conceded to Lothian that his was 'an 
unpopular theory (a reference presumably to his Foreign 
Office colleagues) but it is not my duty to preach what is 
pleasing'. He remained sure that: 
we can count on peace in our time. 
daily menace. " 
'Settle the Sudeten and 
Fail and war will be a 
If Henderson's theory was 'unpopular', as it certainly 
was with Vansittart and his supporters in the Foreign 
Office, it was also not entirely novel. Since 1937 the 
British Government had been trying to get Prague to make 
concessions to the Sudeten German minority; and even if 
these overtures can be described as 'gentle warnings', later 
frustration in London has to be seen in the context of this 
lengthy and unsuccessful diplomatic offensive in Czechoslo- 
vakia. Some criticisms can be made of the treatment of the 
Sudeten Germans by the Czechoslovak Government, and the 
Sudetens were not alone in their complaints, which were 
echoed by the strong Slovak nationalist movement. But the 
British attitude towards the Czechs was unduly influenced by 
the British Minister in Prague from 1930 to 1936, Joseph 
Addison, who was notoriously biased against the Czechs and 
over-sympathetic to Sudeten German complaints about the 
post-war land settlement in the Republic. Addison passed on 
his prejudices about the Czechs to Henderson, Newton and 
other colleagues in the Foreign Office. ' 
Henderson's position, however, rested on more than mere 
accusations of discriminatory behaviour by successive Czech 
governments. It was as baldly stated in private communica- 
tions with his superior Halifax, as it was with the amateur 
diplomatist Lothian (who visited Berlin on several occasions 
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in the 1930s). Three days after the Anschluss, Henderson 
wrote to Halifax making no secret of his view that: 
Czechoslovakia is, as I have always pointed out from 
here, a far more potentially dangerous proposition. 
British interests and the standard of morality can 
only be combined if we insist upon the fullest 
possible equality for the Sudeten minority of 
Czechoslovakia. If the Czechs cannot make their 
German fellow citizens into contented Bohemians 
instead of treating them as a German minority, they 
can only end by losing them altogether. ' 
This position was obviously closer to that of the Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain than to Vansittart's supporters 
who (in the words of Sir Frank Roberts, then a second secre- 
tary in the Central Department), believed that the 
Ambassador was being 'less than objective, failing to warn 
the PM of Hitler's long-term aims ranging far wider than 
bringing Germans into the Reich'. ' Chamberlain had 
seemingly made up his own mind about the viability of 
Czechoslovakia. In a letter to his sister Ida on 20 March 
1938, the Prime Minister had written that in his view 
Britain could do nothing to prevent Czechoslovakia being 
overrun by the Germans. All he could do for the Czechs 
would be to approach Hitler personally and say 
The best thing you can do is tell us exactly what 
you want for your Sudeten Germans. If it is 
reasonable we will urge the Czechs to accept and if 
they do, you must give assurances that you will let 
them alone in the future. ' 
Henderson was in total sympathy with this view. 
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Significantly, Henderson and Chamberlain's views on 
Czechoslovakia were endorsed by Basil Newton, the man on the 
spot as Minister in Prague, who had formerly served in 
Berlin under Rumbold and Phipps between 1930 and 1935 and 
had therefore obtained some insight into Nazi policy. 
Newton made little attempt to disguise his lack of sympathy 
for the Czechoslovaks. 
Reporting, like Henderson, just after the Anschluss, 
Newton told Halifax that 'If I am right in thinking that 
Czechoslovakia's present political position is not perma- 
nently tenable, it will be no kindness in the long run to 
try and maintain her in it' .' Newton, who unlike Henderson, 
has mysteriously avoided attracting the castigation of 
historians, ' reported shortly afterwards that the Sudeten 
German Party, led by Konrad Henlein, was moving towards a 
position of demanding 'incorporation in the Reich'. " 
Nothing in Newton's subsequent despatches suggests that he 
objected to the ultimate incorporation of the Sudetenland 
into the Reich. 
It was Newton's telegrams which most influenced the 
Lord Halifax, because he openly advocated the dismemberment 
of Czechoslovakia and was in this sense more radical than 
Henderson. " Newton stated his belief that in the event of 
war breaking out 'nothing that we or France could do would 
save Czechoslovakia from being overrun'. 12 When Halifax 
spoke to the Foreign Policy Committee of the Cabinet on 
18 March, he referred to Newton's viewpoint and said that 
the Government was 'entitled to decline the risk of 
involving Great Britain in a fresh war to shore up the 
present position which seems to us fundamentally 
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untenable'. " References to Nevile Henderson's alleged 
influence on policy-making invariably ignore Newton's 
influence on the Foreign Office during the Czech crisis, 
which has been much understated. John Charmley also points 
out that Chamberlain's view of the Czech question was based 
'not upon some craven desire to grovel to Hitler, but upon 
advice coming from the very Foreign Office which he is 
supposed to have ignored'. " Henderson himself unsurpri- 
singly, refers to Newton's 'sage counsel' in his memoirs, as 
both men agreed on the ultimate inviability of the Czech 
state. 5 
There was therefore a degree of consensus between 
Halifax and the British representatives in the key Berlin 
and Prague postings, about the undesirability of making any 
commitment to defend the Czechoslovak Republic against 
potential German aggression. Although Britain's ally France 
had a defence treaty with the Czechs, Britain did not, and 
resisted any attempt to be drawn into commitments in Central 
and Eastern Europe that involved armed intervention. 
Halifax's problem was that the British Government did 
not wish the Germans to become aware of Britain's unwilling- 
ness to back her French ally in a conflict over the Sudeten- 
land (although Britain refused to give formal military shape 
to Anglo-French friendship). France's problem was that she 
had a revised defence treaty with the Czechs dating from 
1935, and contingent on this was a Czech-Soviet treaty which 
became operative if the French honoured their commitment to 
the Czechs. But the French were in their turn equally 
desperate to avoid being forced to honour their commitment 
to the Czechs, and if they were successful in this, to 
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implicate the British in their betrayal. Both powers became 
increasingly involved in a strategy of trying to coerce the 
Czechs into making concessions over the Sudetenland. But a 
surprising feature of the whole Czech crisis in 1938 was the 
limpet-like way in which London clung to the French 
alliance, despite the fact that such a policy would force 
Britain to abandon its traditional policy of disinterest in 
Central and Eastern Europe. It has indeed been argued that 
ultimately it was French policy, rather than British, which 
prevailed over the Sudeten question, although the record of 
the summer months shows that it was Britain, rather than 
France, who took the initiative over the Sudeten question. " 
Everything in previous record suggested that he would resist 
both a commitment to the Czechs, and any French attempt to 
involve Britain in resolving the Czech crisis by the threat 
of force. 
It was clear to the Foreign Office that the Sudeten 
question would be difficult to solve. The unwillingness of 
the Czechs to make concessions had been underlined in a note 
by Vansittart to Halifax, prior to the latter's visit to 
Germany in November 1937. In the note, Vansittart referred 
to a letter sent by the Czech Minister in London, Jan 
Masaryk, to 'a member of the Foreign Office' on 5 November. 
Masaryk was caustic about the recent speech made by Henlein, 
the Sudeten German leader, to the Royal Institute of Inter- 
national Affairs, Chatham House: 
Do the friends of Czechoslovakia really believe 
[said Masaryk] that Henlein-Chatham House experi- 
ments will bring about an understanding between the 
two nations of my country and help to secure the 
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peace of Europe? Do they actually imagine that we 
could be prepared under any circumstances other than 
war to grant autonomy such as Henlein envisages, 
meaning nothing less that a totalitarian state 
within our state. 
Vansittart, then in his last weeks as Permanent Under- 
Secretary, believed that Masaryk's comments merely under- 
lined the need for 'patience and caution' over the Sudeten 
issue. In this at least he was at one with Halifax, 
Henderson and Newton., ' 
After Vansittart's effective demotion to the meaning- 
less post of Chief Diplomatic Adviser at the end of 1937, 
the evolution of British policy towards the Sudeten question 
rested primarily with four men, Halifax, Henderson, Newton, 
and most important of all, Neville Chamberlain. An inter- 
mediate role between the diplomats was played by 
Vansittart's successor Cadogan, and briefly by Eden. 
Between December 1935 and February 1938, Eden was 
Foreign Secretary before being replaced by Halifax, but the 
documentary record does not suggest that Eden's line over 
Czechoslovakia would have been markedly different from that 
of Halifax. In November 1937 Eden had told the French 
Foreign Minister, Delbos, that Great Britain and France 
might usefully 'concert with Germany in seeking to find a 
satisfactory solution to the problem', '' but that 
there would be little public support in Britain for 
a war to maintain Czechoslovakian sovereignty and he 
urged the Czechoslovakian Government to defuse the 
situation by granting further autonomy to its German 
subjects . 
19 
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Even when Eden was out of office, his attitude to the Czech 
problem was ambivalent and does not square with the tradi- 
tional view of him as an anti-appeaser. 2° Meanwhile from 
February until late May 1938, policy towards Czechoslovakia 
depended on the triumvirate of Halifax, Henderson and 
Newton. 
The relationship between Halifax and his two pivotal 
diplomats can be traced in the British Foreign Policy 
Document series, in Foreign Office files, and in private 
correspondence. After his passage of arms with Halifax (see 
Chapter Three) over the 'precipitate folly' remark, for 
which he had been rebuked, Henderson was initially cautious 
about the Sudeten question. In an interview with Mastny, 
the Czech Minister in Berlin, on 17 March, he telegraphed to 
the Halifax that he had put forward the view that although 
the Anschluss success might have gone to Hitler's head, and 
even more to the heads of the extremist followers', he 
personally doubted whether having achieved this primary 
objective Hitler would 'risk all again for a secondary 
one, . 
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By contrast Newton in Prague was continuing to put 
pressure on Bene6 in an even more radical approach to the 
Sudeten issue. When the Czech President stated his belief 
that some 25 per cent of the Sudeten Germans would not 
support Henlein's position, Newton was sceptical. 'In 
this, ' he wrote to Halifax, as indeed in attitude which he 
continues to maintain to the minority questions, I fear that 
the President may be cherishing illusions. '2' Bene6 felt 
that the Anglo-French 'were too far away to understand 
things', according to the German Minister in Prague. 23 
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Newton's interview with Bene6 was on 20 March 1938, and 
is of particular interest in that at a time when his Berlin 
colleague was being cautious about the Sudeten issue, Newton 
was actively pushing the issue of minority rights in Prague. 
Three days later on 23 March, Halifax made clear to 
Newton what the official British position on Czechoslovakia 
was. While assuring the Czechs that the 'obligations of 
Great Britain to Czechoslovakia are those of one member of 
the League to another' he (Newton) was to tell them that it 
was 
with the greatest regret that His Majesty's Govern- 
ment have been forced to the conclusion that they 
are unable to take any further direct and definite 
commitment in respect of Czechoslovakia. `' 
Halifax's statement was endorsed in Chamberlain's foreign 
policy statement to the House of Commons the next day, when 
he warned that France's commitment to the Czechs should not 
be interpreted by the latter as in any way committing 
Britain to the defence of Czechoslovakia. This would have 
created a position, the Prime Minister stated, whereby the 
decision as to whether or not this country should find 
itself involved in war would be automatically removed from 
the discretion of His Majesty's Government'. " The same 
day, in a telegram to Halifax, Henderson reiterated his 
long-held view that forceful protests were of no use if they 
were 'unbacked by force or fear of force. Experience has 
taught Hitler, ' Henderson went on, that only by jungle law 
can he achieve his objectives'. 26 He shared the Prime 
Minister's lack of faith in collective security, which 
Chamberlain had so strongly expressed when opposing the 
137 
imposition of sanctions against Mussolini over Abyssinia. 
It was 'tragic, ' Henderson concluded, 'that the League of 
Nations and collective security should be reduced to such a 
pass, but it is nevertheless the case'. " 
However, Henderson remained unconvinced that the 
Germans were ready to intervene in Czechoslovakia in the 
early spring of 1938. A week later on 1 April he told the 
Foreign Secretary that if such an intervention did take 
place 
as far as my information goes this will not be for a 
year or so. All other things being equal there 
should still remain therefore a period during which 
either preparation can be made at home for another 
world war or for the negotiation of a peaceful 
settlement as regards the Sudeten. "' 
This comment is instructive, indicating that as late as six 
months before Munich, Henderson believed that the Sudeten 
problem could be addressed over a much longer time span than 
was actually to be available, and that in the last resort he 
believed 'preparations' might have to be made for 'another 
world war'. Bene6 might yield to Anglo-French pressure and 
agree to a settlement without fighting; but if he did not, 
Britain and France would have another year to complete their 
rearmament. This at least is a reasonable inference to make 
from Henderson's remarks. A peaceful solution of the 
Sudeten issue would be preferable, but in the longer time- 
span foreseen by Henderson, German intransigence would 
permit a more forceful response. 
Henderson's assessment was supported by the military 
attache in Prague, Lieutenant-Colonel Stronge, whose report 
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on the war-readiness of the Czech and German forces was sent 
by Newton to Halifax two days later on 3 April. Stronge 
believed that it seemed 'probable that the German army is 
not ready for a European war' adding that in a year's time 
'the Czechs will be in a far better position to resist an 
invasion'. -, Stronge's support f or Henderson's view was 
further endorsed by an enclosure with Newton's next telegram 
to Halifax from the British Consul in Liberec, Pares. 
Henderson's view that the existing Czechoslovak state was 
unviable was supported by Pares, who believed that the 
Sudeten Germans had no loyalty to that state, and were 
hiding arms in secret dumps in the frontier area. This 
testimony was particularly valuable, coming as it did from 
the man on the spot. 3° Such information appeared to endorse 
Henderson's parallel view that in the long run the position 
of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia was unsustainable. 
Turning now to any likely involvement in the crisis of 
Czechoslovakia's ally, the Soviet Union, it is clear that 
Henderson believed that any intervention by the USSR was 
undesirable. The Prime Minister's 'underlying ideological 
hostility towards the USSR' was well known, and was shared 
by Halifax. " So Henderson knew that unsympathetic refe- 
rences to the Czech-Soviet alliance of 1935 would be well 
received in London. In his despatch of 1 April he advocated 
that the Czechs abandon the alliance. 
Newton shared Henderson's view. Indeed he went further 
and expressed his doubts about 'whether a permanent solution 
can be expected unless Czechoslovakia is, if not to give up 
her existing alliance with France, at least to change its 
character'. In an extraordinarily anti-Czech despatch, 
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which was more extreme than any of Henderson's anti-Czech 
statements, Newton went on to refer to the 'temperamental 
obstinacy', which made the Czechs 'so determinedly uncom- 
promising', thus making their state 'more untenable every 
day'. " It was Henderson who was to become notorious for 
anti-Czech sentiments, but Newton had been consistently 
critical of his hosts, opining in October 1937 that 'the 
Czechs are an obstinate people with whom fear may more 
easily breed hatred than readiness to yield'. " 
In 1938 Newton believed that the solution to the 
Sudeten problem was 'a neutralised position', which would be 
'comparable to that of Switzerland whereby Czechoslovakia 
would become a kind of sanctuary or reserved area immunised 
against aggression'. " Newton had clearly reached a 
position whereby defence of his host state had become a lost 
cause because Czechoslovakia was 
at Germany's very doors, surrounded by potential 
enemies, completely inaccessible to any force that 
Great Britain could possibly put into the field, and 
exposed in any case to economic strangulation. " 
There could scarcely have been a bleaker analysis of Czecho- 
slovakia's prospects, coming as it did from Newton himself, 
a month after the Anschluss. 
By contrast Henderson, in an interview with Göring on 
16 April, obeyed his instructions to keep the Germans 
guessing about British intentions, even if to Halifax he 
remained pessimistic about the Sudeten issue and the likeli- 
hood of the German minority remaining 'citizens of Czecho- 
slovakia unless they do so willingly'. Göring, according to 
Henderson in his despatch, had talked 'wildly' about 
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dividing up Czechoslovakia between Germany, Poland and 
Hungary (a reference to the discontented Polish and Magyar 
minorities in the Czech State). But Henderson warned him 
that 'aggression was likely to have far more serious conse- 
quences than in the case of Austria'. Nor, Henderson 
suggested, should Germany find it 'surprising that people 
asked where the limit was and did not believe that Germany 
would ever settle down peacefully as a satisfactory (sic) 
country'. " In this instance at least Henderson carried out 
to the letter his instructions to keep the Germans guessing 
about likely British reaction to German aggression against 
the Czechs. 
Meanwhile Halifax was anxious to keep the situation 
under control by addressing German grievances over the 
Sudetenland directly. In his telegram of 4 May to Hender- 
son, Halifax told his Ambassador that if 
the German government could indicate the lines of a 
settlement which in their view would be satisfactory 
to the Sudeten Deutsch, His Majesty's Government 
would consider how far they could recommend accep- 
tance by the Czechoslovak Government. " 
The policy of trying to coerce the unwilling Czechs 
into concessions, enthusiastically supported by Newton in 
Prague, was therefore to continue in the Government's two- 
pronged assault on the Sudeten problem through Newton and 
Henderson. Newton was doubtful in his despatch of 16 May 
that there was 
any permanent halfway house between a Czechoslovakia 
within her present frontiers ... and the abandonment 
to Germany of the whole area covered by the Historic 
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Provinces (save perhaps such parts as might be 
snatched by the Poles). " 
The picture of Henderson that emerges therefore from the 
official British documents, and which undermines the usual 
presumption that Nevile Henderson was hopelessly anti-Czech, 
is that he, rather than Newton, hoped for a long-term 
solution of the Sudeten issue which might conceivably avoid 
fragmentation of the Czech state if the Sudeten Germans 
could be persuaded to remain inside that state. 
Private correspondence between Henderson and Halifax 
supports this view. Writing to the Foreign Secretary on 
27 February, Henderson repeated his belief that a German 
move against the Czechs could only come in the long term, 
because assimilation of Austria would be a lengthy business. 
But he went on to say that the objective which I would far 
rather achieve is the integrity of Czechoslovakia'. 19 This 
theme was reiterated just after the Anschluss on 16 March, 
when Henderson told Halifax that 'we have now to consider 
how to secure, if we can, the integrity of Czechoslovakia'. 
This was a different issue from that of Austria, in Hender- 
son's view, because a 'considerable proportion' of Austrians 
'did not even want independence' whereas the Czechs wanted 
to remain independent. 40 
Henderson still expressed support for the 'integrity' 
of Czechoslovakia in a further despatch on 30 March, after a 
conversation with Mastny. His faith in the principle of 
nationality as 'the governing principle of the twentieth 
century' remained, and in a classic exposition of his views 
Henderson went on to concede that Prague extended more 
national rights than perhaps any other government. However, 
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even Mastny, he said, admitted that in practice 'they were 
often disregarded'. Henderson went on to claim that the 
only real solution was a 'Federal State', which he believed 
was what the founder of the Czech Republic, Tomas Masaryk, 
had originally intended. He concluded his interview with 
Mastny, Henderson told Halifax, by advising the Czech 
Minister to rely on a Prague-Berlin-Paris axis rather than 
the existing Prague-Paris-Moscow one. 41 This was a far more 
moderate position than the one advocated by Basil Newton. 
The evidence suggests, therefore, that in the crucial 
period between the Anschluss and the 'May Scare', Henderson 
did make some effort to accede to his instructions about 
Czechoslovakia, and that he personally believed that a long- 
term solution of the Sudeten issue might be possible because 
Germany was not ready to fight in 1938. Henderson believed 
however that Britain was not ready to fight. This view was 
also supported by Cadogan, who confided in his diary on 
30 March 'We must not precipitate a conflict now - we shall 
be smashed'. `' This too was overwhelmingly the view of the 
Chiefs of Staff at the time. " 
It is clear from the official British Foreign Policy 
Documents that Henderson maintained his scepticism about 
German capacity to intervene in Czechoslovakia right up to 
the eve of the 'May scare'. As late as 19 May Henderson was 
telling Halifax that Hitler would welcome Britain's 'good 
offices' (this was doubtful) over the Sudeten issue, because 
he shrank from the prospect of 'armed intervention ... parti- 
cularly in view of possibility of British participation in 
any war which might ensue'. This was because, Henderson 
reiterated, 'Austria is not digested, the German army not 
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ready for all eventualities and Four-Year Plan far from its 
maximum development'. " Henderson's view accurately 
reflected, in fact, the reservations of the German High 
Command at the time about their likely military performance 
in any war over the Sudetenland; and Henderson did not 
believe that Britain would be forced to give in to Germany 
because of her overwhelming military might. " Henderson's 
telegram on 9 May shows, however, that in his interview with 
Mastny he was supporting Newton's attempt to persuade the 
Czechs of the virtues of concession. Germany, Henderson 
feared, would not be 'deterred by the risk of war with 
Britain' (an observation which ran counter to his statement 
to Halifax) and he told Mastny that 'Czechoslovakia had 
nothing to gain and everything to lose by delay'. " Hender- 
son was adhering to his instructions in his talk with 
Mastny, and putting pressure on him to get concessions from 
Prague, just as Newton was doing with Bene6. He did this 
even though he did not believe in the long-term viability of 
the Czech state in its existing form. 
A consistent theme emerges nonetheless. Henderson was 
not convinced that Germany was ready for war in 1938, but he 
was convinced of the 'morality' of the Sudeten German 
claims. He was sceptical about the ability of the Bene6 
government to keep the Sudeten Deutsch inside Czech 
frontiers, and believed that in the short run some form of 
devolution was the best available solution. Minority status 
for the Sudetens in 'a state of nationalities' was unaccep- 
table, and equal status must be insisted on by Britain if 
they were to be 'willing, citizens of the Czech Republic. 
At root Versailles was to blame for the situation, because 
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it had ignored the national principle in 1919, as far as 
full self-determination for the Germans was concerned. 
While the record shows that Henderson was prepared to use 
the fear of German armed intervention to extract concessions 
from Prague, as were his political masters in London, he did 
not personally believe that Germany was ready for war. This 
accounts for the ambivalence in tone in his two telegrams to 
Halifax on 19 May, the second of which gave details of his 
interview with Mastny. But ambivalence and guesswork were 
predominant characteristics of the period 13 March to 20 May 
1938 in Europe. Not the least curious aspect of this was 
the pessimistic assessments of the military situation: 'both 
German and British military chiefs were urging upon their 
respective heads of government their inability to engage 
upon a successful war'. " 
Nevertheless, Henderson did not use the military weak- 
ness argument to justify his diplomacy in the Sudeten 
crisis. He remained convinced, and would continue to be so, 
of the morality of the Sudeten case and wrote in his memoirs 
that it 'was difficult to justify off-hand the refusal of 
the right of self-determination to the 2,750,000 Sudetens 
living in solid blocs just across Germany's border'. 'e He 
also observed, accurately enough, that: 'The negotiations 
at Prague were not my concern, and it is from the German 
angle alone that I am competent to speak with authority. '49 
These negotiations were of course the responsibility of 
Basil Newton, who has left no written defence of his unsym- 
pathetic attitude to the endangered Czech democracy, and the 
assessment of whose role has been neglected. 
While Newton clearly advocated partition of Czechoslo- 
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vakia, Henderson, despite his post-war reputation, 'did not 
advocate dismemberment', which he believed the Germans did 
not want. '`' Newton's line of thought had obviously been 
picked up by Halifax, who by 25 May was telling Masaryk that 
the least Prague could get away with would be autonomy 'on 
the Swiss model'. " Halifax may have had some grounds for 
hoping that such a solution might be acceptable to the 
Czechs. '' It is significant, however, that by contrast with 
Henderson's experience in Berlin, there is no record of 
rebukes from the Foreign Secretary to his Minister in 
Prague. This seems to imply that Newton's line in Prague, 
however harsh it seems in retrospect, had Halifax's full 
approval. And this despite some accusations that on 
occasion Newton misrepresented the views of Bene6. " 
Tensions surrounding the Sudeten issue were markedly 
increased when, over the weekend of 20-21 May 1938, the 
Czech Government ordered a partial mobilisation of its 
forces. This was a response to rumours about an impending 
German attack as a result of information the Czechs received 
about troop manoeuvres in Saxony. 
Nevile Henderson was intimately involved in the events 
of this so-called 'May scare' of 1938 and even his trivial 
personal actions were linked to the heightening of tension 
over that traumatic spring weekend. In particular, Hender- 
son's decision to send some British Embassy staff home on 
leave sparked off speculation in Germany that war was about 
to break out in the wake of the Czech Government's decision 
to order partial mobilisation. 
There has been much controversy about the origins over 
the May Crisis over the years. Henderson was convinced that 
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German troop movements in Saxony over the weekend of 20-21 
May were no more than manoeuvres. Writing after the event 
he conceded that 
in fairness to the Czechs much abnormal military 
activity - judged by normal standards - was 
continually going on in Germany and that unskilled 
agents and observers can easily be misled. " 
Henderson sent his military attaches, Colonel Noel Mason- 
MacFarlane and Major Kenneth Strong, on 'extensive military 
reconnaissance through Saxony and Silesia' which, as he 
expected, disclosed no significant military activity by the 
Germans. ss But sections of the British press, much to 
Henderson's annoyance, insisted that there had been a real 
threat of a German attack, and rejoiced when the French 
reasserted their commitment to defend Czechoslovakia, and 
this commitment was backed by Britain, albeit in the usual 
rather ambivalent terms which were part of the policy of 
keeping the Germans 'guessing' . 
S' On 21 May Halifax 
instructed Henderson to tell Ribbentrop that the British 
Government 'could not foresee the results if force were 
resorted to and there could be no guarantee that Britain 
would stand aside'. " But this ambivalence and the 'fuzzi- 
ness of the government's position was intentional'. " 
For Henderson himself this was a fraught period. In 
the course of two stormy interviews with Ribbentrop on 
21 May, relations with the Foreign Minister reached a nadir 
when Ribbentrop accused Henderson of a breach of protocol in 
citing General Keitel as his authority for denying that 
there had been any troop movements. As a result, Ribbentrop 
said that no more military information from the Germans 
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would be made available to Henderson. " 
According to one source, Henderson, 'a gentlemanly 
Englishman of the old school,, was taken aback by Ribben- 
trop's 'churlish manner of speaking, and ... was not of the 
calibre to return coarseness for coarseness'. 60 But in the 
two interviews with the bullying Ribbentrop on 21 May and a 
subsequent one on 22 May, he did, according to another 
source, show a firmness that was neither characteristic nor 
customary in him'. " 
Why this apparent wavering from Henderson's allegedly 
supine attitude to the Nazis occurred is never explained by 
his critics; but the outburst was almost certainly caused by 
his notoriously poor relationship with von Ribbentrop. 
Henderson was also infuriated by the circulation of another 
bizarre rumour over that May weekend which heightened the 
fraught atmosphere of the time. This was the rumoured 
evacuation of some British Embassy staff in Berlin and the 
hiring of a special train for them, which strengthened war 
rumours in Germany. 
According to Henderson's memoirs, these rumours started 
as a result of a normal leave arrangement for the British 
naval attache, Troubridge, when an extra train coach had to 
be obtained because some other staff members wanted to take 
leave too. The French Ambassador, Francois-Poncet, on 
hearing this, assumed that all British Embassy staff were 
being evacuated as a prelude to hostilities, and rang the 
Secretary of State at the Wilhelmstrasse, von Weizsäcker, 
who also assumed the worst. Henderson, who regarded the 
whole affair as 'rather childish', relates that the 'special 
train' rumour was taken so seriously that he found Francois- 
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Poncet on his doorstep on 21 May asking about it. " 
At no point during the weekend did British behaviour 
suggest that London would go to war for the Czechs, and 
Henderson was angered by the suggestion that war was 
imminent. But it is clear that at the time the British 
Cabinet did believe that the impression of firmness had 
deterred Hitler from a possible attack. The First Lord of 
the Admiralty Duff Cooper wrote in his diary on 22 May that 
'everybody believes that it was entirely due to the firmness 
of the British Government'. Duff Cooper agreed with Hender- 
son that 'this was a complete misapprehension'. 6' But 
Chamberlain and Halifax believed, despite what Henderson had 
been telling them from Berlin, that there had been a crisis 
and that firmness had some effect. Moderate counsels had 
prevailed in Germany', even if only in the short run. 64 
The capture of German documents after the Second world 
War made it possible to show that Hitler never intended to 
attack Czechoslovakia in May 1938. On 21 May General Keitel 
submitted a draft directive to the Führer for the so-called 
Operation Green which began with the words 'It is not my 
intention to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the 
immediate future' and went on to say that Czechoslovakia 
would not be attacked 'without provocation, unless an 
unavoidable development of the political events in Europe 
create a particularly favourable opportunity'. 65 Henderson 
therefore was right in his appraisal. For the actual conse- 
quence of Anglo-French misjudgement of Hitler's behaviour, 
was to infuriate the German Dictator so that on 30 May he 
was telling his entourage of his 'unalterable decision to 
smash Czechoslovakia by military means in the near future'. 
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1 October was the deadline set for the solution of the 
Sudeten problem before Germany resorted to force. 66 Hender- 
son was also right in his judgement that threats against 
Hitler, which could not be backed up by force, were counter- 
productive. Hitler was in deadly earnest after the May 
Scare. 
By contrast the British Government while apparently 
convinced that Hitler had been deterred by Anglo-French 
support for the Czechs, was determined to prevent such a 
crisis arising again. 
The lesson drawn from the May crisis by Chamberlain 
and his colleagues was thus, not that the Nazi 
leader would be restrained by a firm stand against 
him, but that everything must be done to avoid a 
repetition of the crisis since next time the outcome 
would be far more unpleasant. ' 
In his seminal article on the Sudeten crisis, H. Aulach sees 
the May crisis as part of an 'activist' phase in British 
policy, following lengthy talks with the French in April 
1938 about their commitment to Czechoslovakia. The British 
Government was motivated by concern that delay in dealing 
with the issue was dangerous. " This followed a 'delibera- 
tive' phase between the achievement of the Anschluss and the 
Anglo/French talks of 28-29 April. 69 Given Henderson's 
longstanding reservations about the desirability of 
following French policy towards Germany, it is unlikely that 
he would have accepted Aulach's contention that it was the 
French who really dictated policy over the Sudeten issue: 
but the broad heading of 'activist' seems appropriate for 
the diplomacy pursued in the post-Anschluss period by 
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Halifax, Newton and Henderson. It is also true that the 
British Government's 'deliberative' phase really stretched 
back to 1937, when Eden was still in office, and the doubts 
about, lack of sympathy for, and sheer ignorance of the 
Czechoslovak state in the British establishment were of even 
older vintage. 70 Henderson was one of those who queried the 
legitimacy of and doubted the durability of, the Czecho- 
slovak state. Whether he was, as has been suggested, 
unwontedly firm during the May crisis and then abandoned all 
firmness, is open to question. His position on the Sudeten 
Deutsch issue in the two months after the Anschluss appears 
to have been consistent, and in line with Foreign Office 
policy at the time. " And the record shows that Henderson's 
firm attitude on 21 May with Ribbentrop was not an 
aberration. 
This contrasts with a recent appraisal of Henderson's 
role by D. Cameron Watt, who argues that he was unable to 
abandon the policy of offering colonial readjustments to 
Germany (see Chapter Three) which had preceded the 
Anschluss, and so could not 'play the warning and 
restraining role with his German contacts this new phase of 
British foreign policy demanded'. " 
Yet in his interview with Göring on 16 April, and his 
two interviews with von Ribbentrop on 21 May, Henderson 
displayed a robust 'warning and restraining role'. Newton 
by contrast, remained consistently and, it can be argued, 
unpleasantly hostile to the Government to which he was 
accredited. Remembering Henderson's admonition in Failure 
of A Mission that the task of an ambassador was in the first 
instance to 'faithfully interpret the views of his own 
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Government to the Government to which he is accredited' and 
in the second 'to explain, no less accurately, the views and 
standpoint of the Government of the country in which he is 
stationed to the Government of his own country', it could be 
argued that Henderson sometimes failed the first test, and 
that Newton failed the second. " Henderson was not, 
however, as consistently anti-Czech as has frequently been 
suggested, and in the period before the May Scare he was not 
an advocate of dismemberment. He also seems to have carried 
out his instructions to the letter in this period, although 
it has to be recognised that such caution may have been 
induced by Halifax's admonition over the 'precipitate folly' 
remark. For, as will be seen, Henderson never lost his 
capacity for the 'blazing indiscretion'. 
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The May crisis of 1938 was clearly a very unsettling 
experience for Henderson. His despatches in the three 
months that followed it were full of references to the need 
to avoid such alarms and excursions; again (a lengthy 
telegram to Halifax on 12 August, for example, stated that 
'We cannot keep having May 21sts"). 
Doubly galling, therefore, for the Ambassador was the 
persistent belief that the supposed 'evacuation' of the 
Berlin Embassy in May represented some form of anti-German 
stand persisted. Writing to Halifax on 12 June, Henderson 
told of how he had been caused some distress' by a letter 
from Lord Stanley of Alderney, copied to him by the Foreign 
Office, in which Stanley said that Henderson's action had 'a 
restraining effect' on the German Government. Henderson's 
annoyance is clear from the tone of his comments. 'The 
tragedy of a lie, ' he wrote, is that once started it is 
never quite caught up with', deploring the fact that Wolf 
was 'being cried too soon'. 2 
Henderson would have been equally irritated by the 
comments made by his Counsellor, George Ogilvie-Forbes, in a 
letter to William Strang at the Foreign office, shortly 
after the May crisis. Although Ogilvie-Forbes confirmed 
that the Embassy in Berlin had no evidence whatever of 
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abnormal concentrations of troops', he went on to reflect 
that 
Hitler may have intended some grave step such as an 
ultimatum, and that for the moment he has shied off, 
thanks to the energetic intervention of the 
Ambassador who has had a most trying interview with 
von Ribbentrop. ' 
It is in fact odd that Ogilvie-Forbes wrote in such terms to 
Strang, as he must have known (although his personal 
relationship with Henderson was poor) that Henderson was not 
rejoicing over the events of 20-21 May, or his personal role 
in them. 
More mollifying would have been a private letter from 
Henderson's fellow diplomat Basil Newton on 27 May, 
expressing his thanks for an encouraging note which Hender- 
son had sent to him on 19 May. Newton expressed his hope 
that Henderson would 'be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and 
when that is done, I hope I may receive honourable mention'. 
'You, ' opined Newton, 'have much the hardest job. '` 
Several related themes emerge relentlessly from Hender- 
son's telegrams and personal letters in the period after the 
May scare, leading up to the Nazi Party Rally at Nuremberg 
in early September 1938. 
One was that Henderson remained convinced that Hitler 
did not want war, as he told Halifax on 24 July, tele- 
graphing that the German Government as apart from sections 
of the Nazi Party, are as frightened as we are of an 
incident which may precipitate a war' .S The evidence 
available to Henderson suggested that the German public 
itself did not want war, and wanted a peaceful resolution of 
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the Sudeten issue. ' 
Henderson continued to reiterate another of his favou- 
rite themes, the danger of driving Hitler into the arms of 
his 'extremists', who wanted to resolve the Sudeten Question 
by force. Thus he wrote to Halifax that in his view, 
We are more likely to strengthen the Chancellor's 
hand against extremists if we show belief in his 
good faith than if we reiterated a warning and a 
threat which has already been taken to heart. 
It is easy to scoff at Henderson's naivety in continuing to 
subscribe to the 'moderates' and 'extremists' analysis of 
the Nazi leadership, but worthy of note that his predecessor 
Eric Phipps had made the same sort of error in his estimate 
of Göring that Henderson was prone to. In November 1936, in 
his fourth year in Berlin, Phipps had telegraphed to London 
about 'very helpful points of contacts with General Göring, 
who is an old army officer with few Nazi proclivities in his 
saner moments'. ' Henderson was at least capable of 
wondering in early August 1938 about whether Göring might be 
'out of the moderation camp'. ' The fundamental error, and 
it was not Henderson's alone, was to imagine that Hitler 
would ever be susceptible to moderate advice. 
Neither was Henderson blind to German tendencies to 
stupidity and inability to see anyone else's point of view, 
which he regarded as 'one of the worst German failings' .9 
This tendency was at its worst in von Ribbentrop whose 
personal animosity towards Henderson restricted his access 
to the Führer. Writing to the Permanent Under-Secretary 
Cadogan, Henderson deplored the lack of contact with the 
sole arbiter of Germany's fate', which meant that one 
is 
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consequently groping in the dark,. 1° 
During these crucial weeks Henderson made little secret 
of his low opinion of, and lack of trust in, the Czech 
President Eduord Bene6. l' In Henderson's view, Beneg was 'a 
small man' especially by comparison with his illustrious 
predecessor Tomas Masaryk, and needed constant reminders 
that the solution to the Sudeten problem was in the Czech, 
as well as the wider European interest. 12 Unless pressure 
was constantly applied in Prague, Henderson believed, Bene6 
would hide behind a wall of rhetoric and no progress would 
be achieved in meeting Sudeten German grievances, and their 
demand for autonomy. 
Henderson's preferred solution, stated in several tele- 
grams over the three months before the Party Rally, was 'a 
Swiss cantonal system for the Sudeten', which would prevent 
them from being harassed continuously by minor Czech 
officials. " But he was concerned that when Lord Runciman 
was sent to the Sudetenland as a mediator in August by the 
British Government, he should reach a conclusion to his 
deliberations before the Nuremberg Rally. " Otherwise 
Hitler, he believed, would be handed a propaganda victory. 
In a stream of telegrams and private letters in August 
and early September 1938, Henderson continued to offer 
Halifax and the Foreign Office suggestions and warnings 
about the right strategy to adopt in dealing with Hitler and 
Ribbentrop. He was scathing about Ribbentrop, whom he 
described (accurately) as being as vain as he is stupid, 
and as stupid as he is vain' . 
i' Then Henderson was brought 
to the centre of the stage, when he was asked to be present 
at a Cabinet meeting on 30 August (he reported back to 
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London on 28 August and returned to Berlin on 31 August). 
New sub-plots also emerge in the period after the May 
Crisis. Henderson's military attache, Colonel Frank Mason 
MacFarlane, becomes an important figure in the events 
leading up to Nuremberg, and there are also several signifi- 
cant references in Henderson's personal papers, and in the 
published documents, to the role of the Italian Ambassador, 
Attolico, who broadly shared Henderson's perceptions about 
likely German behaviour. " Henderson could also rely on the 
support of his new American colleague, Hugh Wilson, whom he 
later described as having 'keen observation and sound judge- 
ment'. Relations with Wilson were much better than with 
Wilson's predecessor Dodd who thought Henderson far too pro- 
German (and with whom Henderson was later to be in dispute 
about entries in Dodd's published diary). " 
Henderson was concerned about having a reputation for 
being too sympathetic towards the Hitler regime with 
diplomatic colleagues or inside the Foreign office itself. 
Just before the onset of the May Scare Henderson had 
expressed these concerns to Halifax in a private letter. 
Believe me or not, [Henderson wrote] and anyway your 
Department seems to have some doubts, I have not 
prejudiced the issue in any way with the German 
Government either as regards the 'State of Nationa- 
lities' or what we shall do in the event of trouble 
... I am in fact very much alive 
to the delicacy of 
our operation. 19 
Henderson concluded this letter by telling Halifax that 
he could rest assured that the Germans do not at all have 
the impression that Britain will sit still in all 
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circumstances and that they do have confidence in our 
sincerity' . 
'° Henderson repeated this assurance on 
12 August when he told Halifax that 
I lose no opportunity of reminding, tactfully or 
not, Germans of every kind (all Germans are working 
gramophones so every little helps) of what we might 
do in certain circumstances. " 
His critics in the Foreign Office remained unconvinced. 
Nevertheless Henderson did have sympathizers in the 
Foreign Office. One was R. H. Hadow, formerly the First 
Secretary in the Prague Embassy during Addison's time, who 
by 1938 was a First Secretary in the Northern Department. 
Hadow wrote to Henderson on 11 May, enclosing a memorandum 
which he had prepared for the Foreign Office on the pros- 
pects of an Anglo-French alliance with the USSR. He told 
Henderson that 
All that you have said will of course come true; 
but here the clique who would not allow of any right 
on the German side are still doing what they can to 
bring on the day of reckoning. 
In Cabinet circles, Hadow went on, on the other hand 
your telegrams and those of Newton (who had been castigated 
by Vansittart but endorsed by Butler and S of S) are 
receiving anxious attention'. Hadow bemoaned the failure of 
the Foreign office to speak bluntly to the French about the 
Sudeten problem, and complained that 
in the Office 'Russian help' is part of a creed 
which is not helpful to your efforts to keep peace 
in Europe. I hope you will succeed and wish I could 
help but in the Northern Department one is side- 
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tracked and anyway a ist Secretary is easily 
smothered though, as you will see, not silenced. 
I have of course no authority to send on these 
documents so hope you will not mind treating them as 
'nut et non avenu'. 
Hadow concluded his private letter by saying that if he 
could be 'of any help at any time I shall be only too 
glad'. 21 Hadow's reference to Newton being 'castigated' by 
Vansittart is interesting, although no reference to this 
criticism appears in the published British Foreign Policy 
Documents, whereas there are numerous examples of Henderson 
being reproved by the Foreign Office. Hadow was taking a 
considerable risk in writing to Henderson in such terms, as 
his request for secrecy indicates. The reference in Chapter 
Two to Owen O'Malley's supportive letter to Henderson in 
June 1937 shows that he did indeed have support from senior 
officials in the Foreign Office, and O'Malley, like Hadow, 
was prepared to take some risks to encourage Henderson's 
style of diplomacy in Berlin. 2' 
Henderson also maintained good relations (Ribbentrop 
apart), with officials at the Wilhelmstrasse, particularly 
with the State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker. He under- 
stood Weizsäcker's own difficulties with the pompous Ribben- 
trop when the State Secretary told him that he had to be 
'loyal to my chief'. Henderson told Halifax on 30 July that 
this was 'a sentiment in which I outwardly fully concurred, 
but which inwardly I feared in this particular case would be 
scarcely likely to be helpful'. ' Weizsäcker himself 
remains an ambivalent figure, whose position over the Czech 
issue has been criticised for merely substituting his 
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'cherished but not much less questionable formula for the 
"chemical dissolution" of the Czechoslovak State' for the 
aggressive threats of Adolf Hitler. He was, observes the 
same critic, 'a German counterpart of Sir Nevile Henderson' 
who feared war but 'wanted a more respectable expansionist 
Reich'. " The analogy presumably refers to the heartfelt 
desire for peace which both men possessed, but Henderson was 
dedicated to the conservation of the British Empire, not to 
its expansion. By contrast, Weizsäcker wanted to secure the 
cession of the Sudetenland to the Reich, albeit by peaceful 
means. 
Henderson also got on well with his counterpart in 
London, the German Ambassador von Dirksen. In his memoirs 
von Dirksen wrote 
from the very beginning we liked each other, because 
we both had to bear heavy responsibility and were 
approaching our task with equal goodwill. We gave 
advice to each other ... I recommended Göring, 
Weizsäcker and the Generals to him. 26 
The two men lunched together in Berlin in early August, at a 
time of acute tension caused by German troop movements close 
to the Czech frontier, which, Henderson warned von Dirksen 
(another example of Henderson carrying out his warning 
function) 
might easily produce panic in Czechoslovakia and 
elsewhere. However expedient on purely military 
grounds, such a step would assuredly be misunder- 
stood abroad and if anything happened would be held 
as proof of German intention to be aggressive. " 
The accusation that Henderson did not carry out his warning 
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function after the Anschluss therefore flies in the face of 
the testimony of this reliable German career diplomat. Von 
Dirksen was 
a career foreign servant, and for this reason 
Ribbentrop would never wholly trust him. During 
neither his Japanese nor his British assignments was 
Dirksen made privy to the party's plans in foreign 
affairs. -' 
Henderson's confidantes, with the notable exception of 
Göring, were career diplomats, not Nazis, and even in 
Göring's case, Henderson was following the guidelines laid 
down by Eric Phipps. 
The problem with Henderson was that he could still be 
indiscreet with sympathetic foreigners. In June, he told 
von Weizsäcker about a confidential British initiative in 
Prague when the Czechs were warned that they would be aban- 
doned by Britain if they did not make concessions over the 
Sudetenland. But he may have calculated that Weizsäcker, 
whom he plainly regarded as an anti-Nazi, would not pass on 
such indiscretions to Ribbentrop whose anti-British bias was 
by now notorious. 2' Ribbentrop was likely to perceive such 
a British initiative as an example of British double- 
dealing, and to further poison Hitler's mind about British 
sincerity. As it was, Ribbentrop was already convinced that 
Britain would never take any action if Germany were to 
attack Czechoslovakia. 30 
The whole issue of Nevile Henderson's relationship with 
the German opposition to Hitler is a thorny one. But it was 
not Henderson's job to assist 'oppositionists' like Weiz- 
säcker (and as indicated above there have to be some doubts 
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about the latter's credentials as an oppositionist) to over- 
throw the German Government. He saw in the State Secretary 
someone, like himself, who wished to prevent Britain and 
Germany from going to war. To criticise him for not advoca- 
ting a sympathetic hearing for the German oppositionists, 
which neither his Prime Minister nor Foreign Secretary then 
supported, seems somewhat absurd. Even Vansittart had his 
doubts about the German opposition and their insistence on 
maintaining revisionist territorial claims to Austria, the 
Sudetenland and the Polish Corridor. 31 Both Henderson, and 
Neville Chamberlain, believed that maintaining relations 
with the anti-Nazi opposition might 'compromise relations 
with the Nazi state which was a sovereign state with which 
Britain was maintaining diplomatic relations'. " 
Ribbentrop predictably continued to make life difficult 
for the 'man with the carnation' after the May crisis. 33 
When the British Government nominated Lord Runciman as a 
mediator in the Sudetenland in late July, Ribbentrop 
instructed von Weizsäcker to complain to Henderson that the 
announcement of the Runciman mission had been made before 
the German Government had been informed. Henderson informed 
Halifax that he had 
told the State Secretary that I regarded such unhelp- 
ful messages as quite deplorable and since German 
government professed not to influence Sudeten Party 
I trusted that the latter would show more sense and 
understanding. " 
It is difficult to square such language with accusations 
that Henderson abandoned 'all firmness' after the May 
Crisis. Henderson was also angered by the behaviour of 
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Woermann, the Political Director at the Wilhelmstrasse, when 
Chamberlain passed on a personal message to Henderson for 
transmission to Hitler. Woermann, Henderson reported, 
verged on the truculent and his attitude was 'that of von 
Ribbentrop' (Woermann had contended that such a personal 
message should be routed through Ribbentrop in the first 
instance). " 
In a personal interview with Ribbentrop on 1 September, 
Henderson conveyed the Foreign Office warning that the 
Germans should reflect on 'the probability of Great Britain 
becoming involved if France found herself at war with 
Germany'. After his experiences with Ribbentrop on 21 May 
Henderson made the best of a bad job in his subsequent 
interviews. He had no illusions where Ribbentrop was 
concerned. 
Henderson also kept up contacts with assumed 
'moderates' in the German establishment, even when they had 
fallen out with their Führer. Thus on 3 September, just 
before his departure to the Party Rally at Nuremberg, Hender- 
son had an interview with the former Foreign Minister von 
Neurath, who had been displaced in Hitler's reshuffle in 
January 1938. Yet again Henderson warned that 'circum- 
stances might be such as to compel us to participate'. 
Neurath wanted to see Henderson at Nuremberg, but Henderson 
told him that he was anxious lest he be forced to hear 
speeches by Nazi leaders of which his Government might 
disapprove. 36 It is instructive indeed, given the constant 
attention given to Henderson's gaffes, and the reprimands 
which he received from the Foreign office, to note that on 
5 September he was informed that his language 
in the inter- 
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view with Weizsäcker on 1 September when he had commented 
, with amazement and regret' on the growing strength of anti- 
German feeling in Britain, had been approved. Henderson 
also warned Weizsäcker in that interview that no British 
government could cause France to act 'contrary to her 
honour' over the Sudeten issue. His language to Ribbentrop 
on 1 September was also approved by the Foreign Office. " 
Ill-thought of by many in the Foreign Office and with 
nerves frayed by Ribbentrop's persistent rudeness in inter- 
views, Henderson seemed during this period (whatever Halifax 
may have felt later about Henderson being 'a light-weight') 
to have retained the confidence of the Foreign Secretary. 38 
In a long letter early in August Halifax wrote to Henderson: 
'It has been of the greatest help to me to have your views 
and judgements'. He went on to sum up Britain's policy as 
one of 'perpetually telling Bene6 of what we might not do in 
the event of trouble: and of tactfully reminding the 
Germans of what we might do'. Halifax also expressed some 
sympathy for his hard-pressed Ambassador. 
Meanwhile, I am sorry for you in Berlin when the 
atmosphere in all respects must be beastly. But we 
are all in this very disagreeable job together and 
yours is not the least important part. Write as 
often as you can or like. It is very helpful. 39 
Henderson plainly took him up on his offer although shortly 
afterwards he was expressing regret at 'flooding you with 
all this correspondence'. 40 
Much of this correspondence in August and September 
concerned the likelihood of Lord Runciman achieving a 
compromise about the status of the Sudetenland. Hearing of 
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Runciman's appointment on 26 July, Henderson told Halifax 
that he did not 'envy Lord Runciman the difficult and thank- 
less task which he is undertaking'. This was because 'The 
Czechs are a pig-headed race and Bene6 not the least pig- 
headed among them'. Henderson went on to invoke the memory 
of his halcyon days in Belgrade, recalling the low opinion 
that 'King Alexander and the Yugoslavs had of him 
[Bene6]'. 4 1 He also assured Weizsäcker that Runciman was to 
have complete independence and hoped that he would be able 
to establish the 'bases for a settlement which ought to be 
"on the basis" of Home Rule' (Henderson was fond of analo- 
gies with Ireland). '' Throughout Henderson was insistent 
that Runciman should make known the lines on which he was 
working before the Nazi Party Rally in September. As for 
Runciman, he too soon fell victim to the Addison school of 
anti-Czech prejudice to which Henderson and Newton were 
heirs. " 
At the end of August, Henderson's local knowledge was 
required in London, and he was to attend the Cabinet meeting 
on 30 August. He was subjected to intensive questioning by 
Cabinet Ministers about Hitler's intentions. He was not 
sure that Hitler had made up his mind to use force to settle 
the Sudeten question immediately but he thought that he 
would try and do so 'before the winter'. Assessments in 
late August that Hitler would use force, according to 
Henderson, came 'from enemies of the regime who would be 
unlikely to know the facts'. But if Bene6 did not make some 
meaningful concessions before the Nuremberg Rally, Hitler 
would make 'some strong pronouncement' at the Rally. Asked 
about the role of the Sudeten leader, Konrad Hen ein, 
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Henderson did not think that Henlein was 'entirely in 
Hitler's pocket although some of his followers were'. 
Henderson, as ever, was against the use of pointless 
threats against Germany, which he was sure would strengthen 
the 'extremists' like Goebbels and Himmler. 'The extremists 
would say that we were moving towards a preventative war. ' 
A threat of British intervention over the Sudetenland might 
cause Hitler to 'draw in his horns now; but that would not 
be the end. He would press on with his rearmament'. When 
the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Winterton, asked 
about the colonial issue, Henderson told him that Hitler 
knew that if he attacked Czechoslovakia, colonial readjust- 
ment would be impossible. " 
Henderson's attendance at this Cabinet meeting was 
significant, but its importance should not be exaggerated. 
It was not unprecedented for ambassadors to attend Cabinet 
meetings, and Palairet had done so at the time of the 
Anschluss. 
Henderson's comments at the Cabinet meeting on 
30 August underline one of the problems which he, and the 
Foreign Office in general, had to deal with. This was the 
question of how independent Henlein really was. In April, 
for example, Halifax told the Cabinet that: 'Henlein was 
more and more coming under the influence of Herr Hitler'. 
But a month later (after Henlein visited London on 18 May) 
he told his colleagues that Sir Robert Vansittart now 
believed that Dr Henlein had no instructions from Berlin', 
and that based on this premise 'Dr Bene6 could get an agree- 
ment of a useful character if only he would act quickly'. `s 
Henderson had already demonstrated scepticism about Henlein 
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when he wrote to Halifax on 27 August about his belief that 
Hitler's position was 
of course equivocal in that he takes credit for 
leaving Herr Henlein free to negotiate with the 
Czechs at the same time allowing his party to 
instigate Sudeten to put forward far-reaching 
demands. " 
This was merely a polite way of saying that Hitler and 
Henlein were hand in glove, as they assuredly were, although 
Henderson seemed to qualify this statement at the Cabinet 
meeting on 30 August. Nevertheless he deserves credit for 
being able to discern the duplicity behind the overall 
German strategy. In this instance Henderson was right, and 
his great critic Vansittart, who had been taken in by 
Henlein's professions of goodwill since 1935, was wrong. 
Whatever his doubts about Henlein's trustworthiness, 
Henderson continued to press for compromise, talking of the 
need for 'real autonomy on the lines of the Swiss Federa- 
tion, and absolute equality of rights'. " He also asked on 
28 August whether Runciman could not 'report to His 
Majesty's Government what he intends to recommend to Czech 
Government as basis for negotiation, say Swiss cantonal 
authority'. " 
Underlining all his pleas for compromise throughout the 
summer and early autumn of 1938, was Henderson's demand that 
Britain should be seen to be following the morally correct 
course on the Sudeten issue. This was most famously 
expressed in his plea on 12 August that the British case be 
'morally copper-bottomed' and his certainty that the British 
Empire could not 'set itself against the principle of self- 
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determination'. 
He urged Halifax to point out that British policy was 
dictated not by self-interest (something the Czechs might 
have had doubts about) but by a desire to uphold the 
principle of self-determination which the democracies had 
fought for in the first world War. " This was laudable 
enough, but in his enthusiasm to protect Sudeten German 
rights, Henderson tended to lose sight of the related issue 
of Czechoslovak rights, especially when he, quite correctly, 
foresaw that there would be additional problems with 
Hungarian and Polish claims for territorial revision in 
respect of Czech Ruthenia and Teschen. On 28 June, Hender- 
son had written to Cadogan that if there was 'trouble over 
Czechoslovakia I think we must take it for granted that the 
Germans have nobbled the Magyars' . 
50 He believed that both 
Hungary and Poland were likely to mobilise in the event of a 
Czech-German crisis, maintain 'benevolent' neutrality, and 
then 'move to seize their respectively agreed portion of the 
skin once the bear is on the ground. A charming picture'. 51 
Henderson was thus well aware of the dangers of Hungarian- 
Polish irredentism, but shut his eyes to the fact that such 
behaviour would be a direct consequence of encouraging 
Sudeten German separatism. But he was not alone in his 
myopia, and had at least put forward the idea of a Four 
Power guarantee for a truncated Czech state without the 
Sudetenland, which at the time was a plausible solution and 
offered Bene6 some protection against future German 
aggression. '' 
At times too, Henderson showed some sympathy for the 
unfortunate Czechs whom he described as 'a small and heroic 
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race', and as late as 2 June, he hoped, in another letter to 
Cadogan, that there was still 'a chance to preserve the 
integrity of Czechoslovakia and keep the Sudeten within 
it'. " This sympathy, however, was overridden by his sym- 
pathy for the Sudeten Germans, and when in early August the 
Czechs produced a plan for so-called mixed provinces, in 
which the Germans would have been placed in a minority, 
Henderson believed that this was not workable. The Sudeten 
German demand for a State of Nationalities would not, he 
said, be met by what was just a variant of the existing 
minority statute in Czechoslovakia. " Oddly, and ignoring 
the ethnic mix in their states, he told Halifax that 'Eng- 
land would fight for Hungarians, Poles or Rumanians, but not 
for the Czech Sudetenland' because it had a majority German 
population. " This ignored the fact that many Czechs lived 
in the Sudetenland, although Joseph Addison (even though he 
was on the retired list), had done his best to muddy the 
waters about the racial composition of the Czechoslovak 
'Republic in a memorandum to the Foreign Office in May. "' 
Henderson's perception of the Czech crisis differed 
from that of his military attache in the British Embassy, 
Mason MacFarlane, who became an important figure in this 
period. " MacFarlane's papers make it clear that there was 
a degree of personal antagonism between Henderson and 
himself, and he thought that Henderson was not taking a 
tough enough line with the Nazis. 58 Nevertheless in August 
1938 MacFarlane's despatches, normally covered by a letter 
from Henderson, played an increasingly important part in the 
British Cabinet's assessment of Hitler's likely behaviour. 
On 27 July, MacFarlane thought that Hitler's armed 
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forces were 'seeing to it that if the emergency arises their 
preparations shall not be found wanting'. He believed that 
Hitler might make a surprise attack on the Czechs. Hender- 
son did not agree. 'I am not so sure, ' he told Halifax, 
, that he will begin marching without warning. ' Henderson 
thought that Hitler would not take any aggressive action 
against the Czechs, without giving Britain at least 24 
hours' warning so that disaster could be avoided. " 
In his telegram of 3 August, Henderson commented on 
MacFarlane's warning that up to eight German divisions in 
Germany, and all German forces in Austria, had been put in a 
state of war readiness. Henderson believed, he told 
Halifax, that this move was 'a mixture of bluff and of real 
menace' (seeming therefore to be hedging his bets). But he 
conceded that such moves could not 'but have regrettable 
repercussions'. Mason MacFarlane worded his anxieties more 
strongly. He thought that the German test mobilisation was 
'desperately provocative. It is hard to see how Czecho- 
slovakia can fail to mobilise in reply'. Although Henderson 
confessed himself to be 'extremely perturbed' about the 
projected Czech plan for three years' military service, 
which he believed would be provocative in turn, in fact the 
Czechs did not mobilise at this point. 60 
Henderson's fears about a repetition of the May Crisis 
reappeared in his telegram to Halifax the next day 4 August. 
During the past few months [Henderson reminded 
Halifax] he had consistently endeavoured to discount 
rumours which ran contrary to my evidence and 
personal opinions, regarding intention on Germany's 
part to take action against Czechoslovakia. "' 
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He was by now desperately anxious that the Sudeten issue 
might lead to war, and abandoned his earlier opposition to 
dismemberment of the Czech State if that would preserve the 
peace. 
He was nonetheless sufficiently impressed by the test 
mobilisation, and rumours of German preparations, to send 
Mason MacFarlane to London in early August to 'discuss the 
extent and significance of German military preparations'. 62 
This statement in Henderson's memoirs presents the problem 
rather baldly, as there was a clear difference of view 
between the two men and MacFarlane spent some time 
trying to correct Henderson's presentation of the 
military information. The War Office staff having 
known him as a consistent optimist were impressed 
with his sombre account of the military preparations 
in eastern Germany . 
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On his return to Berlin, MacFarlane continued on the 
same theme. He had good contacts with the German military 
establishment, and on 8 August he reported to Henderson and 
Halifax about a conversation with Victor von Koerber, a 
retired army captain, who was also chief correspondent in 
Berlin for Wiener Journal. Koerber told MacFarlane that 
Hitler had already decided upon war in September, but also 
commented on a great upsurge in opposition to the Nazis in 
the past few months. MacFarlane himself had commented on 
the unpopularity of the Nazi regime during his visit to 
London during the first week in August; but on the issue of 
British support for German opposition to Hitler he and his 
Ambassador were of one mind. MacFarlane thought that 
any bungling of an attempt to interfere from without 
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with Germany's domestic politics during Hitler's 
lifetime would most assuredly lead to exactly what 
we all wished to avoid. " 
Henderson for his part repeated his view that any outside 
interference in German affairs would be counterproductive. " 
In fact Mason MacFarlane's position was not as clear- 
cut as his biographer has suggested, and he was prone to the 
same doubts and fears as his Ambassador. For a week later 
MacFarlane was cautious about Hitler's intentions, and 
thought that the British would not be 'justified in suppo- 
sing that Herr Hitler has made up his mind to go to war this 
autumn'. 66 Henderson agreed, writing of the Führer 'I do 
not believe he wants war'; but while MacFarlane was 
inclined to think war would come, Henderson thought that 
Hitler was bluffing because Germany was still not ready for 
war. 67 This meant that: 
Two entirely different courses of action opened out 
from these reports. Britain could either be firm 
and repeat the warning of 21 May, hoping that 
internal disagreements in Germany would produce the 
same result as before; or she could hasten at all 
costs the Runciman Report and keep Germany as sweet 
as possible in the meantime. " 
MacFarlane preferred the former course of action. Hender- 
son, who still believed that Hitler could be reined in, the 
latter. His interpretation of what had happened on 21 May 
was the correct one, and it was not unreasonable of him to 
assume that a warning which had enraged Hitler on 21 May and 
strengthened his determination to attack the Czechs would 
again produce the opposite effect to that intended. The 
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flaw in MacFarlane's position was that he was on the one 
hand warning about German preparations (and 'crying wolf'), 
while also doubting on the other whether Hitler was about to 
attack. His comments in his personal papers smack of post 
hoc justification, and the information he was passing on to 
Henderson and London is apt to confuse rather than to 
enlighten. " Henderson, although fearful of war, was consis- 
tent in his argument that Germany was not ready for war, but 
that in any case the Sudetenland was not worth one. And his 
view that the Czech army would only hold out for a matter of 
weeks was based on an assessment made by the British Chiefs 
of Staff in March 1938. 
To be fair to both men, the situation in August and 
September 1938 was highly confused. The French Prime 
Minister Dalader had suggested that if war came the Czechs 
could hold out for up to three months, but his Chief of 
Staff Gamelin had told the US Ambassador Bullitt that the 
Anschluss had made any effective defence of Czechoslovakia 
impossible. 70 
Henderson was decidedly unenthusiastic about consulta- 
tions with the French, and opposed the idea of sending a 
personal message to Hitler which Halifax had mooted during 
MacFarlane's visit to London. He hoped in his telegram of 
19 August that Halifax would not 'decide to inform the 
French government at this stage of memorandum which you 
instructed me to communicate to Herr Hitler' (Halifax had 
told Henderson to make a demarche to Hitler, expressing 
British concern about the German test mobilisation on 
11 August). 71 This was not the first, or last time that 
Henderson queried his instructions, and he won a technical 
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victory on this occasion. Henderson was concerned that a 
personal approach to Hitler about the test mobilisation 
might enrage him, and in his reply on 19 August, Halifax 
agreed that it was only necessary to inform the Wilhelm- 
strasse about British anxieties. But, Halifax said, if the 
French raised the matter of German military measures with 
him, he would be bound to tell them about the approach he 
had ordered Henderson to make on 11 August. 72 Henderson 
could however, claim that there was a good precedent for 
withholding information from the French, as they had only 
been told about the plan for the Runciman mission during the 
visit by King George VI and Queen Elizabeth to Paris in July 
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Although Henderson told von Weizsäcker on 1 September 
that no British government would advise France to act 
'contrary to her honour', he was in fact sceptical about 
what the French could do in the event of war over the 
Sudetenland. He did not believe that the French would 
attack the Siegfried Line on the Franco-German frontier, or 
that the Germans would attack the Maginot Line. The result 
would be a stalemate which would be of no assistance to the 
beleaguered Czechs. " This point was reiterated in Hender- 
son's personal letter to Halifax on 28 August. The Czechs 
and the Sudetens, wrote Henderson, 'would be heroically 
butchered' while France would stand by unless Britain came 
in and blockaded Germany as she had done in the First World 
War. "' 
This assessment has been supported in the latest 
seminal study of Franco-British relations. 
In fact [writes P. M. H. Bell] the French position was 
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much less clear-cut than their treaty obligations 
implied. The French High Command ruled out any 
prospect of an immediate assault on the newly built 
Germany fortifications in the West, which meant that 
the best they could hope to do was to rescue Czecho- 
slovakia at a final peace treaty and not by prompt 
military action. " 
Henderson's attitude to the French alliance, though 
conditioned by his overwhelming desire to prevent British 
involvement in a war for the Sudetenland, was in fact based 
on a pretty sound assessment of the existing military 
realities. The British Chiefs of Staff were convinced that 
only a long war, using Britain's overwhelming naval superio- 
rity, brought any prospect of victory over Germany. In the 
short run 'no pressure we and France could bring by sea, 
land or air could stop Germany over-running Bohemia and 
inflicting a decisive defeat on Czechoslovakia'. " 
Henderson, then, although sticking to his view that 
Hitler (unless swayed by his extremists) did not want war, 
was convinced that the Sudeten issue was not worth fighting 
for because the cause was not morally sound, and did not 
merit the squandering of British lives. 'B British policy 
was to keep the Germans guessing about what Britain would do 
in an emergency, while putting pressure on both the Czechs 
and the French to settle. Henderson's essential task was to 
warn the Germans about the consequences of an invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, and create enough uncertainty in the German 
mind about Britain's response to deter Hitler. 79 
He is open to the accusation that he failed to do this. 
Reference has already been made to the June conversation 
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with Weizsäcker, when Henderson had allegedly said that the 
Czechs would be abandoned by Britain if they did not come to 
terms, and that Prague had been told this-60 And he is 
further accused of saying on 6 August (at a party) that 
'Great Britain would not think of risking one sailor or 
airman for Czechoslovakia', the sort of reported comment 
that caused the French to complain about him. " On the face 
of it, this was pretty damning evidence, which shows 
Henderson failing to stick to his brief of keeping Germany 
guessing. Two points seem pertinent here. Firstly, did the 
Germans pay any real heed to what Henderson said, and would 
it have had any more influence on what Ribbentrop and Hitler 
did than the critical attitudes of his predecessors Rumbold 
and Phipps? It is on the record that the sight of 
Henderson seemed to arouse Hitler's antagonism', and that 
Ribbentrop had made up his mind that Britain would never go 
to war with Germany. °, 
The second point is that reliable witnesses, like von 
Dirksen and Spitzy, bear witness to the fact that in the 
months before the Party Rally in Nuremberg, Henderson did 
carry out his warning function properly. The paradox is 
(unless the contrary evidence is dismissed as a German 
fabrication) that he appeared to undermine his good work by 
being indiscreet on public occasions. But then this was 
nothing new in Henderson's career. " 
One possible explanation for Henderson's behaviour is 
offered by Sir Frank Roberts, a fellow diplomat with post- 
war experience as an ambassador in a totalitarian state, who 
offers a more sympathetic analysis of Henderson's behaviour 
than many historians have done. Roberts notes that 
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Henderson was sent to Berlin in the expectation that he 
would be able to 'talk more frankly' with the Nazi leaders 
than his more intellectual predecessor Phipps. 
Henderson thus unexpectedly brought back from a 
distant post, [Roberts writes] ... not unnaturally 
regarded his mission primarily as one of support for 
the Chamberlain appeasement policy, and took his 
lead much more from Number 10 than from the Foreign 
Office, with the result that during the Czech crisis 
he always seemed to be criticising the Czechs and 
defending the Nazis. " 
This analysis centres on the premise that because Henderson 
saw himself as Chamberlain's man in Berlin, he could not be 
balanced in his appraisal of Czech-German relations, but, as 
has already been outlined above, the Foreign Office itself 
lacked this balance because of Addison's influence. 
It is also true that Henderson did not owe his appoint- 
ment to Chamberlain but to Vansittart, who was sufficiently 
concerned about Phipps' alleged anti-Germanism to accommo- 
date the process whereby Henderson was sent to Berlin in 
1937.85 But when Henderson took the opposite, more 
emollient line, he too was heavily criticised. " 
The main problem with Henderson was not that he was 
anti-Czech, or unable to carry out his warning function as 
such, but that because he saw himself as the Prime 
Minister's emissary, he could not, or would not, master the 
complexities of the Foreign office's policy of keeping 
Hitler guessing. In his parallel task of guessing what 
Hitler would do next, Henderson was in an unenviable 
position, as Halifax fully recognised. Halifax himself 
182 
confessed when writing to Henderson 'I am ... all the time 
groping like a blind man trying to find his way across a 
bog, with everybody shouting from the banks different 
information as to where the next quagmire is. 8' Henderson 
found his task equally daunting, and the evidence suggests 
that when he did exercise his warning function, it was more 
likely to be taken seriously by the Germans because they 
knew that such criticism came from a sympathetic source. " 
Whether Henderson ever had any real influence with a German 
leadership headed by Hitler and Ribbentrop is another matter 
entirely. 
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The month of September 1938, when he made a significant 
contribution to British policy-making, was a crucial one in 
Henderson's career. He was however left exhausted, and 
pessimistic by the process of coercing the Czechs into 
ceding the Sudetenland at the Munich Conference. 
Henderson's role was important in three respects. He 
was averse to the British Government's suggestion that 
Hitler be sent a personal warning about the consequences of 
an attack on Czechoslovakia. He was involved in the evolu- 
tion of the so-called Plan Z whereby Neville Chamberlain was 
to fly to Germany to see Hitler in an attempt to reach an 
accommodation over the Sudetenland. And he advised Chamber- 
lain not be swayed by the pleas of German oppositionists, 
like Gordeler and von Kleist, that Britain could assist 
Hitler's overthrow by standing up to him. This, according 
to the anti-Nazis, would create the scenario which would 
enable them to overthrow Hitler, because a war would be 
unpopular in Germany. 
The dangers of antagonising Hitler by passing on 
warnings had been a preoccupation with Henderson since, what 
he saw as the disastrous consequences of the May Scare. On 
4 September 1938, Henderson reiterated his fears about the 
damage that could be done. He repeated to Cadogan what he 
had said on 21 May. It was more and more brought home to 
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me', Henderson wrote, 'not that I did not always appreciate 
it - how unfortunate was the public interpretation of our 
action here on May 21st'. This warning had been 'resented 
especially by Hitler'. ' This old concern was linked in 
early September to Henderson's new preoccupation with the 
dangers of presenting Hitler with an ultimatum at the time 
that the Party Rally in Nuremberg was about to start. 
Henderson was unwilling to pass on a warning about the 
consequences of German aggression for a variety of reasons. 
One was that he had seen what he regarded as the counter- 
productive consequences of the May warning. Another was his 
awareness of Hitler's abnormal psychology, and there are 
numerous references in Henderson's despatches to Hitler's 
irrational behaviour as a reason for not risking a repeti- 
tion of the 21 May warning. 
Hitler, according to Henderson, was in a state of 
'extreme nervous tension' on 12 September at Nuremberg, and 
'his abnormality seemed to me greater than ever'. ' On the 
same day Henderson expressed his anxiety that Hitler might 
'have crossed the border-line of insanity' .3 Hence Hender- 
son's particular reluctance to provoke Hitler by passing on 
such a warning at the time of the Party Rally. 
Another reason for Henderson's unwillingness to risk 
provoking war by passing on a warning to Hitler, was that he 
had no faith in the ability of the Czechs to hold out 
against a German attack. On 4 September he told Halifax 
that 'the Czechs would collapse much quicker than people 
think, after the first week or two,, a view which he shared 
with Mason MacFarlane. ` Thus, Henderson believed, Bene 
must not be allowed to drag his feet and force Britain into 
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an unwinnable war which could not save Czechoslovakia. 
Increasingly, Bene6 reminded Henderson of the unfortunate 
Austrian Chancellor, Schuschnigg. Bene6 seemed 'cast to 
play the same role . .. and will end up doing incalculable 
harm to his country and possibly to all of us. '' Pressure 
had therefore to be continually applied to Bene6 before it 
was too late. 
The last reason for Henderson's unwillingness to pass 
on a warning was his conviction, already underlined in 
Chapter Five, that the German claim for autonomy in the 
Sudetenland was just. Ultimately also, if it avoided the 
war which Henderson, like Neville Chamberlain, so dreaded, 
he was willing to approve the secession of the frontier area 
to Germany. Britain and its empire could not be put in 
jeopardy to save the integrity of the Czechoslovak state. 6 
Henderson began by opposing the fragmentation of Czechoslo- 
vakia, but as the Sudeten crisis worsened, he came to see 
the loss of the Sudetenland to Germany as a necessary evil. 
Henderson was also directly involved in a second major 
thrust of British policy in early September. This concerned 
the plan for a personal visit to Germany by Chamberlain, as 
the Prime Minister became more and more alarmed by the possi- 
bility that war might break out over the Sudeten issue. 
Runciman's mediation had merely strengthened British sym- 
pathy for Sudeten German grievances, but there was still a 
distinct danger that Hitler might attack the Czechs and 
throw aside the diplomatic option. This danger brought 
about the formulation of Plan Z, which might have actually 
involved a visit by Chamberlain while the Nuremberg Rally 
was taking place between 5 September and 12 September. 
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Henderson was notably cautious about the efficacy of Plan Z. 
When Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's Chief Diplomatic Adviser, 
wrote to Henderson about it on 9 September, he referred to 
'the talk we had the day you left', and expressed Chamber- 
lain's view that the moment is approaching when it might 
have to be decided to adopt it, [that is Plan Z] .7 In this 
correspondence Chamberlain's identity was disguised under 
the codename X. Henderson, however, wrote back that 'the 
moment for X is not come in my opinion. Here at Nuremberg 
it is out of the question. " He appears to have been told 
about the projected visit during his visit to London between 
28 and 31 August. This at least is the inference behind 
Wilson's reference to the day you left', and this interpre- 
tation is supported by what Henderson subsequently wrote in 
his memoirs about his visit to London in the course of 
which the idea of actual personal contact took concrete 
shape'. ' 
Henderson did not think it appropriate for Chamberlain 
to interrupt the Party Rally at Nuremberg by a personal 
intervention, and, he told Wilson on 9 September, much would 
depend on Hitler's closing speech on 12 September. 
I don't believe Hitler will bang the door though he 
may bang it if I make another communication like May 
21st. Göring said again yesterday to me, 'Chamber- 
lain and Hitler must meet. ' 
Henderson agreed, but the time was not ripe, in his view, 
until after 12 September. Henderson remained fearful of 
'the unpredictability of Hitler and his moods'. 1° 
But once more he hammered home his point about the 
morality of the Sudeten-German case. It was possible, 
he 
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wrote to Halifax on 13 September, that Britain might be 
forced into a shameful surrender to avoid war. But if she 
were, Britain could claim justly that this would be a con- 
sequence of 'adhering to the principle of self determination 
... This principle we 
fought for in war,. " This was a 
reiteration of Henderson's insistence that the Britain 
position on the Sudetenland be 'morally copper bottomed'. 12 
Henderson's behaviour at the Nuremberg Rally, occa- 
sioned by his sincere desire to avoid war, has opened him up 
to both criticism and ridicule. He had clashed bitterly 
with Vansittart about the very issue of whether he should 
attend the Rally at all in 1937 (see Chapter Two). But 
Halifax had agreed that he should go in 1938, in a personal 
letter to Henderson on 8 August, and hoped that an interview 
could be arranged with Hitler. Halifax had hoped that such 
an interview could be used to warn Hitler about the conse- 
quences of German aggression; but by early September, 
Henderson was determined to resist such an instruction. '3 
Henderson's behaviour at Nuremberg was certainly odd. 
He left Berlin on 6 September, and while meaning to stay in 
Nuremberg for thirty-six hours, he actually spent five days 
there. Amazingly, he 'foolishly omitted to provide myself 
with any materials [for writing]' and 'was obliged to use 
for the purpose the blank pages torn from some detective 
stories which I happened to have taken with me'. 10 Even 
more bizarre was the episode when Henderson met Unity 
Mitford, the aristocratic British admirer of Hitler. When 
Miss Mitford 'squeaked out Heil Hitler to me, I was so dumb- 
founded that I forgot my usual retort which is "Rule 
Britannia" 1 . 
13 
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Henderson complained bitterly about the cramped condi- 
tions in the wagon-lit in which he was forced to live, while 
attempting to keep in contact with London via his colleagues 
in the Berlin Embassy. But these issues pale before the 
serious accusations made against Henderson's behaviour 
during his five-day stay. They are that he made indiscreet 
remarks at the Rally which exceeded his brief, and that, in 
the words of the Labour MP, Josiah Wedgwood, he 'smiled, 
fraternised with evil, and did not stand apart with nose in 
the air'. " 
Henderson was allocated an SS minder, called SS Unter- 
stürmbanführer Baumann, who reported Henderson's alleged 
indiscretions to his superiors. But these do not seem to 
have amounted to very much, and the more telling accusations 
were made by the maverick correspondent of 'The News 
Chronicle', Ian Colvin. The one exception being a comment 
reported by Baumann, when Henderson 'expressed his aversion 
to the Czechs in very strong terms'. 
There is no evidence that Baumann was Henderson's 'SS 
friend', as Patricia Meehan alleges. 17 Neither does it seem 
fair to prefer the testimony of an SS officer like Baumann, 
to that of German diplomats like von Dirksen and von 
Hassell, who both knew Henderson well. 
Colvin appears to be a more reliable witness. He 
claimed to have heard Henderson say at a party at Nuremberg 
that he could not 
warn the Führer and talk policy to him at a Party 
occasion. If I did he wouldn't listen, wouldn't 
understand it. It would have the wrong effect and 
send him off the deep end. They must start with the 
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Czechs. " 
However, this alleged comment by Henderson was recorded 
twenty-seven years after the event, and Colvin's credentials 
as an historian have been questioned. One analyst has 
expressed surprise about 'how Colvin obtained the influence 
he undoubtedly had at this time', and suggested that his two 
books on the period 'should be treated with caution'. 19 
Colvin was, after all, a close associate of the embittered 
Vansittart, to whom he fed information about Germany; and 
Cadogan, another recipient of his accounts found him to be 
'rather highly strung'. `'° Colvin was to be a major source 
of alarmist rumours about German intentions early in 1939, 
which proved to be highly inaccurate. Crucially, Colvin 
does not state to whom Henderson's remarks were made. If it 
is legitimate to raise the issue of Henderson's capacity for 
indiscretion, it is also legitimate to query the bona fides 
of some of his accusers. It is also true that the Germans 
were not beyond mischief-making where British diplomats were 
concerned, as their attempts to spread rumours about Basil 
Newton being pro-Czech and anti-German underline. " 
There had, however, been other complaints about Hender- 
son from the French Minister in Prague, Lacroix, which 
worried Foreign Minister Bonnet because they seemed to raise 
questions about Henderson's commitment to the Anglo-French 
alliance. Bonnet was particularly concerned about Hender- 
son's support for a plebiscite in the Sudetenland 
in mid- 
August. But his Berlin French colleague Andre Francois- 
Poncet came to Henderson's aid in a telegram on 15 August. 
'L'eventualite ä laquelle ces communications font 
allusion n'a jamais ete concue par mon collegue que 
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comme une Sorte d'expedient in extremis et pour le 
cas oü l'on voudrait a tout prix eviter un choc 
belliqueux. 
Mais de ce qu'il ait pane librement il serait 
inexact et injuste de conclure qu'il preconise 
ouvertement dans ses propos une teile solution. 22 
Frangois-Poncet, unlike most of Henderson's critics, was the 
man on the spot, who had day to day dealings with him. He 
also had an appreciation of the difficulties involved in 
dealing with a totalitarian regime. 2' 
Whatever Henderson may or may not have said at social 
gatherings at Nuremberg, there is no doubt about what he was 
saying to the Foreign Office. This brought him into 
conflict with Halifax. 
Halifax had written to Chamberlain on 6 September about 
the question of what Henderson should, or should not, say to 
Hitler at Nuremberg. He wanted Henderson to make it clear 
to Hitler that if he attacked the Czechs 'this country would 
inevitably have to come to her assistance'. But then he had 
second thoughts and told Chamberlain that to speak in such 
terms at Nuremberg would be premature. 
Rather confusingly Halifax then suggested a second 
formula for a warning that Henderson might use, saying that 
'if France were ... to 
be involved in a war arising out of 
the present crisis Great Britain could not allow her to be 
defeated'. He recognised that Chamberlain might feel that 
nothing like this ought to be said by Henderson without 
consulting the Cabinet first. " 
Henderson's own view, sent to Halifax on 6 September, 
about the usefulness of a warning, was clear cut. 'An 
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official demarche, ' he said, 'will drive him [Hitler] to 
greater violence or greater menace ... another warning will 
not help. Henderson Is position on the efficacy of a 
personal warning to Hitler at Nuremberg was unwavering. He 
believed that it would be both provocative, and counter- 
productive. 
Halifax remained convinced of the usefulness of warning 
Hitler, even if only in an informal way. On 6 September he 
telegraphed his instructions to Henderson. He was not to 
ask for a special interview with Hitler at Nuremberg but to 
seek to speak to him privately. If he was successful, 
Henderson was to speak along the lines he had already 
followed in the interviews with Ribbentrop and Weizsäcker on 
1 September, and warn Hitler 'not to underestimate the 
dangers to the general peace of Europe'. Halifax concluded 
by saying that, 'Even if you do not have opportunity of 
speaking to Hitler, you will no doubt use this kind of 
language to any other leaders that you may meet at Nurem- 
berg. j26 Henderson's language in the Ribbentrop-Weizsäcker 
interviews had already been approved by the Foreign Office 
(see Chapter Five). 
Halifax was still exercised by the chance of a meeting 
between Henderson and Hitler therefore, and in a following 
telegram on 6 September he hoped that Henderson would agree 
with his view about a meeting and the tone of his 
instructions 
. 27 
Henderson did not agree, writing on that same day to 
Cadogan in emotive style about the dangers of war. 'And all 
the world is looking to us to save civilisation. So we must 
take the bull by the horns. ' He thought that the chances of 
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peace surviving Hitler's Nuremberg speech on 12 September 
were only 50-50, unless the Czechs made concessions. " 
Cadogan himself was engaged in a parallel debate in 
London about the issue of any warning that the Foreign 
Office might give to Hitler. On 4 September he noted in his 
diary: 'After my reading of the papers, I gave some support 
to the idea of private warning to Hitler that we should have 
to come in to protect France. 1'9 Four days later on 
8 September he was engaged in further debate with Halifax, 
Vansittart, Chamberlain and Simon, this time about whether 
Chamberlain should go to Germany. 
PM now against telling H[itler] he is coming and he 
produced no draft ... He seems to want simply to 
wait till after Nuremberg and then spring himself on 
Germany. I think we want to do what we can to 
prevent Hitler committing himself irretrievably at 
Nuremberg. " 
Henderson's advice about Chamberlain's visit to Nurem- 
berg had plainly prevailed therefore, and the result of 
these consultations was that on 9 September Halifax sent 
instructions, via Kirkpatrick at the Berlin Embassy, to 
Henderson in Nuremberg about the extent of British obliga- 
tions to France, which were to be made clear to the German 
Government. 'France thus having become involved, ' the tele- 
gram ran, 'it seems to his majesty's Government inevitable 
that the sequence of events must result in a general 
conflict from which Great Britain could not stand aside. '31 
Henderson was now thoroughly alarmed. The next day, 
10 September, his response reached the Foreign office, 
conveying his views about the dangers of using such language 
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to the Germans. Such a warning, he argued, 'would be ill- 
timed and disastrous'; but, he added, if a warning had to 
be passed on 'it is clearly most important that demarche 
should be kept secret'. ' A second strongly-worded telegram 
from Henderson, via the Embassy Counsellor Ogilvie-Forbes, 
was sent on the same day. 
The most fatal thing [Henderson wrote] would be any 
repeat of May 21 threat ... As it is the tale of a 
London aeroplane with a message for me is enough to 
start stories of another may 21, and that must be 
avoided at all costs. It will drive Hitler straight 
off the deep end. " 
Cadogan noted his subordinate's agitation in his diary 
that night. 'NH violently against a warning and Ministers 
decide to hold their hand. I think right. '" So Hender- 
son's advice prevailed, as Cadogan acknowledged the next 
day: 'Yesterday on NH's recommendation we refrained from 
further warning owing to possible irritant effect'. " The 
aftermath of the May Scare shows that Henderson was right in 
his analysis of Hitler's reactions to provocation, for he 
'spotted earlier than most the degree to which Hitler was 
liable to be driven to more extreme action by overt attempts 
to put pressure upon him'. '' And Cadogan agreed with 
Henderson's judgement about the warning. 
Others did not, notably Duff Cooper the First Lord of 
the Admiralty, whose diary entry for 12 September stated 
that amongst numerous Foreign Office telegrams which Cabinet 
members had been obliged to read were 
a series of messages from Henderson which seemed 
almost hysterical, imploring the Government not to 
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insist upon his carrying out his instructions which 
he was sure would have the opposite effect to that 
desired. And the Government has given way. By the 
Government now is meant the PM, Simon, Halifax and 
Sam Hoare. Henderson had already left for Nurem- 
berg, therefore it seemed to me that the Cabinet was 
called at the worst possible moment. " 
Yet Duff Cooper had agreed with Henderson that British firm- 
ness had nothing to do with deterring Hitler in the May 
Crisis. But his testimony also supports the view that over 
the question of the Nuremberg warning it was Henderson's 
opinion that prevailed, regardless of what Duff Cooper 
thought of it personally. " 
In fact the Government's decision to heed Henderson's 
advice was soundly based. For when 
a senior ambassador writes 'I am acquainted with the 
views of HMG and being on the spot I feel that they 
would be well advised to trust me, ' a government has 
to have powerful reason for disregarding his words; 
when that view coincides with the thinking of the 
Prime Minister and the head of the diplomatic 
service, it provides powerful reinforcement for that 
thinking . 
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It is also true that constant warnings to Germany which were 
not followed by any action would be regarded by Hitler as 
bluff. 4° Pointless threats were a diplomatic tactic which 
Henderson had castigated throughout his Foreign office 
career, especially as a result of his experience in the 
Chanak crisis. 41 Henderson had indeed reminded Horace 
Wilson on 9 September that 'I am acquainted with the views 
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of HMG and being on the spot I feel that they would be well 
advised to trust me. '" His victory over the Nuremberg 
warning shows that the Government and Cadogan did ultimately 
defer to his judgement. Another option was always open to 
them, insistence that Henderson deliver the warning to 
Hitler in person at the Rally. Vansittart had argued in 
favour of this, but he had been overruled. " 
In its way Henderson's logic was impeccable. The Czech 
case over the Sudetenland was not a moral one. Bene6 was in 
the wrong, and it was the British task to persuade him of 
this. Threatening Hitler, therefore, in a manner likely to 
provoke a war which was not morally justifiable, would be 
foolish and have catastrophic consequences for Britain and 
its empire. Henderson would go to the limits of diplomacy 
to prevent this. 
Halifax also accepted Henderson's analysis, whatever he 
may have said later about Hitler's behaviour and state of 
mind, which must have contributed to the decision not to 
send a warning. He told the Cabinet meeting on 12 September 
that 'he thought Herr Hitler was possibly or even probably 
mad'. Was it wise to provoke a madman? Halifax thought 
not. " 
Halifax's actual capitulation to Henderson's view that 
no warning should be sent to Hitler was contained in his 
telegram of 10 September. Henderson was told that the with- 
drawal of the instruction to warn Hitler either publicly or 
privately, was subject to an understanding that you have in 
fact already conveyed to Herr von Ribbentrop and others sub- 
stance of what you were instructed to say in my telegram of 
yesterday'. " If this was the case, Halifax told Henderson, 
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'I agree you need make no further communication,. 06 The 
German documents contain no record of what Henderson 
actually said to Ribbentrop on 1 September, and Halifax was 
accepting here Henderson's assurance that he had conveyed 
the British Government's view accurately and vigorously to 
the Nazi leadership. Doubts have been expressed about 
whether Henderson did warn the Germans properly in this 
period. There is however, existing evidence, which histo- 
rians have ignored, that Henderson did indeed carry out his 
instructions to speak in forceful terms to important German 
figures . '- 
On 14 September, just after his return from Nuremberg 
to Berlin, Henderson had an interview with Ulrich von 
Hassell, the former German Ambassador in Rome. Von Hassell 
also had links with the German opposition to Hitler. 
Henderson's account, given in the relevant volume of the 
British Foreign Policy Documents, tells us that 
Since he was seeing General Keitel, who is a friend 
of his, later in the afternoon, I asked Herr von 
Hassell to tell the General that while nothing will 
be more distasteful to British nation than to go to 
war with Germany again, it would be impossible for 
us to keep out if Germany acted in any way which 
would compel France to come to the aid of Czecho- 
slovakia. Herr von Hassell undertook to give this 
message faithfully and, in strict confidence, I told 
him of Prime Minister's projected visit to 
Chancellor in interests of peace. " 
Von Hassell's diary corroborates exactly what Henderson 
said in his telegram. Von Hassell wrote 
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I lunched alone with Henderson. He was very frank 
and friendly but at the same time visibly agitated. 
He explained the English position to me as follows: 
(1) to work with all their might to preserve the 
peace, even if this involves sacrifices; (2) but if 
Germany resorts to force, and if France finds it 
necessary to act, the English will march with 
France. 
He complained bitterly about Ribbentrop, who 
was chiefly responsible for the fact that England 
and Germany were not getting along better. Further- 
more he was of the opinion that all might yet go 
well if the Nazi regime did not make itself so 
terribly hated throughout the world, and especially 
in England. Finally he said he had made a final 
attempt and induced the British Cabinet to propose 
Chamberlain's visit to Hitler. It was decided 
yesterday evening. This morning at eight o'clock he 
had informed Weizsäcker and Woermann, and he was now 
waiting for an answer. Unfortunately Ribbentrop was 
off somewhere with the Führer. 
In my presence he telephoned Göring at Karin- 
hall and explained the developments. Henderson had 
sworn me to secrecy, but when he heard that I was to 
see Keitel in the evening he asked me to tell Keitel 
what he had revealed to me. I did so and was 
surprised to observe that Keitel was manifestly 
astonished at England's readiness to march with 
France. " 
Von Hassell's testimony is so important that it is 
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reproduced here in full. Several points of importance 
emerge. First of all, it is clear that Henderson was 
obeying Halifax's instruction of 10 September, to warn 
Ribbentrop 'and others' about the likely consequences of 
German aggression against the Czechs. Henderson had been 
ordered to do this as the price of Halifax's argument that 
he need not pass on a warning to Hitler in person. 
Secondly, von Hassell's evidence also shows that he 
passed on Henderson's warning to Keitel, who would presu- 
mably have informed Hitler. S° This was an intelligent move 
by Henderson, whose access to Hitler was constantly blocked 
by Ribbentrop. The inference behind von Hassell's diary 
entry, although he does not explicitly say so, is that 
Henderson spoke in similar terms to Göring on the telephone. 
Lastly, Henderson had sufficient trust in von Hassell 
to tell him in confidence about Chamberlain's impending 
visit to see Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 15 September. This 
is a significant point in the context of Henderson's alleged 
gaffes. For Henderson appears to have been saying one thing 
to one sort of German (von Dirksen or von Hassell) and 
another to a second (Baumann). The question that has to be 
asked is whether the account given by the SS man Baumann is 
more reliable than that given by von Hassell. And whether 
Henderson would speak as frankly with Baumann as he would 
with von Hassell. sl The von Hassell Diaries make it clear 
that on 14 September he was telling the Germans precisely 
what he claimed to be saying in his telegrams back to the 
Foreign Office. It also seems highly unlikely that Hender- 
son, always renowned for being something of a snob, would 
unburden himself to someone like Baumann. 
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Apart from the von Hassell Diaries, additional support 
for Henderson has recently been provided by Ribbentrop's 
aide Reinhard Spitzy. Spitzy attests that 'Henderson was 
clear and outspoken with his continuous warnings' in the 
period when the two men knew each other in 1938-39. And 
unlike Ribbentrop, who believed that Henderson 'was only 
feigning friendship for Germany while in reality acting 
completely with Czech interests', Spitzy knew that Henderson 
was a convinced friend of Germany. 5-' Henderson's problem 
was that Ribbentrop's animus against him was so extreme that 
nothing he said was likely to be believed by the Foreign 
Minister, who had also poisoned Hitler's mind against him. 
In these circumstances it is difficult to understand why 
Henderson has been accused of exercising such a malign 
influence. His advice to the Government about the warning 
to Hitler had been clear and consistent. He had carried out 
Halifax's instructions to warn other important German 
figures about the potential consequences of Hitler's policy 
on Czechoslovakia. And policy was made in the last analysis 
in Downing Street, and not in the Berlin Embassy. This 
policy was faithfully represented by Henderson in Berlin in 
September 1938. The assumption that somehow he could have 
altered Germany policy underlies most of the misconceptions 
about Henderson's role in Berlin. 
Another assumption is that Henderson could have played 
a more positive role in encouraging the German opposition to 
Hitler. Henderson did, as has been shown, keep open his 
lines of communication with Weizsäcker, a shadowy figure 
whose policy of covert opposition from within has been 
regarded with scepticism by some historians. He also spoke 
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frankly to von Hassell, who by September 1938 had clearly 
thrown in his lot with the German Opposition. But the 
accusation remains that somehow Henderson, because of his 
negative attitude to the anti-Nazi opposition, weakened its 
resolve in the crucial period before the Munich Agreement on 
29 September 1938. 
One leading critic of Henderson's behaviour was Fabian 
von Schlabrendorf, who wrote in his post-war account about 
Henderson's negative influence. There could be no doubt', 
according to von Schlabrendorf 
that the reports and opinions voiced by the British 
Ambassador in Germany, Sir Nevile Henderson, played 
an important role in supporting the British Govern- 
ment's conciliatory attitude towards Hitler. We all 
had the feeling that Henderson was captivated by 
Hitler and National Socialism. 
Von Schlabrendorf also comments on the unfortunate cotnbina- 
tion of Chamberlain, Halifax and Henderson for 'the purposes 
of the German anti-Nazi Resistance'. S' 
Von Schlabrendorf's bitterness about the appeasement 
policy is perhaps understandable, as he was incarcerated in 
Flossenburg Concentration Camp after narrowly escaping death 
after the abortive attempt on Hitler's life in 1944.5' But 
his case against Henderson is a flimsy one, on two grounds. 
Henderson was following his Government's instructions in not 
attempting to subvert a legitimate regime with which Britain 
had a normal diplomatic relationship. He was alarmed during 
his return journey from the Nuremberg Rally to hear 
officials from the Wilhelmstrasse talking a lot of treason 
'on the train'. " For this he has been ridiculed, but his 
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reaction was precisely the same as that of Vansittart when 
the German Oppositionist Carl Gordeler visited him earlier 
in 1938. Both Henderson and Vansittart then had difficul- 
ties about encouraging the overthrow of a legitimate, albeit 
odious, regime. This, it can be convincingly argued, is a 
perennial problem in the conduct of foreign relations when 
the accepted premise is that states choose their own form of 
government. 
The second point, already made in Chapter Five, is that 
the German Opposition made revisionist territorial claims to 
Austria and the Sudetenland, which were indistinguishable 
from those of the Nazis. Even Vansittart eventually became 
disillusioned with people like Gordeler, and his vehemently 
expressed demands that Germany had a right to the Sudeten- 
land and the Polish Corridors` For Chamberlain, Halifax 
and Henderson, therefore, there was little obvious merit in 
assisting the opposition. war could only be justified by 
the clearest evidence of German aggression against neigh- 
bouring states. 
A final observation also needs to be made about the 
post hoc judgement on Henderson's handling of the German 
Opposition. This is that leading historians of the German 
Resistance have not seen fit to credit Henderson with any 
especially significant role at all. " The main problem with 
the German Opposition was that it seemed predisposed to load 
the responsibility for its own failure to act decisively 
against Hitler onto Henderson and others, the responsibility 
for its own failure to act decisively. It seems a curious 
argument to say that the anti-Nazi opposition could only act 
when Britain and France did, and that their failure to act 
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against Hitler over Czechoslovakia justified the Opposi- 
tion's own inaction. 
That said, Henderson obviously did play a part in 
influencing the British attitude towards the German Opposi- 
tion. But his advice was not always taken. When the 
Opposition emissary von Kleist came to London on 16 August, 
Henderson advised that Cabinet members should not see him, 
deeming that it 'would be unwise'. " Chamberlain still saw 
von Kleist in fact on 19 August and wrote to Halifax that 
'He reminds me of the Jacobites at the Court of France in 
King William's time and I think we must discount a good deal 
of what he says '. S" Chamberlain was eminently capable of 
making his own judgement about links with the German 
Opposition, without advice from Henderson. 
Once the decision was taken that Chamberlain should fly 
to meet Hitler at Berchtesgaden, and subsequently at Godes- 
berg and Munich, Henderson's role became less significant. 
This was because the Prime Minister was actually in Germany, 
and because Henderson's Foreign Office superior William 
Strang was present at the first meeting. Henderson's claim 
in the von Hassell interview that he had 'induced' the 
British Government to propose the Chamberlain visit is 
curious, as he makes no such claim in his memoirs. He was 
in fact instructed to arrange the visit by Halifax on 
13 September . 
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He did, though, score a minor triumph when he secured 
the exclusion of the tiresome Ribbentrop from the Berchtes- 
gaden meeting which was to take place on 15 September. Even 
Hitler realised that the presence of von Ribbentrop, with 
his known anti-British bias, would hinder rather than help 
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the proceedings. " 
Even though Henderson's role became less prominent once 
the Berchtesgaden meeting had been arranged, disagreements 
with the Foreign Office continued. On 13 September (the day 
before the Cabinet meeting which endorsed the decision by 
Chamberlain to go to Berchtesgaden), Henderson raised the 
issue of the wording of one of Halifax's telegrams to the 
French Ambassador on 7 September. Halifax had said that 
British public opinion would not be prepared to support a 
war over German aggression against Czechoslovakia. Neither 
would the British Government, according to Halifax, 'be 
prepared to fight Germany' . 
62 Henderson felt obliged 
to point out that in consequence of public warnings 
to Germany and of language which I was instructed to 
hold, and held in Berlin and Nuremberg, official 
circles and German nation have been led to believe 
that in the event of aggression on Czechoslovakia 
France would carry out treaty obligations and 
England would stand by France. If after all Germany 
deliberately and maliciously attacks Czechoslovakia 
and His Majesty's Government do no more than express 
their disapproval we shall be regarded in Germany 
with universal contempt. " 
Two points were being made by Henderson in this tele- 
gram. As he had consistently done since his time in Turkey, 
Henderson decried the use of what he called in the same 
telegram 'impotent reprobation', the threat of force without 
the capacity, or will, to back it up. But Henderson also 
drew Halifax's attention to the degree of ambiguity in 
British policy. Telling the French that Britain could not 
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fight over the Sudeten question might have been part of the 
strategy of applying pressure in Prague and Paris; but in a 
leak-prone Quai d'Orsay it was a dangerous one which might 
well get back to the Germans. This would undermine 
Britain's game-plan. 
Halifax's reply to Henderson's comments came on 
14 September, and it was brusque and to the point. Halifax 
said that he had told Corbin, the French Ambassador in 
London, that in the event of war Britain might feel obliged 
to help France. But such support, warned Halifax, should 
not be regarded as automatic. 
Then came a rebuff for Henderson. The British Govern- 
ment had not therefore 
as you imply gone so far as to declare 'that in the 
event of aggression on Czechoslovakia France would 
carry out her treaty obligations and England would 
stand by France', and still less should we be 
prepared to intervene on the sole ground of a German 
attack on Czechoslovakia. " 
In this instance Henderson was being reprimanded for taking 
.= tough a 
line with the Germans, by overstating Britain's 
commitment to France in the event of war over the Sudeten- 
land. As the von Hassell interview shows, Henderson had 
been using such language to the Germans, and was now being 
told by Halifax that if Germany resorted to force, then 
British support would not be automatic. In the light of 
Halifax's reprimand Henderson might have felt justified in 
asking exactly under what circumstances Britain would inter- 
vene. 'Faulted for not sufficiently intimidating the 
Germans, he was reprimanded when he did. '6S 
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Much effort had been applied by the Chamberlain 
Government in trying to make the Germans wary of British 
intervention if Hitler persisted with his aggressive policy. 
Henderson, as has been seen, was criticised for selling the 
pass by being indiscreet. It is therefore difficult to 
understand why, when Chamberlain met Hitler at Berchtesgaden 
on 15 September, he immediately conceded in principle the 
German demand for cession of the Sudetenland before securing 
the approval of Cabinet colleagues. 
Chamberlain's personal notes about the interview show 
that he gave Hitler his 'personal opinion' that there could 
be no objection in principle to the cession of the Sudeten- 
land. He had prefaced his remarks by saying that he could 
not give an assurance on the principle of secession on 
behalf of the British Government who had not authorised me 
to say anything of the kind' . '6 But Chamberlain 
destroyed 
the negotiating stance by giving a personal opinion which 
could only encourage Hitler, undoubtedly aware of Chamber- 
lain's dominance over his Cabinet colleagues, to assume that 
their agreement would only be a formality. Henderson had 
devoted much energy to warning German leaders and diplomats 
about what would happen if Hitler attacked the Czechs, only 
for Chamberlain to sabotage his efforts in a single moment. 
In such circumstances it seems invidious to criticise 
Henderson for alleged indiscretions, when Chamberlain had 
undermined at a stroke the strategy of keeping the Germans 
guessing. Chamberlain had already made a considerable 
concession by flying to Germany at the age of sixty-nine, 
and for the first time, without needlessly conceding what 
the Germans wanted at the first hurdle. Small wonder that 
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Henderson tended to be confused by his instructions, and by 
Government policy. 
The constant feature in Henderson's diplomacy in the 
last half of September was his determination that there 
should be no war. At Berchtesgaden Hitler had promised 
Chamberlain that he would not resort to war if he could help 
it. Henderson believed him, and told Halifax on 16 Septem- 
ber that Hitler would not be 'so unwise as to seek for 
trouble just when he is on the point of obtaining his object 
without war'. Henderson's main anxiety, he told Halifax, 
was that Czech refusal to hand over the Sudetenland would 
drive Hitler to 'such violence as may in Herr Hitler's eyes, 
justify him in going back on his assurance'. 67 
Thus, although Henderson believed that Hitler did not 
want war, he was also convinced that he would march if self- 
determination was not conceded to the Sudeten Germans. 'At 
the risk of exceeding my proper functions, ' Henderson told 
Halifax on 18 September, 'I am compelled to tell you that 
this is an absolute certainty. '" 
Although Chamberlain had effectively preempted the 
British position by his comments at Berchtesgaden, he did go 
through the formality of securing Cabinet approval for the 
principle of self-determination for the Sudeten Germans. A 
second meeting with Hitler was then arranged at Bad Godes- 
berg on 22 September. Henderson was enthusiastic about the 
prospects, as he believed that Hitler's agreement to a 
second meeting showed that he would do nothing until the 
meeting was over. His sources of information in Germany had 
told him that Hitler was impressed by Chamberlain. 69 
Henderson was still anxious that British diplomacy 
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should not drive Hitler to extremes. When Halifax's tele- 
gram of 20 September instructed him to complain about German 
troop movements near the Czech border, he objected, and took 
advantage of a caveat in the telegram. Halifax had 
concluded his instruction by saying 'unless you think it 
will do harm' . 
70 In his reply on 21 September Henderson 
said that 
I am decidedly of the opinion that the message in 
your telegram ... would cause Herr Hitler resentment 
and disappointment ... I am consequently availing 
myself of your discretion not to transmit it. " 
Henderson's decision was not surprising. What is surprising 
is the amount of latitude which Halifax allowed him at this 
moment of extreme crisis, which suggests that Halifax had 
confidence in the man on the spot. 
Henderson's lack of sympathy for the Czech case over 
the Sudetenland was obvious throughout the summer of 1938, 
but the language used by Halifax was no more friendly. On 
20 September the Czech Cabinet rejected the Anglo-French 
demand that areas of the Sudetenland that were more than 50 
per cent German should be directly transferred to the Reich. 
Halifax responded in aggressive fashion, by saying that the 
Czech reply in no way met the critical situation which 
Anglo-French proposals were designated to avert'. He 
threatened the Czechs with the cancellation of Chamberlain's 
Godesberg visit, and this had the desired effect. 72 On the 
evening of 21 September the Czech Government accepted under 
protest the Anglo-French proposals. 
The problem also arose of whether or not Britain should 
advise the Czechs to mobilise. Halifax had intended to 
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instruct Newton to tell the Czechs that Britain could 
advise them against mobilisation. Now, in what seems like a 
fit of pique, after the Czech had rejected the Anglo-French 
proposals, he told Henderson that he had decided not to 
instruct Newton along those lines. The only other explana- 
tion for Halifax's volte-face lies in a reference to a 
message from Sir Horace Wilson (which has never been traced 
in Foreign Office archives) which may have caused Halifax to 
change his mind. " This must, presumably, have conveyed 
some anxiety that Czech mobilisation ahead of the Godesberg 
meeting would be provocative. In his telegram Halifax 
assumed that Henderson would agree with the suspension of 
the instructions about Czech mobilisation. A reply from 
Godesberg on 23 September passed on the agreement of the 
'British Delegation' of which Henderson was part, about 
suspension .` Henderson was present at Godesberg together 
with William Strang, his Foreign Office superior. 
Halifax's attitude towards the Czechs, which was quite 
independent of any advice he was getting from Henderson, and 
in accord with that of Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden, had 
thoroughly undermined Czech resolve. In the light of this 
behaviour, the attempts of his latest biographer to depict a 
'Damascus Road' conversion to anti-appeasement after the 
Godesberg terms became known do not convince. Free from the 
influence of Chamberlain, who flew to Germany on 21 Septem- 
ber, and influenced by Cadogan (whose doubts do seem to have 
been genuine) Halifax evinced a belated respect for Czech 
sovereignty not evident before. Meanwhile Henderson had to 
cope with Halifax's vacillation and tendency to obfuscation 
in his instructions. Halifax had after all told Henderson 
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on the eve of the Anschluss in March 1938 that it would be a 
tall order if Schuschnigg could not order a plebiscite in 
his own country if he wished. In September he was ordering 
the Czechs to hold plebiscites in the Sudetenland willy- 
nilly, and threatening them when they objected. This was 
the confusion of mind and action which Halifax had admitted 
to in his personal letter to Henderson on 6 September, 
likening himself to 'a blind man' groping in a bog. " 
Henderson, by contrast, had the virtue of consistency in his 
conviction that the Czech cause was a forlorn one, and he 
had always believed that Schuschnigg's decision to hold a 
plebiscite was a mistake. 
At Godesberg on 22 September Chamberlain expected to 
reach agreement with Hitler. Instead when Chamberlain told 
Hitler that the British and French had agreed in principle 
to the cession of majority German areas of the Sudetenland 
(although there would need to be a plebiscite in areas where 
the German majority was 65 per cent or less), Hitler replied 
'I'm sorry but that won't do any more' . 
76 Instead, pointing 
out that there were Hungarian and Polish claims to Czech 
territory (a development which Henderson had foreseen), 
Hitler insisted that a new frontier for Czechoslovakia must 
be drawn up at once, and that the Czechs must evacuate all 
the disputed territory by 1 October at the latest. Chamber- 
lain capitulated on the point about plebiscites by agreeing 
that only a bare majority would be needed in Sudeten areas, 
before returning to London to consult his colleagues. " 
Despite the setback that Chamberlain had undoubtedly 
suffered at Godesberg, Henderson was convinced that war 
would have broken out 'had it not been for the Prime 
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Minister's two journeys' 
. 
7e On 26 September Henderson was 
present at an interview between Hitler, Ribbentrop and 
Chamberlain's emissary Horace Wilson. Wilson told the 
Foreign Office subsequently that it was a 'very violent 
hour' . 
79 
In the interview Hitler expressed doubts about 
Britain's ability to coerce the Czechs into agreement, and 
Henderson intervened. 
His Majesty's Government [he told Hitler and 
Ribbentrop] would see that the Czechs handed over 
the territory; they were in a position to put 
adequate pressure on the Czech Government. Moreover 
Hitler surely trusted Mr. Chamberlain. " 
In fact Henderson was growing more desperate by the 
hour. His state of mind was reflected in a telegram to Hali- 
fax on 26 September, when he pleaded with the Foreign Office 
to ensure that if the British Government contemplated war 
in support of the Czechoslovak Government's refusal 
to accept German plan as it stands Sir Horace Wilson 
and I should be authorized to make this quite clear 
to the Chancellor this afternoon. 81 
Henderson feared a repeat of 1914, when the ambiguities of 
British policy had contributed to the July crisis. There 
must be no room for misunderstanding. 
By 27 September the chances of preserving peace looked 
bleak. Halifax, influenced by Cadogan, had revolted against 
the Godesberg terms and reversed his position on Czech mobi- 
lisation on 23 September. The Czechs themselves rejected 
the Godesberg terms on 25 September as 'absolutely and 
unconditionally unacceptable' "82 
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Henderson had an interview with Göring on 26 September, 
when he was told that if war came and Russia honoured her 
1935 alliance with the Czechs, she would be attacked by 
Germany's friend Japan. He also said that Poland would side 
with Germany. And Göring's aide, Bodenschatz, probably 
irritated Henderson by stating that his beloved Yugoslavia, 
under his friend the Regent Prince Paul, would also side 
with Germany. He then reiterated his warning to Halifax 
about the consequences of Czech resistance. 
If His Majesty's Government [said Henderson] do not 
at this eleventh hour advise the Czechs themselves 
in the name of humanity since we cannot in practice 
help them, to make best terms they can with Berlin, 
we shall be exposing Czechoslovakia to the same fate 
as Abyssinia. " 
Henderson's observations were supported by comments by 
Mason MacFarlane in London about the war-readiness of the 
Czech army. MacFarlane had volunteered to undertake a 
perilous journey from Berlin to Prague, with a map and memo- 
randa about the German demands for a new frontier, and this 
meant travelling through the Czech frontier defences. He 
was not impressed by what he saw, but the Foreign Office 
queried his credentials as an observer. R. Speaght of the 
Foreign Office minuted that it was 
surprising that Colonel MacFarlane should find Czech 
morale poor. This is certainly contrary to infor- 
mation from Mr Newton, to the view of the French 
General Staff (of General Gamelin's remarks 
yesterday) and to reports of reliable special 
correspondents. "' 
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Henderson was influenced by MacFarlane's opinion, which 
strengthened his anti-war case, and sent him back to London 
to report to the Cabinet on 27 September. MacFarlane found 
that some Cabinet ministers thought Hitler was bluffing, 
'and he did what he could to dispel this belief'. '5 Hender- 
son agreed with him entirely in his assessment of Hitler's 
intentions. 
In a telegram on 27 September Henderson warned that if 
the Czechs had not accepted the German plan by 2 p. m. on the 
following day, Hitler would order general mobilisation. At 
this point even Henderson appeared to accept that war was 
inevitable and that 'there is nothing to be done except to 
prepare for it. It is in any case quite useless to say 
anything more at Berlin'. Henderson remained convinced that 
war would be the ruin of Bene6 and Czechoslovakia. He had 
also seen the Czech Charge d'Affaires in Berlin on 
27 September and urged upon him the virtues of an eleventh 
hour capitulation. Bene6, Henderson told his diplomatic 
colleague, 'would go down in history as a far greater man if 
he did this than if he involved his country and perhaps the 
world in disaster'. " But on 28 September Weizsäcker told 
Henderson that the Czechs must accept the German demand for 
withdrawal from the Sudetenland by 1 October, although the 
British were maintaining that this would be practically 
impossible. °' 
War was now very close and Horace Wilson sought another 
interview with Hitler on 27 September in which he warned the 
Chancellor that if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, and 
forced France to stand by her commitment to the Czechs, 'the 
British Government would feel obliged to support her'. 
" 
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The contrast between what Halifax said to Henderson in his 
reprimand on 14 September, and what Wilson said to Hitler on 
27 September is marked, and justifies Henderson's original 
protest about Halifax's language in the Corbin interview on 
7 September. Wilson would undoubtedly have had the approval 
of both Chamberlain and Halifax before using such language, 
and Halifax is open to an accusation of confusing ambiguity 
regardless of his post-Godesberg conversion to a tougher 
stance. 
On 28 September Henderson tried another tack, putting 
forward the idea that there should be direct contact between 
the Czechs and the Germans. " This meant abandoning the 
previous policy of Anglo-French mediation in Prague. At the 
same time Halifax was telling him about Chamberlain's plan 
to fly directly to Berlin, which he wanted Henderson to pass 
on to Hitler. Halifax was also willing to allow German 
troops into the Sudetenland by 10 October if this would 
placate Hitler. 90 
Henderson was working closely with his French colleague 
in these anxiety-ridden days, but Francois-Poncet thought 
that Halifax's planned concession was an irrelevance. " 
When the two men spoke on 28 September Francois-Poncet was 
about to have an interview with Hitler, and Henderson urged 
him to make it clear to Hitler that the Czechs could not 
reject Halifax's plan 'without forfeiting their claim to 
French support'. He himself was asking for an interview 
with Hitler to pass on Chamberlain's offer to come to 
Berlin. 92 Henderson still thought, like Chamberlain, that 
agreement could be reached 'within a week'. 
93 
This view was not shared by Cadogan in London, who 
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rejected Henderson's suggestion that there should be direct 
Czech-German contacts. The Germans should be told, Cadogan 
instructed Henderson, that they would be dealing with the 
British. " Despite this setback, Henderson could still see 
'a glimpse of hope', and his belief in unorthodox diplomacy 
surfaced again with a suggestion that Stanley Bruce, the 
Australian High Commissioner in London, should be sent to 
Germany as a British plenipotentiary, now that Cadogan had 
vetoed his plan for direct contacts between Czechs and 
Germans. 's At this point Henderson received news that 
Hitler was about to invite Chamberlain to meet him in 
Munich. 
The subsequent Conference at Munich on 29 September 
gave the Germans what they had asked for at Godesberg, and 
sanctioned the handover of the Sudetenland, starting on 
1 October. But it agreed that the occupation should take 
place in five stages. The limited demarcation areas were to 
be occupied by 7 October, while the rest of the largely 
German areas of the Sudetenland would be occupied by 
10 October. These areas were to be defined by an inter- 
national commission set up by the four signatory powers 
(Germany, Italy, France and Britain). Henderson's joy at 
the achievement at Munich was evident in the letter of 
congratulations which he sent to Chamberlain. 'Millions of 
mothers, ' he told Chamberlain, 'will be blessing your name 
tonight for having saved their sons from the horrors of war. 
Oceans of ink will flow hereafter in criticism. 
'96 The last 
remark was to prove all too accurate. 
Henderson had no doubts about the wisdom of Chamber- 
lain's action and wrote later that the Munich compromise 
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had to be tried as a final attempt to save the world from 
the catastrophe of war'. " This view was shared by Halifax, 
who wrote in his memoirs that Munich was 'a horrible and 
wretched business, but the lesser of two evils'"98 
Henderson's behaviour in the month of September 1938 is 
consistent in a number of respects. He believed that if the 
Czechs did not make concessions Hitler would march, and he 
was consistently critical of Benet for his unwillingness to 
do so. His disregard for Czech sovereignty was as marked as 
his sympathy for Sudeten German grievances. And throughout 
the crisis he demanded that Britain should behave morally, 
and avoid a futile conflict over a lost, and unjust cause. 
For Henderson war was the ultimate evil, and to avoid it he 
would use any device to hand be it pressure on the Czechs or 
French, or personal interventions by Chamberlain, Runciman 
or even Stanley Bruce. He shared with his military attache 
Mason-MacFarlane the belief that the Czechs could not hold 
out for long if war came, and that there was nothing that 
Britain or France could do to save them. 
This assessment was correct. Czechoslovakia was 
surrounded on three sides by German territory, and had no 
common border with its nearest ally the USSR, whose inten- 
tions were uncertain. French military planning did not 
provide for a rapid offensive into Germany, and Britain was 
certainly in no position to offer immediate and effective 
aid to the Czechs, as the Chiefs of Staff persistently 
pointed out to Chamberlain. The Dominions were against war 
over the Sudetenland, and there was no prospect of American 
help either. 
Henderson was also consistent in his demand that the 
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language of British diplomacy in Germany should be clear, 
notably in his telegram of 13 September to Halifax which 
earned him a rebuke. This demand was occasioned in part by 
his belief that British obfuscation in 1914 had contributed 
to the outbreak of war. 
Both Henderson and Newton, his colleague in Prague, 
were by now of the opinion, as Henderson himself put it on 
25 September that 'only immediate surrender of territories 
can save them [the Czechs) from tragedy', 
99 
There was of course another solution to the Sudeten 
question for Britain, which was never advocated by Hender- 
son. This was complete disengagement, which would have 
forced the Czechs, the French and the Germans to sort the 
problem out for themselves. Yet it was one the Foreign 
Office never seriously considered, and even Henderson, with 
his personal reservations about the French alliance, 
persisted in his belief that pressure must be applied in 
Prague to achieve a settlement. '°° 
Once this option was rejected, the British stance was 
to warn off the Germans and coerce the French and the 
Czechs. Henderson's task was to warn the Germans about the 
consequences of an attack on the Czechs, and it was one he 
found difficult because he did not believe in the morality 
of the Czech case. 
But Henderson also knew that Chamberlain, and indeed 
the Foreign office, were hostile to the Czechs; and his 
frustration with his role of double bluff frequently 
surfaced. Henderson saw little point in pretending that 
Britain would fight for Czechoslovakia when it was clear 
that, after the May Crisis, the Chamberlain Government had 
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no intention of doing so. His tendency to query instruc- 
tions however, or even to refuse to carry them out (as in 
the case of the Nuremberg warning) can be traced back to 
earlier phases of his diplomatic career. 10' He was not 
alone in doing so however, and even his redoubtable mentor 
Horace Rumbold had refused to carry out his instructions 
during the Chanak Crisis. 10ý Henderson's action in the 
light of Hitler's response at the time of the May Scare, and 
the sensitivity of the occasion at Nuremberg, was both 
reasonable and justified. 
In the last analysis, responsibility for ensuring that 
instructions were carried out lay with Halifax in London, 
just as the appropriate judgements about policy towards 
Czechoslovakia had to be made in Cabinet. To assume other- 
wise is to dangerously inflate the influence of diplomatic 
servants like Henderson. 
Such an exaggeration of Henderson's role may have 
occurred in the prestigious British Foreign Policy Documents 
Series, which uses Henderson's personal letters in a manner 
not applied to other ambassadors, often in a way that is not 
flattering to him. Halifax's reprimands of Henderson are 
also published together with those of Sir Orme Sargent, 
'whereas the mistakes of other members of the Foreign Office 
are hardly mentioned at all'. 103 The dangers of this sort 
of historical personalisation are obvious in the work of two 
of Henderson's critics, Lewis Namier, who began the historio- 
graphical assault on him, and more recently by D. Cameron 
Watt. Watt's line is to contrast Henderson unfavourably 
with other ambassadors of the period, where Namier indulges 
in character assassination. 
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Henderson was neither a fool nor a knave, although he 
can be accused of partiality. He may have rejoiced 
initially about Munich but he was soon in despondent mood. 
Writing to Halifax privately on 6 October Henderson remarked 
that the experience of the previous weeks had been 
intensely disagreeable and painful. I want to wash 
the taste out of my mouth, and I will rejoice from 
the bottom of my heart if you could remove me to 
some other sphere. I never want to work with 
Germans again ... As it is by keeping the peace we 
have saved Hitler and his regime and I am still in 
Berlin .l 
V' 
Any sense of relief was therefore short-lived, but Halifax 
would not agree to Henderson's plea for a transfer. 
Henderson's disillusionment reflected his physical and 
mental exhaustion after weeks of crisis. But in fact Munich 
represented a triumph for his diplomacy, as he had consis- 
tently opposed both the Czech position on the Sudetenland, 
and the issuing of threats to the Nazi regime which could 
only be counter-productive. 10S Henderson presented Munich 
as a triumph for Wilsonian idealism because of the victory 
of the ethnic principle over the power politics which, he 
believed, had resulted in the creation of Czechoslovakia in 
the post-war settlement. Henderson had also warned, quite 
rightly, against the encouragement of a German opposition 
whose goals were generally indistinguishable (excepting his 
racial imperative) from those of Hitler. Neither could 
Britain, he claimed, interfere in the internal affairs of 
another sovereign state, and subvert its government. 
Henderson argued on two levels, one of principle, and 
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one of hard-headed realism. The Czech position was immoral, 
but Britain could not in any case fight a war which might 
jeopardise the existence of her empire. Chamberlain well 
knew that Britain's armed forces were in no position to take 
on the Germans, and her ally France was an uncertain 
quantity. Henderson remained convinced that 'in 1938 it was 
useless to presume to stop a dictator by saying "No" to him 
when he knew himself to be infinitely readier and stronger 
than his opponents'. 10° He pointed out persistently, and 
rightly that nothing that Britain and France could have done 
in the event of war would have saved the Czechoslovak state 
which was riven with ethnic dissension, from destruction. 
Faced by a powerful external foe, and minority Slovak, 
Hungarian and German discontent, Czechoslovakia was, as 
Henderson believed tragically, but surely, doomed. 
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Nevile Henderson was a very sick man by the autumn of 
1938, with a cancer of the throat which needed immediate 
surgery, and necessitated a return to London. He left 
Berlin in the middle of October and only returned in 
February 1939. During this period, however, and despite his 
illness, Henderson remained in touch with Embassy colleagues 
like Ogilvie-Forbes, and corresponded with Halifax, Cadogan, 
and influential figures like Lord Londonderry. He 
continued, from afar, to try and influence the course of 
Anglo-German relations. 
Henderson's conviction that he had a 'mission' to 
preserve good Anglo-German relations meant that he went home 
unwillingly, and he himself (with what could be regarded as 
vanity) describes his absence in the important post-Munich 
period as 'a minor disaster'. But he redeemed himself by 
adding 'I am not presuming to suggest that anything might 
have been altered by my presence in Berlin', although he 
thought that four months was far too long an absence. ' This 
modesty reads oddly when it is recalled that Henderson 
believed that he had been selected by Providence to repre- 
sent the British Government in Berlin, and his critics in 
the Foreign office and elsewhere continued to believe that 
sending him back to Berlin after his sick leave would indeed 
be a disaster. ' Henderson's caveat, however, does protect 
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him from Namier's charge of hubris. 
During this period, with the exception of the two weeks 
that followed the Munich Agreement, Henderson was an 
invalid. But his prolonged absence from Berlin has also 
prompted historians to contrast his record as Ambassador 
unfavourably with that of Ogilvie-Forbes, who acted as his 
temporary replacement. A related issue is the extent to 
which Henderson's personality and behaviour had put, and 
continued to put, undue strain on the Embassy staff as a 
whole. The fact that the Foreign Office still opted, in 
February 1939, to send this sick, exhausted man back to 
Berlin has also come under critical examination. Historians 
have also questioned Halifax's failure to recall Henderson 
permanently, when he was withdrawn from Berlin in March as a 
protest against the German occupation of Bohemia and 
Moravia. The failure to do so, in the light of Halifax's 
known reservations about Henderson by early 1939, can only 
be described as bizarre. Henderson himself later admitted 
that it would have been 'natural, and possibly more politic, 
to have withdrawn me altogether'. ' 
During the short period between Munich and the start of 
his sick leave, Henderson had two major concerns. One was 
to warn the British Government about the weak state of 
Britain's aerial defences, about which Henderson had become 
increasingly concerned. 
Henderson's concern about Britain's air defences 
emerged from his experience over Munich and the tension of 
the preceding weeks. On 11 October, a few days after his 
heartfelt plea to Halifax that he should be moved from 
Berlin (see Chapter Six). Henderson wrote to the Foreign 
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Secretary about the melancholy question of German air 
strength and the threat which it constitutes to our safety,. 
Henderson told Halifax that there was a division of opinion 
on this question between the two air attaches in Berlin. The 
senior man, Group Captain Vachell, thought that 'the 
strength of the German Air Force is grossly exaggerated', 
whereas the Assistant Air Attache, Cooper (who, Henderson 
pointed out, had been in Germany much longer), was prone to 
err slightly on the side of pessimism'. This seems to have 
been a considerable understatement of Cooper's position 
because Henderson also reported him as saying that unless 
the British Government took steps to remedy the situation, 
, our position in the air vis ä vis Germany will be hope- 
less'. ' Predictably, Henderson with his pessimistic 
assessment of the military situation, thought that Cooper 
the pessimist rather than Vachell ought to be consulted by 
London. 
On October 12 Henderson was again reporting to Halifax 
about the reality of the German air peril'. He believed 
that the British authorities did not grasp the urgency of 
the situation and the immensity of German rearmaments in the 
air, which was at least double ours. In design and perfor- 
mance they are far ahead of us'. ' 
Henderson continued to express his concern about 
Britain's aerial weakness when he was back in Britain. In 
this case his correspondent was Lord Londonderry (the former 
Secretary of State of Air 1931-5). Henderson wrote to him 
on 12 December about his concern over Britain's lack of 
anti-aircraft guns and went on 
Personally I would shrink from any approach to 
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Germany till we are in a position to say to her, 
'Make war if you like but realise that though yr 
(sic) aeroplanes may bomb London, 75% of them will 
never get back to Germany. It is not gas masks we 
want but anti-aircraft guns and a British air 
equivalent of the Maginot Line. Then we can talk. 16 
Henderson's views on the state of Britain's air 
defences were commonly held at the time, and he was 
absolutely right about the deplorable state of Britain's 
anti-aircraft guns for the defence of London at the time of 
Munich). In September 1938 Ismay, the Secretary of the 
Imperial Defence committee, produced a paper saying that 
Britain would be better able to counter a German knock-out 
blow in six or twelve months' time. Henderson wanted to 
postpone any new demarche to the Germans until after Britain 
had strengthened its defences. His post-Munich gloom 
reflected his concern about Britain's defence weakness at 
the time. But he was prescient about the heavy price the 
Germans would pay for any aerial assault on Britain when its 
defences had been adequately strengthened. 
The second of Henderson's concerns before his return to 
England was his role on the border commission, set up under 
the terms of the Munich Agreement to adjudicate on the 
details of the revised Czech-German frontier. As far as the 
new frontier was concerned Henderson was pragmatic in his 
willingness to countenance further modifications. 
Henderson was sure that the Czechs would be 'well 
advised to yield once again to force majeure and to 
endeavour after October 10 to recover certain positions by 
direct negotiations'. ' He made this statement because he 
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himself, the French and Italian Ambassadors on the Inter- 
national Commission were siding with the Germans on the 
crucial issue of whether the 1930 or the 1910 census should 
be used to determine which areas of occupation were predomi- 
nantly German. The former would give more territory to the 
Czechs (the eventual settlement agreed to by the Inter- 
national Commission transferred eleven thousand square miles 
of territory to Germany). The Germans insisted that the 
1910 census should be used, with its criteria that the 
language most in daily use in the area should be accepted, 
rather than the mother-tongue. 
Henderson agreed because there was no post-war map 
available showing the racial compositions of the areas 
between 1910 and 1923, and the pre-war situation had changed 
considerably since the war. He thought that if the Czechs, 
in the face of the great power unanimity, felt aggrieved, 
they should negotiate later with the Germans on a bi-lateral 
basis. He felt sure, writing on 7 October, that 
It would be unwise as it would be misleading to 
encourage the Czech Government to believe that they 
have much to hope from the International Commission. 
The question of the standard year and the percentage 
for preponderantly German areas is an instance of 
this reality. ' 
Henderson's motivation for taking this position calls 
for some comment. He was later to give three reasons for 
siding with the Germans about the question of the ultimate 
shape of the Czech-German frontier. First of all, he said 
that it removed the need for plebiscites in the areas about 
to be transferred. Secondly, he thought that it would be 
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wise to 'pin the Germans down to a line of their own 
choosing which they would find it difficult afterward to 
modify again to their renewed advantage'. Finally Henderson 
thought that the German position on the census was the more 
convincing case of the two. (Henderson does not explain why 
he thought this in his memoirs, other than to make the point 
about the absence of maps. )' 
For Henderson the last point was crucial. He could not 
lightly abandon his insistence on a moral position. If the 
German case on the transfers of territory was the correct 
one, it must be supported. But to safeguard compliance with 
any agreement, the Germans must be pinned down to a 'line of 
their own choosing'. Thus although Henderson's language 
about the Czechs was unsympathetic, he can still be shown to 
be completely consistent in his desire that any British 
position should be 'morally copper bottomed'. 
Neither was Henderson naive about the Germans, writing 
in the same despatch on 7 October that: 'the Germans are 
certainly not a magnanimous race: nevertheless the best 
tactical chance for the Czechs lies in direct negotia- 
tions' . -° 
The Germans persisted in demanding plebiscites, beyond 
the 1910 census line; and this infuriated Henderson, who 
was by now thoroughly disillusioned with the Germans. At 
the time, he threatened to resign from the International 
Commission when the Germans resorted to this tactic. He 
would withdraw from it unless the demand was withdrawn. 
At a subsequent meeting of the ambassadors with 
Ribbentrop [he wrote in his memoirs] I made it clear 
that I deeply resented the method employed by the 
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German Government, and would, if were resorted to 
again seek the authority of my Government to 
resign .1 
This was an absolutely accurate report by Henderson after 
the event, as he did indeed report to Halifax his anxieties 
about bullying German tactics. In Cadogan he also had an 
ally on the issue of any new Czech-German border. Cadogan 
noted in his diary for 5 October that 'Van in a splutter, 
and got H(alifax) to agree to tell N. H. to stick up for 
something we can't get'. '- Cadogan agreed with Henderson's 
view about the validity of the German position on the 1910 
census, and that Britain had to give way. 
On 10 October Henderson told Halifax that the Germans 
had been told by the Czechs that they would not agree to 
plebiscites in areas outside the scope of the Munich Agree- 
ment. He noted that this amounted to 'acquiescence' in the 
current line of occupation as the final boundary. " 
On the same day Henderson had an interview with 
Weizsäcker who could 
express no opinion as to the view the Chancellor 
himself may take on the subject of plebiscites ... 
there were forces at work [Ribbentrop for example] 
in favour of them with a view to including in the 
Reich the areas mentioned in my telegram No. 600.1' 
Henderson went on: 
I consequently spoke with the utmost gravity. I 
said that I personally would never agree to plebi- 
scites being held for such a purpose and would 
if 
were suggested withdraw from the International 
Commission pending instructions from my Government. 
242 
Henderson correctly pointed out to Weizsäcker that at Munich 
Hitler had given Chamberlain an assurance that any territo- 
rial changes after the agreement would favour the Czechs 
rather than the Germans. 
If I said, Chancellor went back on all these 
assurances Prime Minister's confidence in his good 
faith would be completely destroyed, there would be 
no possibility of any talk of Anglo-German under- 
standing, and I personally would do my utmost to be 
relieved of a mission which had become utterly 
distasteful to me. l' 
Henderson was reiterating here the line he had taken 
with Halifax in the private letter of 6 October referred to 
in the last chapter. He may indeed have been trying to use 
his forthcoming sick leave, which was to start on 
18 October, as a device for showing British disapproval of 
German tactics on the International Commission. The Germans 
knew, after all, that Henderson was sympathetic to their 
grievances, whereas his replacement Ogilvie-Forbes, might be 
less so. 
Halifax was sympathetic about German behaviour in his 
telegram of 13 October. He also approved of the 
attitude you adopted in this matter in your 
conversation with State Secretary, though I would 
not wish you to withdraw from commission in any 
circumstances without personal authority from me. 16 
This was a reminder to Henderson to observe Foreign office 
procedures, something which he had been prone to ignore 
throughout his diplomatic career in unorthodox fashion. He 
had however, contrary to the Watt thesis, shown a 
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willingness to stand up to the Germans over the issue of 
plebiscites, and even been prepared to resign from the 
Commission as a protest against German behaviour. It is 
also important to recognise that in the general issue of the 
German-Czech border readjustment Britain could not act 
alone. British policy had to be co-ordinated with that of 
France and Italy, as well as Germany. Henderson recognised 
that the Great Powers agreed about accepting the German 
position on the 1910 census, and his advice to the Czechs to 
seek post hoc readjustments on a bi-lateral basis was 
therefore sound, if optimistic. 
Henderson's tactics on the International Commission 
were successful in that the Germans withdrew their demand 
for plebiscites. But they rested on a new formula whereby 
the line agreed to by the Commission on 5 October (based on 
the 1910 Austro-Hungarian census statistics) could be varied 
l' in accordance with Article 6 of the Munich Agreement. 
This meant that the Germans were able to demand minor 
modifications beyond any agreed line. A further German 
demand was put forward on 14 November, involving the trans- 
fer to Reich jurisdiction of a further 40,000 people, most 
of whom were ethnic Czechs. No protest by the Czechs was 
allowed, and Henderson's colleague and successor on the 
Commission, Ogilvie-Forbes, told the Czechs that they had no 
option but to agree. 11 But by then Henderson had 
been on 
sick leave for a month. 
A comparison between Henderson's behaviour on 
the 
International Commission, and that of Ogilvie-Forbes 
is 
particularly pertinent here in the light of unfavourable 
comparisons that have been made between the two men. 
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Ogilvie-Forbes is described as being 'part of the anti- 
appeasement camp' and someone who was more robust in his 
dealings with the Nazis, both before and after the point 
where he took over as acting Ambassador until Henderson's 
return in February 1939.19 
For such an accusation to be sustained, there has to be 
clear cut evidence that Ogilvie-Forbes, had as Watt argues, 
'none of Henderson's [alleged] desperate willingness to 
ingratiate himself to substitute optimism for observation, 
nor his fear of failure' . 
=Ö A first riposte would be that 
Henderson's fear of failure was clearly not so great if, 
firstly, he could request a transfer elsewhere after Munich, 
and, secondly, threaten to boycott the International Commis- 
sion in protest at German tactics. Confusingly, the same 
critic who accuses Henderson of ingratiating himself also 
concedes that Ogilvie-Forbes was 'a second rank diplomat' 
who was 'not a toughie'. ' 
The available evidence on Ogilvie-Forbes' performance 
on the International Commission does not show him in a 
particularly favourable light in comparison with Henderson. 
Roger Makins of the Foreign Office, who was sent to Berlin 
by William Strang after concern about Henderson's management 
of the Embassy and pre-Munich 'panic-burning' of Embassy 
papers, was an important witness here. 22 Makins was blunt 
both about the operation of the International Commission and 
Ogilvie-Forbes' role on it. Before Henderson left on sick 
leave, Ogilvie-Forbes was on one of the Sub-Committees of 
the Commission as Chairman, and Makins was decidedly 
unimpressed by his performance. He told Strang on 
6 October 
that 
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The Chairman of our Sub-Committee is a cipher, and 
the proceedings have been apt to degenerate into a 
shouting match, four or five people frequently 
shouting at once. =' 
Ogilvie-Forbes had 'rolled over, before the Germans. 24 
Matters had not improved by 18 October, the day Henderson 
went on sick leave, when Makins wrote to R. A. Butler, Under- 
Secretary at the Foreign Office, complaining about 'a good 
deal of shouting and banging of the table'. Makins went on 
to report that the Nazis presented the Sub-Committee, which 
was trying to draw up a new frontier, with a twelve-hour 
ultimatum and that the Ambassadors 'had no choice but to 
agree'. As a result of this blackmail, over which Ogilvie- 
Forbes presided, 'plebiscites became both unnecessary and 
dangerous and would not have been of much help to the 
Czechs' (Makins' view endorsed Henderson's preference for 
bi-lateral Czech-German talks). 25 Subsequently, on 
14 November, it was Ogilvie-Forbes who told the Czechs that 
they had no option but to agree to the further German 
demands for territorial modifications under Article 6 of the 
Munich Treaty. Ogilvie-Forbes did not make a strong protest 
against German behaviour on the Commission until it was 
about to be wound up, which was far too late. By contrast 
Henderson, a tired and exhausted man who was about to go on 
sick leave, did so in a forceful manner. 
A recent article by Bruce Strang provides further 
insight into Ogilvie-Forbes' period as temporary Ambassador 
in 1938-9, while also recognising that 'Henderson perhaps 
even more than Chamberlain has provided a soft target for 
both left and right-wing critics of appeasement' "26 
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The case presented in this article is that Ogilvie- 
Forbes was indeed tougher than Henderson in his attitude to 
Nazism, and brought about an important change in the Foreign 
Office's thinking about Germany in 1938-9, and especially 
Halifax's. Some of the evidence presented seems impressive, 
particularly in its emphasis on Ogilvie-Forbes' trenchant 
attack on the behaviour of the Reich Government in the 
aftermath of the Kristallnacht in November 1938. 
On 13 November 1938 Ogilvie-Forbes wrote to Halifax, 
I can find no words strong enough in condemnation of 
the disgusting treatment of innocent people and the 
civilised world is faced with [the] appalling sight 
of 500,000 people about to rot away in starvation. " 
This angry despatch is contrasted with Henderson's 
'amazingly ill-timed suggestion to Halifax, the day after 
the Kristallnacht [9 November] that the time was now ripe 
for a comprehensive offer to return erstwhile German 
colonies' ." 
The inference is clear: Henderson was so cold-blooded 
in his appeasing obsession that he suggested this initiative 
despite the clearest evidence of Nazi anti-Semitic atroci- 
ties. Strang also comments on Henderson's 'anti-Semitism 
and anti-Slavism'. 29 
Several points can be made here in Henderson's defence. 
His memoirs, admittedly written long after the event but 
published in 1940 before the Holocaust took place, contain 
the clearest possible denunciation of the Kristallnacht. 
With the connivance and actual participation of 
Himmler's secret police and extreme Nazis, [Hender- 
son wrote] squads of German hooligans reverted to 
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the barbarism of the Middle Ages and indulged in an 
orgy of violent ill-treatment of the Jews such as 
even the Middle Ages could scarcely equal. The 
motives of this disgusting exhibition, which shocked 
all decent Germans as much as it did the whole out- 
side world, were twofold. One was utterly ignoble 
and revolting - namely, the opportunity which the 
murder afforded to plunder the Jews and expedite 
their expulsion. The second, within limits, might 
have been comprehensible. The German authorities 
were undoubtedly seriously alarmed lest another Jew, 
emboldened by the success of Grynzspan, should 
follow his example and murder either Hitler or one 
of themselves . 
'0 
At the time, Henderson was away from Berlin, and may 
not have fully realised how appalling the events of the 
Kristallnacht actually were. He soon did so, however, and 
on 12 December was writing to Lord Londonderry about the 
unlikelihood of an Anglo-German accord 'with England in the 
mood it is over the Jews' . 
'1 There is also the pertinent 
fact that Henderson was known to be a friend of the 
Rothschild family (which hardly suggests that he was a 
convinced anti-Semite), a fact which Ribbentrop highlighted 
to discredit Henderson and sabotage his efforts to achieve 
an Anglo-German understanding. " Such attempts to smear 
Henderson with the charge of anti-Semitism do not stand up, 
and smack of that involuntary prejudice against him which so 
many historians have been guilty of. A reference to the 
Cadogan Diaries for the month of November 1938, for example, 
will find no reference to the Kristallnacht at all. And 
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even Halifax, that pillar of High Anglican rectitude, 
confessed himself to having been 'always rather anti- 
Semitic'. " 
By contrast Henderson was prejudiced against Slavs (or 
at least some of them, such prejudice did not extend to the 
Yugoslav Royal Family), but he shared this defect with 
colleagues like Sargent, Hadow and Addison. Indeed there 
was precious little evidence of pro-Slav sentiment in the 
Foreign Office at all. 
Ultimately, Strangs claim that Ogilvie-Forbes 
'fostered the moral revulsion that partly underlay the 
Foreign Secretary's personal evolution towards resistance' 
is somewhat weakened by the evidence of Halifax's own anti- 
Semitic tendencies, evident in the circumstances surrounding 
the dismissal of the Jewish War Minister Hore-Belisha in 
January 1940. " 
In 1938, unlike his US counterpart, the acting British 
Ambassador was not withdrawn in protest at the time of the 
Kristallnacht, an act of disapproval, which many might have 
expected from Halifax, a devout Anglican, the man Churchill 
named 'Holy Fox'. It would be unfair perhaps, to suggest 
that Halifax's anti-Semitism was anything more than 'the 
relatively mild form common to a number of his social 
contemporaries'. " Neither however, is it fair to smear 
Henderson, whom Strang, unlike some others, recognises 'was 
not a Nazi sympathiser' . 
16 But Henderson has consistently 
been a 'soft target' even among those disposed to be fair to 
him. He may not have shown that immediate moral revulsion 
to Nazism which his post-war critics have demanded. If so, 
he shared this failing with most other members of the 
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Foreign Office and the British establishment. 
The evidence that Ogilvie-Forbes was linked to Mason 
MacFarlane and other critics of Henderson inside the Berlin 
Embassy seems quite convincing (he was also, like Henderson, 
a protege of Vansittart's, and a regular correspondent of 
William Strang's in the Foreign Office Central Department). 
His role however, in 'raising the spectre of a German attack 
in the West'" early in 1939 does not allow him to be viewed 
as what Professor watt calls 'a toughie', whose conduct 
contrasts with the appeasing Henderson. 
The sheer number of 'scares' about German attacks in 
the period of Henderson's absence, meant that Chamberlain 
and Halifax were not totally convinced about the likelihood 
of an attack in the West during the winter of 1938-9, or a 
surprise Luftwaffe attack on London. Henderson had been 
consistently sceptical about such reports before he went on 
leave, and he was largely justified in his scepticism. For 
one of Ogilvie-Forbes' main confidantes was the excitable 
Ian Colvin of 'The News Chronicle', whose unreliability was 
commented on in the last chapter. Henderson was just as 
concerned about the German aerial threat in the winter of 
1938-9 as Ogilvie-Forbes showed himself to be. 
Comments by their contemporaries on the relative merits 
of Henderson and Ogilvie-Forbes tend to confuse rather than 
to enlighten, particularly when the comments come from men 
who served with them. But it is important to analyse in 
more detail the network of relationships in the Berlin 
Embassy of which Henderson and Ogilvie-Forbes were the apex. 
Henderson's chief aide in the Embassy was the First 
Secretary, Ivone Kirkpatrick, who remained in post for the 
250 
first eighteen months of Henderson's period in Berlin. 
Kirkpatrick wrote subsequently that he 'liked him very much. 
He was a human chief for whom it was a pleasure to work, and 
except for a few outbursts he never was anything but kind 
and appreciative'. " This quotation has rarely surfaced 
amongst Henderson's critics, and it is a significant one, as 
Kirkpatrick went on to become Permanent Under Secretary. 
Henderson's own memoirs make it clear that Kirkpatrick's 
affection was reciprocated. " 
The mutual esteem between Henderson and Kirkpatrick 
contrasts sharply with his more difficult relationships with 
Ogilvie-Forbes and MacFarlane, (whose maverick qualities 
were discussed in the last chapter). On the surface 
Ogilvie-Forbes was loyal to his superior and wrote to 
sympathise with him on 12 December on hearing that you are 
still in considerable pain, . 
'° He also kept Henderson 
abreast of developments among the Embassy staff, telling him 
for example about the resignation of the highly-promising 
Con O'Neill, a Third Secretary, over the Munich Agreement. `' 
But underneath there was a strong feeling of resentment 
towards Henderson which had emerged as early as August 1937. 
Ogilvie-Forbes wrote to Oliver Harvey, Eden's Private 
Secretary, on 2 August about Henderson's behaviour: 
In the major political business of the embassy I 
have always been ignored. My views or participation 
are neither asked for nor wanted nor do I see the 
papers (and by no means all of them until long after 
action ... ). It 
is also very difficult to work for 
someone who is often excited, rude and domineering 
over trivial and sensitive ? [text unclear] matters 
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and all the more discouraging because I have been 
constantly loyal to both his personality and his 
policy, as is my duty. '= 
The vehemence of Ogilvie-Forbes' complaints about Henderson, 
so soon after his arrival in Berlin must point to extreme 
tension between the two men, and it is significant that 
Henderson fails directly to acknowledge Ogilvie-Forbes' 
services in Failure of A Mission. " And despite Ogilvie- 
Forbes' protestations to Harvey of loyalty to Henderson, his 
actions were not those of a loyal subordinate. 
Ogilvie-Forbes' complaints about Henderson's behaviour 
in Berlin are endorsed to a degree by Geoffrey Harrison, 
another diplomat to hold the position of First Secretary 
under Henderson, who did however support Henderson's 
appeasement line. Harrison told Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart 
after the war that he himself was 
pro-Munich; said everyone in Germany was [clearly 
Con O'Neill was an exception]. Neville [sic] 
Henderson was sent out with special instructions to 
get on with the Nazis, was therefore acting on 
general orders and to that extent could be excused. 
He ran the whole policy himself; wrote all the 
telegrams. " 
Harrison's testimony underlines Henderson's tendency to 
behave like a one man band' (although he obviously used 
Kirkpatrick), and also gives Ogilvie-Forbes a rather back- 
handed compliment. 'George Ogilvie-Forbes, ' Harrison told 
Bruce-Lockhart, 'who had not much real grey matter, turned 
out to be more nearly right than anyone else. , 
45 It is also 
on the record that Harold Nicolson, who knew Henderson 
from 
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his early days in St Petersburg, regarded Ogilvie-Forbes as 
being one of the most successful and resolute of our 
diplomats' . 
`6 But Harrison's comments go some way to 
explaining Henderson's reluctance to consult Ogilvie-Forbes, 
and the latter's embittered reaction. 
What does all this tell us about Henderson's relations 
with his Embassy staff? Plainly he was not always the 
easiest of men to work with, and had attitudes 'towards his 
support personnel [which] seem unwise in the extreme, 
particularly in view of the heavy pressures of working in 
the Berlin Embassy'. '- Ogilvie-Forbes reported to him that 
staff were resigning because they were 'apparently tired out 
and discouraged' . 
'e But Henderson himself was under intense 
pressure and in poor health, working in the most demanding 
post in the diplomatic service in an atmosphere so taut that 
Ogilvie-Forbes complained to Henderson that one cannot get 
any peace and quiet' . 
`9 Ultimately Harrison's comments are 
perhaps the most revealing. Henderson was obsessed with his 
mission, and drove himself, and perhaps his subordinates, 
too hard. Yet tensions in the Embassy were not just a 
creation of Henderson's. Ogilvie-Forbes himself wrote of 
Mason MacFarlane, supposedly an ally against Henderson's 
maladroit diplomacy, that 'Mason-Mac' was 
sometimes rather overwrought and has on several 
occasions been unsuccessful in pressing me to send 
recommendations of a warlike nature on political 
groups, quite outside the competence of the 
Embassy . s° 
This letter was written in April 1939, after Henderson's 
return from sick leave, and its sentiments would 
have been 
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shared by its recipient Cadogan. But Ogilvie-Forbes still 
claimed to be on good personal terms with Mason MacFarlane, 
and wanted his letter to Cadogan to be kept secret. As has 
been seen, Harrison could be caustic about Ogilvie-Forbes' 
intellectual capacities. 
The most that this proves, perhaps, is that personal 
relationships can be notoriously difficult, especially in 
the pressurised conditions which Henderson and his staff 
were forced to endure between 1937 and 1939. Certainly the 
assumption that somehow Ogilvie-Forbes offered a distin- 
ctively different form of leadership during Henderson's 
absence, does not really seem to bear scrutiny. With the 
Embassy there were differences of opinion, as would normally 
be expected among colleagues, but Henderson's critics like 
Mason MacFarlane could not claim to be consistent opponents 
of Chamberlain and his policy (as was shown by the episode 
of his pessimistic assessment of the Czech army before 
Munich). Where Ogilvie-Forbes is concerned, personal animus 
must be allowed for in his conduct of Embassy affairs in 
1938-9 when Henderson was away, together with a desire 
(perhaps) to be seen to be doing things differently in the 
absence of his superior. Especially, as Ogilvie-Forbes well 
knew that Henderson had his critics in the Foreign Office. 
Memoirs by, and studies of, Henderson's political 
masters in the Foreign Office, Halifax and R. A. Butler, are 
no more helpful about any difference of nuance between 
Henderson and Ogilvie- Forbes . 
S1 They contain no reference 
at all to either Henderson or Ogilvie-Forbes, and of the few 
surviving scraps of evidence, a letter from Butler, who 
remained a warm admirer of Chamberlain's policy long after 
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it started to unravel after Munich, hardly endorses the view 
that there was an abrupt change after Henderson went home. 
It has been a great pleasure to read your despatches 
and telegrams since you have been in charge [Butler 
wrote to Ogilvie-Forbes on 19 December] ... We are 
naturally passing through a difficult period but all 
the friends of Germany have their feet on the 
ground. " 
The inference behind this private letter is that Ogilvie- 
Forbes, like Henderson, is counted as a friend of Germany. 
Henderson ought of course to be seen against a wider 
Foreign Office background as well. Was he a rogue elephant 
in the Foreign Office, naively pro-German and hopelessly out 
of tune with Foreign Office policy? A seminal article 
written in 1973 by Donald Lammers has provided good grounds 
for saying that he was not. Lammers notes Henderson's 
concern about Britain's air defences after Munich (referred 
to above), but also argues that an examination of Foreign 
Office papers makes it hard to sustain the argument that 
'there was a deep and coherent opposition to the main lines 
of government policy'. According to Lammers, a group of 
officials could be identified in the post-Munich period who 
could be described as broadly speaking 'endorsing the policy 
of appeasement in the later 1930s or at the very least they 
refrained from negative comment on it'. " Amongst the 
Ambassadors in this group were Henderson, Phipps, Perth, 
Chilston (Ambassador in Moscow), Newton and Ogilvie-Forbes 
(Lammers is a more accurate assessment than Strang's attempt 
to portray Ogilvie-Forbes as a toughie). Also mentioned by 
Lammers is Owen O'Malley, appointed Ambassador to Mexico, 
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and a long-time official in the Central Department, who 
clearly supported appeasement (his sympathetic letter to 
Henderson in 1938 has already been referred to). " 
In London the group of pro-appeasers included Cadogan, 
Strang, Ashton Gwatkin (an economic expert who had gone to 
the Sudetenland with Lord Runciman), Kirkpatrick, Oliphant, 
Jebb and Hadow, whose anti-Czech prejudices were well known 
and who was now in the Northern Department. Hadow too, as 
has been noted, wrote secretly and sympathetically to 
Henderson. As Lammers observes, 'the known sceptics about 
appeasement made up a much shorter list', "' consisting of 
Vansittart and his supporters like Sargent and Rex Leeper. 
More recently, even Sargent's credentials as an anti- 
appeaser have come under attack, because of his vehement 
opposition to a Soviet alliance, which helped to undermine 
any real prospect of collective security from 1934 onwards. 
Sargent had been prone to see the doomed Czech Republic as a 
sort of Bolshevik aircraft carrier in Central Europe. 56 
The case of Gladwyn Jebb, Private Secretary to both 
Vansittart and Cadogan, is particularly instructive. Jebb 
(later Lord Gladwyn) is especially snide about Henderson in 
his memoirs; but the record does not suggest that he was 
justified in regarding Henderson's diplomacy in Berlin with 
such 'post hoc' scorn. " In a memorandum dated 19 January 
1939 Jebb said of Germany that 
the extremist leaders are advocating a course which 
is likely to lead to a general war in the spring and 
... this 
is opposed not only by important people in 
the Army, the industrial world, and so on, but even 
by the moderates in the ranks of the party itself. 
S" 
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Jebb may be credited here with rather more insight into the 
psychology of the German Opposition (though none of its 
members openly opposed war in September 1939), but in his 
conception of 'extremists' and 'moderates' he was just as 
blinkered as Henderson has frequently been accused of being. 
The date of the memorandum is also significant, for it 
was written during Ogilvie-Forbes' stewardship in Berlin, 
and not under the supposedly malign influence of Henderson. 
Jebb also contributed a paper to an extensive Foreign Office 
review of policy in the aftermath of Munich. In this paper 
Jebb took an extreme pro-appeasement line, advising that the 
French should be pressed to denounce their 1935 pact with 
the USSR (Henderson never went this far). He also stated 
his view that if Germany required further "expansion" she 
could always seek it in the Ukraine'. In his memoirs, Jebb 
carefully avoids any reference to these projected conces- 
sions to Germany. Showing no apparent concern for the 
balance of power in Eastern Europe, Jebb stated his view 
that Germany's case for the return of its former colonies 
'would be destroyed' if she were allowed to have her 
colonies, or the equivalent of colonies. 59 At no point in 
his despatches did Henderson go so far in trying to appease 
the Germans, and he became ultimately an advocate of a 
Soviet alliance. He believed that it was natural for 
Germany to dominate Eastern Europe in economic terms, but 
this was a long way from conceding political control. 
Henderson never encouraged his German contacts either 
inside, or outside, the Wilhelmstrasse to believe that 
military conquest of areas like the Ukraine would 
be accep- 
table to the British Government. Neither, as has been seen, 
257 
did he initially support fragmentation of Austria or Czecho- 
slovakia. Jebb's suggested concessions show none of 
Henderson's concern about the need for Britain to secure the 
moral high ground, but merely a ruthless, but narrow and 
short-sighted, obsession with the national interest at the 
expense of other states. 
Cadogan and Strang rejected Jebb's suggestion that the 
Ukraine be ceded to Germany. 6° It was of course easy for 
home-based officials like Jebb and Sargent to criticise 
Henderson and other ambassadors, who had to deal with the 
unpredictable regimes of totalitarian states. 61 But in 
Jebb's case it is clear that in 1938 he was just as much a 
supporter of Chamberlain's policy as was Henderson. Indeed 
he was still unrepentant with the advantage of much hind- 
sight in the nineteen-seventies, writing that 'I do not 
believe that there was ever any prospect that either France 
or Britain would have gone to war to protect Czechoslo- 
vakia'. 6' Henderson was castigated for writing this in 
1940, but Jebb's reputation has escaped unscathed, and he 
prospered in the post-war period in the Foreign Office, 
while Henderson has been more roundly denounced for his 
diplomacy in Berlin that even Neville Chamberlain has been 
(the Prime Minister being a beneficiary of revisionist 
analyses of appeasement since the nineteen-seventies). 
Over and above the network of relationships between 
Henderson and his Foreign office colleagues was of course 
his crucial relationship with the Prime Minister, on which 
Henderson set such store. The assumption has been that 
Henderson had Chamberlain's complete confidence throughout 
his period as Ambassador in Berlin. This assumption 
is 
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probably correct, but there is some evidence that Chamber- 
lain did not regard Henderson as a totally reliable agent of 
his policy. The evidence for this comes from Fritz Hesse, 
the German Press Attache in London, who wrote in a despatch 
on 11 October 1938 about a recent interview with George 
Seward, the head of Chamberlain's Press Office. Seward 
allegedly told Hesse that 
in all future moves it was important that all major 
questions should be dealt with direct, thus by- 
passing the Foreign Office and also Sir Nevile 
Henderson, since it has unfortunately become 
apparent that the latter was not completely reliable 
when forwarding communications. Furthermore the 
Foreign Office would always be brought in by 
Henderson, and thus there was the risk of causing 
all kinds of obstruction and undesirable 
p1.1bl icity 
. 
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The fact that Henderson was sent back to Berlin in 
February 1939, despite Chamberlain's apparent reservations, 
makes this a puzzling document to interpret. But in the 
absence of any significant surviving correspondence between 
Henderson and Chamberlain, it does throw some light on 
Chamberlain's expectations. If the Hesse account is 
accurate, Henderson was plainly in an impossible position. 
As an ambassador in the employ of the Diplomatic Service he 
was duty bound to involve his Foreign Office superiors in 
questions relating to Anglo-German relations. If he did 
not, this must have been because his view of himself as an 
agent of the Prime Minister's policy, and not the Foreign 
Office's, was essentially correct. Chamberlain was 
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intensely suspicious of the Foreign Office, but this 
suspicion put any British ambassador in Berlin during his 
premiership in an unenviable position. Henderson could not 
please two masters, particularly when one of them was a 
dominant prime minister, determined to impose his individual 
imprint on the running of British Foreign Policy. The Hesse 
interview therefore may offer an insight into how exacting a 
taskmaster Chamberlain was. Yet Chamberlain did keep 
Henderson in post despite his worsening health. 
Over the whole period from mid-October 1938 to mid- 
February 1939 loomed the issue of Henderson's health. The 
idea that Henderson was constrained by a 'stiff upper lip' 
from speaking about the seriousness of his illness, or fear 
that he might be permanently recalled, cannot be 
sustained. " Ogilvie-Forbes was plainly in the know about 
the pain which the condition was causing his superior. 
Entries in Sir Alexander Cadogan's diary also indicate that 
he too was aware of the situation (as he had to be as 
Henderson' s service boss). On 20 October Cadogan saw 
Henderson, newly returned from Germany. Henderson told him 
that 'he was exhausted as he should be - but didn't look 
so'. But on 11 November Cadogan wrote of how he had seen 
'poor Nevile H who has what he told me was a growth under 
his tongue. He was being operated today. And then they've 
got to do something to his neck. Sounds bad. I 
sorry. I" 
Other colleagues were aware of Henderson's health 
problem as well. Writing after the war, Mason MacFarlane 
recorded the fact that even when Henderson returned to duty 
in 1939, 'he was a much sicker man than he imagined himself 
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to be'. " This raises the issue of why Henderson was sent 
back to duty in such a state of health, and subsequently why 
so little allowance has been made for it thereafter by 
critical contemporaries like Jebb, and historians. 67 The 
return to duty of a seriously sick man in the most sensitive 
posting in the diplomatic service is decidedly odd, and 
cannot be entirely explained away by the suggestion that 
Neville Chamberlain wanted to keep his own man in Berlin, as 
Halifax had allegedly lost faith in him. 6e Or that Chamber- 
lain and Halifax were reluctant to pension off a faithful 
servant of the appeasement policy. 69 Henderson predictably, 
wanted to go back, but even he realised that his health was 
below par, writing in his memoir that 'Physically I was 
still unfit' . 
'0 
After Henderson's return to Berlin on 13 February his 
health was still clearly a matter of concern to his Foreign 
Office superiors. This is indicated by the letter which 
Halifax wrote to him on 13 March, which had a footnote 
asking 'How are you yourself? I hope not feeling the worse 
for being suddenly thrown back into the maelstrom'. " 
This letter is also interesting from another point of 
view which is at what point, precisely, Halifax lost faith 
in Henderson. " There is little sign here, two days before 
the German occupation of Prague, that Henderson had lost the 
Foreign Secretary's confidence. Halifax told Henderson that 
he had 
been very glad from time to time, to receive your 
private letters in which you give me your impression 
of the situation in Germany ... I hope you will 
continue to write: and you may do so in complete 
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confidence as I will give your letters only the most 
discreet circulation. 
While it is true that Halifax warned Henderson not to put in 
official telegrams conclusions based on 'rather impalpable 
evidence', he was also aware that Henderson's telegrams 
could be read in the Foreign Office by people who may not 
have the necessary background ... which may lead such people 
to unwarrantable conclusions'. " At all events this letter 
does not give the impression of having been written by a man 
who had lost faith in his ambassador. 
When Henderson returned to his post in Berlin he was in 
better spirits, after some initial caution. On 15 February 
he wrote to Cadogan that 'After nearly 4 months' respite I 
ask myself which is most disagreeable Berlin or the London 
Clinic'. He thought the Germans 'glad to have me back'. " 
Henderson's optimism had been restored by the next day 
16 February. Henderson believed, he told Cadogan, that the 
Germans are not contemplating any immediate wild adventure 
and that their compass is pointing towards peace'. He had 
also seen Ribbentrop on 15 February who said 
he was glad to see me back ... In my mind I am quite 
sure that he was intensely suspicious that my delay 
in returning had been due to a 'diplomatic' malady 
and connected with the non-return of Hugh Wilson [US 
Ambassador]. This was probably no bad thing but I 
told him the truth, whereupon he became more 
friendly than I have ever known him. 
Henderson's difficulties with Ribbentrop were notorious, and 
the Foreign Minister had made strenuous efforts to prevent 
him having access to Hitler. Henderson had retaliated (for 
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example) by conspiring with Weizsäcker to exclude Ribbentrop 
from the Berchtesgaden meeting. But on his return to Berlin 
Henderson thought that Ribbentrop was now more secure in his 
position as Reich Foreign minister, but he was aware that 
his own critics in the Foreign Office thought he was being 
over-optimistic about likely German behaviour, and would 
'doubtless say "dust in the eye" or "excessive receptivity 
to what I want and believe" - Maybe but I am also conscious 
of a big responsibility'. " Henderson can hardly have lost 
his doubts about Ribbentrop, but his analysis of the 
situation was regarded as fatuous by Vansittart. 76 Yet 
Halifax agreed with it as late as 13 March. In his letter 
to Henderson, quoted above, Halifax put forward his view 
that in 
the last few weeks there has certainly been a 
negative improvement in the situation, in that 
rumours and scares have died down, and it is not 
plain that the German Government are planning 
mischief in any particular quarter. " 
Allowing for Halifax's more sedate language, this prediction 
was as big a 'gaffe' as Sir Samuel Hoare's 'golden age of 
peace' speech a couple of days before on 10 March. 
While Henderson, somewhat naively, was gratified by 
praise emanating from State Secretary von Weizsäcker. When 
he saw Henderson on 18 February Weizsäcker told him 'Your 
reputation in Germany has risen still since Munich ... you 
succeeded in persuading Hitler and the rest of them that 
England would have fought'. According to the Nazi leader- 
ship, said Weizsäcker, 
that damned British ambassador bluffed us from start 
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to finish: first by his special train on May 21st 
and then by convincing everybody at Nuremberg and 
afterwards that England would have made war on us. 
Blast the bloody British ambassador! 
This would not quite have been music to Henderson's ears, 
given his persistent efforts to squash the 'special train' 
story. He had laughed but repeated the story to Halifax 
because 
I am well aware that a section of opinion at home 
chose to believe at the time, and particularly while 
I was at Nuremberg that I had completely failed to 
impress upon the Germans the gravity of the position 
and the seriousness of Britain's determination. " 
Henderson shows again here his sensitivity to Foreign Office 
criticism of his diplomacy. weizsäcker's motives in 
flattering Henderson so assiduously are open to question, 
although he knew of Ribbentrop's animosity towards Hender- 
son. Even his superior Ribbentrop, more truthful than usual 
perhaps, when facing trial and execution in 1946, could 
remember no occasion when Weizsäcker contradicted him or 
indicated disagreement with Nazi foreign policy. 79 Yet we 
are expected to believe that Henderson was at fault in 
failing to pick up the hidden oppositionist signals 
Weizsäcker was allegedly sending out in 1938-9. 
This said, Henderson seems to have been badly at fault 
in failing to predict that Hitler would occupy the whole of 
the Czech lands on 15 March 1939, and reduce Slovakia to 
being a puppet state. The obvious, and traditional conclu- 
sion, is that Henderson did not see them because he did not 
wish to do so. According to Mason MacFarlane's account 
he 
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was extremely annoyed by the Embassy's performance during 
his absence saying 
He was much concerned at the reports which we had 
been submitting to London while he was away. He 
considered that we were appreciating the situation 
wrongly and misinforming HMG. He wished us to 
understand that in future all reports emanating from 
Embassy would have to be strictly in accordance with 
his personal opinions. There was little to be said 
on our side except to point out to him that we 
remained in disagreement with his views on Hitler 
and on the course which Nazi Germany was likely to 
pursue . °0 
Unfortunately MacFarlane does not identify the Embassy 
colleagues who shared his own view, but it is possible to 
make an accurate guess about the nature of Henderson's 
complaints (although the evidence quoted above does not 
suggest that Ogilvie-Forbes had any serious difference of 
perspective with his Ambassador). 
The period between mid-December 1938 and mid-April 1939 
was one of alarms and excursions for the British Government 
during which no less than twenty warnings were received from 
different secret sources about possible German or Italian 
aggression. Henderson was away from his post for the first 
two months of this period, but was obviously briefed on 
these 'scares'. They had started on 11 December, when Ivone 
Kirkpatrick, then completing his tour as First Secretary, 
was warned that the British ciphers had been broken (the 
source was a 'German high official') and that Hitler had 
ordered an air attack on London in three weeks' time (which, 
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if true, would have made Henderson's October warnings 
prescient). Cadogan also noted in his diary, after seeing 
Kirkpatrick on his return to London, that 'Hitler will bomb 
London in March' . 
B1 The Cabinet seems to have taken Kirk- 
patrick's message very seriously, and 'illusory fears of a 
sudden knock out blow by the Luftwaffe lingered into the New 
Year' . 
°' 
Then in mid-January another 'knock out blow' scare 
emerged via Vansittart's secret intelligence sources, which 
ran in parallel to the official SIS. Days later SIS itself 
reported that Hitler and his advisers believed that London 
could be destroyed in a matter of days from the air. And 
yet more false intelligence suggested that the Germans were 
about to make a surprise attack on Holland or even Switzer- 
land. One result of these false rumours, which may have 
been planted by the eminence grise of the German Abwehr, 
Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, was that at their meeting on 
1 February Chamberlain and his colleagues accepted the 
principle of a continental commitment, which the Prime 
Minister in particular, had so long rejected. 
But given the number of scares during this period, and 
the fact that they all turned out to be fictitious, it is 
hardly surprising that by the time Henderson returned to 
Berlin, both Chamberlain and Halifax were dubious about such 
intelligence, especially as much of it emanated from 
Vansittart's intelligence sources, and he was as fervent an 
advocate of scare stories as Henderson was a sceptic about 
them. 
Henderson was clearly sceptical about SIS reports, and 
was rebuked for his agnosticism by Cadogan, after his 
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despatch stating that 'the German compass was pointing 
towards peace'. It was the job of SIS agents, Cadogan told 
Henderson, 
to report rumours or items of information which come 
into their possession: they exercise a certain 
amount of discrimination themselves, but naturally 
do not take the responsibility of too much selection 
and it is our job here to weigh up the information 
which we receive and try to draw more or less 
reasonable conclusions from it. In that we may fail 
and if so, it is our fault, but I do not think that 
it is fair to blame the SIS. Moreover, it is true 
to say that the recent scares have not originated 
principally with the SIS agents in Germany, but have 
come to us from other sources. " 
The last line contains a side swipe at Vansittart and 
his private intelligence sources, but on 15 March Cadogan 
had to admit that he, like Henderson, had been wrong. 'I 
must say, ' Cadogan wrote in his diary as Prague fell under 
German occupation, it is turning out - at present - as van 
predicted and as I never believed it would. If we want to 
stem the German expansion, I believe we must try to build 
now. '84 Henderson was equally dumbfounded by the course of 
events, which undermined everything he had been working for 
since 1937. 
But both Henderson and Cadogan had been wrong in an 
atmosphere of scares and false rumours, and in this sense 
Henderson's scepticism about the sources of these reports 
(one of which was Conwell Evans, who had by 1938-9 become a 
friend of Vansittart) is understandable. Other Embassy 
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staff like Kirkpatrick had been a conduit for false informa- 
tion to London, and Henderson would have been within his 
rights as Ambassador in expressing an opinion on this 
behaviour. Conversely, it has to be recognised that Hender- 
son wanted to believe in the sincerity of expressed German 
good intentions, but he personally was aware of internal 
Foreign Office criticisms that he was being naive. 
Ultimately, as in all these instances, Chamberlain and 
Halifax were the final arbiters on the genuineness of the 
German threat, and on 19 February Chamberlain was saying 
that 'All the information I get seems to point in the 
direction of peace' . 
°S 
The Foreign Office's attitude to Henderson after the 
Prague coup by Hitler is hard to understand. On the one 
hand Halifax and Cadogan were considering Henderson's 
permanent recall as a protest (following the precedent 
created by the withdrawal of the US Ambassador Wilson after 
the Kristallnacht). But on the other, they were prepared to 
recall him as an expression of dissatisfaction with his work 
as Ambassador. 
That this was under active consideration by the Foreign 
Office after Henderson's return from sick leave on 
13 February, is clear from the diaries of both Cadogan and 
of Halifax's Private Secretary Oliver Harvey. Even Hender- 
son himself recognised that his tenure of the Berlin Embassy 
might be coming to an end in March 1939. In Failure of A 
Mission he wrote that: 
The ostensible motive of my recall to London was to 
report but I left Berlin feeling that I might well 
never return there. It would have been natural, and 
268 
possibly more politic, to have withdrawn me 
altogether. I represented a policy of attempting to 
seek a modus vivendi with the Government of Hitler. 
That policy had been wrecked by Hitler's act of 
piracy on the Ides of March, and in ordinary circum- 
stances it would have been more normal to appoint 
another ambassador in my place. But events were 
moving rapidly, and His Majesty's Government 
presumably preferred not to swap horses in the 
middle of the stream .' 
Ultimately the Foreign Office decided to recall Hender- 
son for a limited period, but the issue did arouse some 
lively debate outside its portals. Henderson's superior at 
the Foreign Office, R. A. Butler was in frequent contact at 
this time with the Duke of Buccleuth, who had strong pro- 
German sympathies. Buccleuth was concerned about Hender- 
son's short-term absence from Berlin telling Butler that 
I do not like speaking on matters about which Nevile 
Henderson must know so much more, but the absence of 
contact through him and other ambassadors does seem 
an additional danger. Neither Hitler nor Ribbentrop 
are likely to be quite as inhuman as featured ... 
87 
Henderson's critics inside the Foreign office would 
have challenged Buccleuth's contention that Henderson's 
knowledge of Germany was great, and after 15 March they had 
been joined by Cadogan who had lost confidence in him. 
15 March was a bombshell for the appeasers, and Henderson 
was accused by his critics of failing disastrously to 
predict Hitler's latest coup. Hitler's invasion of the 
Czech lands (for that is what it was), invalidated the 
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assumption made by Chamberlain, and Henderson, that all 
Hitler wanted was a Greater Germany. Czechs were not ethnic 
Germans. 
Even Henderson appears to have been disillusioned by 
Hitler's latest act of aggression. On returning to London 
Henderson looked 
very shattered. He said Hitler was now quite 
unpredictable: he thought his action against 
Czechoslovakia was simply and solely out of fury 
aroused by the broadcast accounts of alleged Czech 
atrocities against Germans - all of which had been 
either invented or magnified by Goebbels. He did 
not know what Hitler might do now as a result of 
PM's speech and Duff Cooper's remarks. e8 
Henderson's rationale for Hitler's behaviour was 
unconvincing, but he did seem to have taken on board the 
idea that Hitler needed to be warned off in vigorous 
fashion. on 7 April (after Chamberlain had given a guaran- 
tee of assistance to Poland should she be attacked by 
Germany) Henderson had an interview with the former German 
Chancellor Franz von Papen, B9 who was passing through 
Berlin, and Papen recorded that Henderson 'confirmed my 
opinion, that the situation could yet be saved if it were 
made clear to Hitler than any new aggression would 
automatically mean war' . 
90 Here is another example of 
Henderson carrying out his warning function to a high- 
ranking German. 
During this new period of enforced leave (Henderson 
returned to Berlin on 23 April) Henderson's long-term future 
was in fact being decided by his superiors in the Foreign 
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Office. On 6 April, Oliver Harvey wrote at length about 
Henderson in his diary. 
One of our minor problems is to know what to do with 
Henderson who is now here having been ordered back 
'to report' after the annexation of Czechoslovakia. 
H(alifax) asked me and I said that I would not send 
him back on personal grounds as I thought his 
reports were bad and had a bad effect here, while 
his attitude in Berlin had the effect of convincing 
the Germans we were flabby. On the main question of 
whether there was any advantage or disadvantage in 
not having an Ambassador there, I rather agreed with 
him that it was better in principle to have an 
Ambassador. 
H. also talked to Alec Cadogan and it is under 
consideration whether he should not now be replaced. 
But it is complicated. No ambassador can do any 
good in Berlin at present. It is going to be 
announced that Nevile Henderson has been given a 
short period of leave. I discussed with A. C[adogan] 
whom we could send there and the favourites are 
Archie Clark-Kerr and Horace Seymour. 91 
Cadogan had been wrestling with the problem of what to 
do about Henderson even before the Germans destroyed Czecho- 
slovakia. His diary entry for 14 March noted that: 'Van 
wants to withdraw Nevile. I against - it's futile. But of 
course Van doesn't like Nevile in Berlin. ' (Cadogan was by 
now as irritated with Vansittart as he was with Hender- 
son. )92 On 3 April Cadogan had a talk with Chamberlain, 
part of which was spent 'discussing N. Henderson's return. I 
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don't see much harm if it's done quickly and naturally'. 
Three days later he had a further meeting with both Halifax 
and Chamberlain and 'sat talking about Nevile H. They 
agreed he ought to be changed ... Saw NH who has been given 
a hint of his move by H'. A further reference on 20 April 
refers merely to the end of Henderson's short 'protest' 
leave and the fact that 'we want to have N. H. back in Berlin 
on Monday... '. " 
Oddly, the whole question of Henderson's recall then 
disappears from Cadogan's record of events, although there 
are numerous further references to the Ambassador both 
before, and after, the outbreak of war on 3 September. 
The question had clearly not been resolved, however. 
Oliver Harvey was elated on 27 May because: 
I hear it is intended to get rid of Henderson at 
last. AC and I want to send Horace Seymour there, 
who can be counted on to report faithfully what is 
going on without parti pris and to carry out his 
instructions loyally. No ambassador is going to 
swing Hitler or German opinion. Germany policy is 
governed by British policy in London. " 
This is an extremely important statement as regards 
Henderson's role. Firstly it makes the accusation that 
Henderson had been disloyal to the Foreign Office, clearly 
the basis for much of the animus against him, and secondly 
Harvey admits what Vansittart and his supporters seemed 
unable to see, that policy was made in London and not by 
Henderson in Berlin. Equally important is Harvey's 
recognition that no British ambassador in Berlin at that 
moment could 'swing Hitler or German opinion'. 
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The issue of Henderson's recall dragged on through the 
summer of 1939. As late as 9 July, only two months before 
war broke out, Harvey was noting that: 'Henderson came over 
to see his doctor. Position is that Halifax and No. 10 would 
be very glad if he were found no longer fit .' 
9S Yet Hender- 
son was not recalled despite his very poor state of health 
and the reservations Chamberlain, Halifax and Cadogan 
clearly had about him. 
This is a matter far more mysterious than Henderson's 
appointment in 1937. For the suggestion that Henderson was 
kept in post at Chamberlain's wish, and because his known 
German sympathies would still render him a more effective 
representative does not square with Chamberlain's reported 
reservations about him, or with the evidence from Cadogan 
and Harvey that the Prime Minister wanted to recall him. 96 
Neither does the evidence support suggestions that Halifax 
and Chamberlain did not wish to be ungracious to a loyal 
servant of the Appeasement policy, or that Henderson still 
had credibility with the Nazis after Prague. The same 
historian concedes that the decision not to replace Hender- 
son after 15 March 'seems extraordinary indeed', but was 
related to the fact that Henderson was 'personable, 
intelligent, and very convincing'. " 
The conclusion must be that the decision to keep 
Henderson in post, even when he himself expected to be 
recalled, must go down as one of the more bizarre made 
by 
the Foreign Office in this period. Henderson himself was an 
exhausted, and extremely sick man, a fact which contempora- 
ries and historians alike have not properly acknowledged. 
Quite why the Foreign Office felt able to recall 
Lord Perth 
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(deemed to be too pro-fascist) from Rome in 1939, and 
replace him with Sir Percy Loraine, yet left the sick 
Henderson in Berlin has never been satisfactorily 
explained. 9° Particularly as the policy with which he had 
been so closely associated was largely discredited by the 
events of 15 March 1939. This point at least was appre- 
ciated by Oliver Harvey, a trenchant Foreign Office critic 
of Henderson. While noting that 
Henderson did not look at all fit and is obviously 
in a very nervous and overwrought state - quite 
unfit to be in such a post at such a time. He ought 
of course to be withdrawn. 
Harvey recognised that 
the policy that he was chosen to represent appease- 
ment, in which he passionately believes, has been 
reversed, and so long as he is there Germany and 
everybody else will never believe we may not have 
more appeasement. " 
Harvey reiterated this point in a letter to Halifax on 
15 July 1939, when the time for replacing Henderson had long 
since gone. 
He is the symbol of appeasement [Harvey wrote] and 
so long as he is at his post Berlin will believe 
that 'appeasement' is not dead. His withdrawal 
would be a piece of ocular evidence that we are 
always being advised to give in order to convince 
Hitler that we mean business. 
A rare contemporary note of sympathy for Henderson then 
occurs in Harvey's diary. He believed that it was unfair to 
keep Henderson 'who has always believed sincerely and 
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passionately in appeasement' in Berlin after the complete 
reversal of policy after 15 March 1939.100 
If Harvey's analysis is accepted then the role of 
Chamberlain and Halifax in keeping Henderson in post seems 
pusillanimous. According to Harvey, 'they did not want to 
retire him themselves' and were confounded when Henderson's 
doctor said he was quite fit (an odd medical opinion about a 
man who had a diagnosed cancerous growth under his tongue 
and in his neck). 1° But this version of events sits oddly 
too with the (not totally convincing) evidence from the 
Steward-Hesse interview referred to above. 
Why then was Henderson's continued presence in Berlin 
deemed necessary? 
Henderson's greatest shortcomings were allegedly made 
evident in the Polish crisis in the summer of 1939. But 
only the harshest critic could fail to feel some sympathy 
for this grievously sick man, left to flounder in Berlin in 
the advocacy of a policy which went against all his natural 
inclinations. And a man also who realised the wisdom of a 
move from Berlin and had been prepared by Halifax for such a 
move. Inexplicably, and with a degree of moral cowardice, 
Chamberlain and Halifax then left Henderson in Berlin. 
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feelings about his recall from Belgrade in 1935, 
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however, to 'a sense of my own inadequacy for what was 
obviously the most difficult and important post in the 
whole of the diplomatic service'. 
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p. 215. 
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Papers, PRO. 
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Once Henderson returned to his duties on 24 April 1939, 
following his authorised absence in protest against the 
occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, he was thrust into a 
situation of accelerating tension between Germany and 
Poland. Britain attempted, as it had done over Czecho- 
slovakia in 1938, to play the role of mediator between the 
two parties. ' 
Poland had taken advantage of the Czech crisis in 1938 
to seize the area of Teschen from its neighbour, but in the 
spring and summer of 1939, the Poles came under increasing 
pressure from Berlin in their turn, over the issue of Danzig 
and the Corridor. The Versailles Treaty had placed the 
largely German city of Danzig under overall League of 
Nations' control, but had given the Poles access to the port 
facilities. It had also created a corridor of territory 
through Germany, which both gave the Poles access to the 
Baltic Sea, and isolated East Prussia from the rest of 
Germany. 
It was to be expected that Hitler would seek to revise 
this aspect of Versailles, which had never been acceptable 
to the vast majority of Germans; and Henderson agreed that 
the German case was a morally valid one, just as he had 
accepted the German case over the Sudetenland in 1938. ' In 
one sense the German case was stronger over Danzig and the 
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Corridor because (unlike the Sudetenland) both had formerly 
been part of the Reich. And unlike Czechoslovakia, the 
'regime of the Colonels' in Warsaw was undemocratic and 
authoritarian, with few admirers in Britain. For Henderson 
himself however, this aspect would have posed few problems 
as he believed that people in Britain 
sometimes forget that there are 'less happier lands' 
than theirs, and fail to realise that even dictators 
can be, up to a point, necessary for a period and 
even extremely beneficial for a nation. ' 
Henderson had as little sympathy for the Poles on this 
issue as he had had for the Czechs a year earlier. They 
should not be allowed through intransigence over Danzig and 
the Corridor to drag a militarily underprepared Britain into 
war. He felt more concerned about the Polish Question in 
April 1939 than he had done about the Sudeten issue at an 
equivalent stage, because the Poles made it clear that they 
would be prepared to fight for Danzig and because Britain 
had given a commitment to defend Poland. But he still 
thought the question of Danzig and the Corridor easily 
capable of settlement. 'Can we allow, ' he asked Halifax, 
'the Polish Government to be too uncompromising in regard to 
them? '` There was a distinct echo here of Henderson's 
diplomacy in the Sudeten crisis, for it was to be the Poles 
who were required, in Henderson's view, to take the initia- 
tive in settling the problem rather than the Germans. 
Henderson, though, constantly denied bias in his dealings 
with the Poles, telling Halifax that he was 'neither pro- 
Polish nor pro-German. One is always for the weaker side 
and whereas Germany is a menace all the time, Poland 
is only 
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a menace as an ally'. ' But although Henderson was capable 
of seeing that Germany was the real menace, he still 
expected the Poles to make the concessions and in this sense 
he was not even-handed. Critics have been unconvinced by 
his protestations of fairness to German and Pole. ' He was, 
however, consistent because he had always maintained that 
the Versailles territorial settlement was unfair to Germany; 
and he remained convinced until his death that leaving large 
numbers of ethnic Germans outside Germany was a recipe for 
disaster. His solution to the Polish problem in 1939, 
therefore, was territorial revision. 
Henderson had to face a situation on his return to 
Berlin whereby Britain had given a guarantee of assistance 
to Poland on 31 March in the wake of the German annexation 
of Bohemia and Moravia on 15 March, and of the largely 
German speaking city of Memel which was seized from 
Lithuania on 21 March. British policy was now to construct 
a bloc of interested states to control and deter Germany. 
The Cabinet meeting on 29 March had shown that Halifax 
was worried that if, as was feared, Germany attacked Rumania 
(and rumours had been spread by the Rumanian Minister in 
London Tilea to this effect) Poland might 'stand aside'. 
Halifax was therefore anxious, now that collective security 
was on the agenda, to secure Polish assistance and as much 
assistance from Russia as was practicable'. 
Henderson had long been suspicious of Soviet communism 
because it sought to 'spread its ideology abroad', but was 
prescient enough to see (unlike Chamberlain) that a Nazi- 
Soviet pact was a possibility in the summer of 
1939. He was 
therefore prepared to put aside his anti-Soviet prejudice, 
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and his suspicious of alliances, in the interests of British 
policy. In the summer of 1939 he, like Vansittart, became 
an advocate of a Soviet alliance, but his advice was 
ignored, a crucial error by the Foreign Office, which had 
indications from the French, and from the German press, long 
before the event, that Germany and Russia were likely to 
reach an agreement. ' Henderson deserves credit for his 
prescience and flexibility over the issue of the Soviet 
alliance, which was badly handled by Chamberlain, Halifax 
and the Foreign Office. He did not trust the Russians, but 
wished to get the USSR into the anti-aggression block ... I 
feel intuitively that the Germans are getting at Stalin'. 9 
In contrast Chamberlain was notoriously reluctant to 
make an alliance with Soviet Russia and refused to accept 
that a Nazi-Soviet pact was imminent. Halifax shared this 
attitude, an alliance with Poland was to be preferred. 
Henderson thought that the USSR could be used to deter 
German aggression; but he continued to believe in the 
morality of the German case over Danzig and the Corridor, 
and in peaceful revision of Versailles. 
I may be wrong [he wrote to Horace Wilson on 24 May] 
but I am personally convinced that there can be no 
permanent peace in Europe until Danzig has reverted 
to Germany. The Poles cannot be master of 400,000 
Germans in Danzig - ergo Germany must be-10 
Yet again Henderson appears as the moralist and the revisio- 
nist, still convinced that the accommodation of German 
grievances against Versailles would carry the day. If these 
grievances were not addressed, Henderson argued, Britain 
would be the pawn of a revanchist Polish foreign policy, and 
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Polish stubbornness over Danzig and the Corridor would be 
encouraged. Henderson was to persist with this line to the 
eve of the outbreak of war in September 1939. 
This persistence brought him under attack from Foreign 
Office colleagues and friendly foreign diplomats alike. 
Henderson was barely back in post on 24 April when his 
apparent failure to learn from previous experience was 
criticised by the Counsellor in the Warsaw Embassy, Clifford 
Norton. He complained to Strang on 27 April that it seemed 
most dangerous for Berlin to use the same language 
about Danzig as they did about Czechoslovakia a year 
ago ... I can quite understand [Norton added acidly] 
that in Berlin life is not conducive to critical 
thought . 
Henderson's French colleague Coulondre was equally 
critical when telegraphing to Foreign Minister Bonnet. 
Referring to Henderson's reaction to the events of 15 March, 
Coulondre made a powerful condemnation of the British 
Ambassador's diplomacy 
les evenements ont cou1e sur Sir Nevile Henderson 
comme l'eau sur un mirroir; it n'en reste plus 
trace et mon collegue ne reflete plus ä nouveau que 
le visage ä son avis prestigieux de M. Hitler. I1 
semble qu'il ait oublie et n'ait rien appris. 
Coulondre did add that Henderson told him in March that he 
had not wished to return to Berlin, and that he had repeated 
this comment on 26 April. But noted Coulondre 'cependant il 
est lä'. 12 Coulondre was more critical of Henderson than 
the previous French Ambassador Francois-Poncet, who had been 
posted to Rome. " His complaints echoed those of the French 
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Minister in Prague Lacroix who complained in 1938 that 
Henderson's behaviour was undermining the Anglo-French 
alliance. But Henderson was no admirer of alliances or 
collective security. 
Henderson had been on enforced leave when the British 
decision to guarantee Poland was made on 31 March. He was 
obviously unhappy about it because of his predisposition to 
fear alliances which went back to his period of service in 
Constantinople when he felt (like the Foreign Secretary Lord 
Curzon) that Britain had been betrayed by the French at the 
time of the Chanak crisis. 'No sooner had we taken up a 
position, ' Henderson was to write later of that experience, 
'than the French and Italians had ratted on us., " Most 
important however, was Henderson's fear that the guarantee 
effectively meant that British policy could be determined in 
Warsaw. Britain would become a prisoner of Polish policy- 
makers. 
Coulondre's comment, however, that Henderson seemed to 
have 'learnt nothing and forgotten nothing' contained at 
best only a half truth. While Henderson continued to 
believe that appeasement was the best policy available, he 
had been deeply shaken by the events of 15 March. He 
realised that the sensible option for the Foreign office 
would have been to transfer him, and replace him with some- 
one who was a natural supporter of a policy of collective 
security. Henderson admitted as much in Failure of A 
This option had been available to Halifax and Chamber- 
lain, particularly in the light of Henderson's very poor 
health, but they had failed to avail themselves of it. 
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Instead Henderson was left in post after there had been a 
revolution in British foreign policy with which, he was out 
of sympathy. In the b rave new world of collective security 
in April 1939 (Britain had also guaranteed Greece, Rumania 
and Turkey), Henderson was ill at ease. Nevertheless 
Coulondre's assessment proved to be wrong in the long run. 
Henderson may have been out of sympathy with the concept of 
collective security, but he was intelligent enough to see 
the need for it after 15 March, and to press for a Soviet 
alliance. He remained fearful however that 'if the Poles 
took up arms, then Britain fought too'. 15 Neither, Hender- 
son believed, would the Poles be able to withstand a German 
onslaught, or Britain and France be in any position to 
'render any effective immediate aid' to Poland (in both 
beliefs he turned out to be absolutely correct)., " 
In the new situation after the British guarantee had 
been given to Poland, Henderson saw his role to be one of 
warning the Foreign Office to beware of encouraging Polish 
intransigence about Danzig and the Corridor. He shared this 
anxiety with Cadogan on 20 April and hinted to the Polish 
Ambassador in Berlin that they mustn't be intransigent 
about Danzig now that we have guaranteed them'. " Henderson 
therefore saw the guarantee to Poland as a means of securing 
Polish acquiescence in a policy of territorial revision. He 
was sure both that the Poles were being intransigent, and 
that the Germans had by far the better case over Danzig. 
Henderson's critics, like Oliver Harvey, thought that he was 
failing in his duty to make Hitler take the British guaran- 
tee seriously. This was not the case, as evidence from 
German sources makes clear, but Henderson clearly saw the 
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guarantee to Poland as a double-edged sword. 18 It could be 
used to warn the Germans about the perils of aggression but 
it could also be used to demand concessions from the Poles. 
Britain was, after all, in a stronger position than she had 
been with the Czechs in 1938, in that she did have a 
commitment to Poland which had not been the case with 
Czechoslovakia, and this gave British warnings more weight. 
With commitment, Henderson believed, not unreasonably, went 
greater Polish responsibilities. Others, like Coulondre, 
saw Henderson's attitude as a dangerous reprise of the 
British attitude to the Sudeten crisis, which had merely 
presented Hitler with a bloodless triumph. While the 
British Government saw the prevention of German hegemony as 
its priority, Henderson still saw the avoidance of war as 
his paramount task. 
Henderson was especially busy in early May, bombarding 
London with telegrams about an interview with Ribbentrop on 
2 May, and expressing doubts about the sincerity of Josef 
Beck in the same manner as he had attacked the integrity of 
Bene6 a year earlier. 
Henderson warned Ribbentrop about the anti-German 
feeling which Hitler's Prague coup had unleashed in Britain, 
but he was sure that Ribbentrop was 'impervious to argument 
or reason'. He told Halifax, however, that in his view 
Ribbentrop was not so confident as he had been before that 
Britain would never fight. Henderson had rejected an 
accusation in this interview that Britain and France were 
encouraging Beck to be intransigent. This, he told Ribben- 
trop, was 'quite untrue '. 19 On 3 May Henderson reported 
back about attacks on the Poles and the British in the 
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German press, which had castigated Chamberlain and Daladier 
as the protectors of Poland. The British press were accused 
of inciting the poles to acts of provocation. " 
This was Henderson in the required assertive mode, 
warning the Germans off, and reporting back accurately on 
the attitude of the German press. But he retained his 
doubts about Polish foreign policy, for on the day of his 
latest fractious interview with Ribbentrop, Henderson 
criticised Beck's diplomacy. He pointed out to Halifax that 
Beck had denied that the Germans had ever made a specific 
offer to guarantee the existing Polish-German frontier. 
This flew in the face of what Henderson's colleague Ogilvie- 
Forbes had been told by the Polish Ambassador Lipski on 
22 April, namely that the Germans had offered such a 
guarantee for a period of between 25 and 30 years. In 
exchange, Lipski had told Ogilvie-Forbes, the Germans wanted 
an extra-territorial corridor across the Polish Corridor. 
Beck's comments were, therefore, Henderson said, 'surely 
disingenuous' . 
`1 His instincts about this were sound, as 
Beck was a notoriously elusive, and untrustworthy character 
who was for this reason cordially disliked by his French 
allies. Beck's policy was to extract as much protection for 
the Poles as possible, without giving up his territorial 
ambitions, which included an interest in the puppet state of 
Slovakia which had obtained an illusory independence after 
15 March. " 
Nevertheless, and despite his legitimate reservations 
about Beck, Henderson had enough insight to see that Hitler 
might be hoping that his offer of a frontier guarantee would 
be rejected. For if it carried with it a demand for an 
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extra-territorial corridor, Hitler knew that the Poles would 
turn it down. 
Henderson though did not make the logical leap required 
to see that Hitler's olive branch, reported on by Lipski on 
22 April, was in fact nothing of the sort. Either Poland 
accepted Hitler's terms, and became a German client state, 
or she would be attacked, and Henderson's unwillingness to 
grasp this fact infuriated colleagues like Norton and 
Coulondre. It remains true nonetheless, in Henderson's 
defence, that many British politicians and diplomats 'tended 
to see in the Polish regime, deviousness, megalomania, total 
national, self-centredness and greed'. ' Only in the 
anxiety ridden atmosphere of March 1939 did an Anglo-Polish 
entente come to see desirable in the interest of stopping 
Hitler. Halifax's fear, referred to above, was that failure 
to reach agreement with Poland would leave it susceptible to 
German offers, and draw it into the Nazi orbit. " The Poles 
had shown a capacity for self aggrandisement at the time of 
Munich. 
Henderson disagreed with Halifax's analysis. He did not 
believe that a Polish alliance was preferable to a Soviet 
one. He opposed all alliances but ultimately saw the force 
of the argument for a pact with the USSR . 
's 
Despite his reservations about collective security 
however, Henderson was concerned that the Nazis should take 
the British guarantee to Poland seriously. Even when the 
British Government introduced partial conscription in April 
1939, he did not think that the German government was 
convinced of Britain's determination to help the Poles. 
I constantly hear reports [he wrote in a private 
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letter to Cadogan on 26 April] which cannot be 
disregarded, that the Nazi Party leaders including 
of course Ribbentrop believe that England is still 
unprepared in the last resort to go to war. I 
realise the danger of this frame of mind. 
Henderson had also asked his confidant the Italian Ambas- 
sador Attolico about the situation. Attolico believed that 
there was a difference between the situation in the spring 
of 1939 and September 1938. In Attolico's opinion, 
Henderson reported, the 'Ribbentrop crowd then believed that 
Britain would not fight because she was not ready. Today 
that crowd did not believe that Britain would fight over a 
question like Danzig, . 
2" Further evidence had been provided 
to the Foreign Office by Ogilvie-Forbes about a conversation 
between the Japanese Ambassador, in which Oshima had stated 
that the Germans believed that British rearmament was only 
bluff . --- 
Henderson had been rightly sceptical about the numerous 
false alarms about German intentions in the early months of 
1939; but he fully realised that it was dangerous for the 
Germans to be allowed to assume that because Britain had not 
fought in September 1938, it would not honour its guarantee 
to Poland. It is not, therefore, the case that, as Aster 
contends, he 'ignored the crisis of confidence created by 
the occupation of Prague' . 
2e Henderson left German 
officials in no doubt that if an attack was made on Poland, 
it would mean war. But unlike many of his Foreign Office 
colleagues, Henderson still believed that Hitler's ambitions 
were limited, and that the Danzig issue could be settled by 
peaceful negotiation. Makins, for example, minuted 'How can 
294 
we ensure that a settlement of the Danzig question will in 
fact be the end, and not a prelude to further demands? 129 
Henderson by contrast went on hoping desperately that Hitler 
was not an extremist and might still be susceptible to 
diplomacy, providing the Poles could be persuaded to make 
concessions. He also continued to hope that British 
mediation might prevent war. Nevertheless Henderson was 
aware of the dangers of allowing the Germans to believe that 
they could achieve another bloodless coup, and he carried 
out faithfully his warning function about the consequences 
of further aggression. He, like Neville Chamberlain, 
continued to hope that the peace might be preserved. 
In early May there were persistent rumours about a 
German coup in Danzig. On 8 May Henderson's former First 
Secretary Kirkpatrick (now back in the Central Department) 
minuted that if any coup of any sort whatever is made in 
Danzig, we should instantly mobilise'. Strang agreed with 
Jebb's suggestion that Henderson should speak to Generals 
Keitel and Haider, if the right opportunity presented itself 
to warn the Germans off. Henderson's critic Sargent 
disagreed with Jebb's suggestion. He thought it would make 
more sense to sound out Beck in Warsaw about what Poland 
would do in the event of a German coup in Danzig. 'I 
doubt, ' Sargent observed, 'whether it is any good telling 
Sir N. Henderson to talk to the German generals and on the 
whole I should prefer not to do so. ' But Cadogan sided with 
Strang and Jebb, minuting that 'perhaps Sir N. Henderson can 
be instructed to say a word or two to both Keitel and 
Haider 1 . 
'° 
A passage of arms then ensued as Henderson, not for the 
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first time in his career, queried his instructions. The 
advice of the Foreign Office officials had by then reached 
Halifax, who wanted Henderson to seek out an opportunity to 
speak to Keitel and Haider. On 11 May Henderson telegraphed 
the Foreign Office that he could not 
well act personally as regards persons mentioned in 
paragraph 2 of Foreign Office telegram No. 150 unless 
I get favourable opportunity. I have asked Military 
Attache to see Deputy Chief of Staff (Haider] at an 
early date. 
Halifax was insistent. He quite understood that 
Henderson might have some difficulty in getting access to a 
member of the High Command. But he did not want the message 
to be delivered 'through a third party such as a Military 
Attache'. In the following telegram on 13 May a tone of 
exasperation had crept into Halifax's response. He still 
thought it 
desirable that you should speak as authorised to 
members of the High Command if an opportunity offers 
... I should prefer that action should 
be taken by 
yourself rather than by your Military Attache'. 
If Henderson failed to deliver the message in person, 
Halifax had already said in his telegram of 11 May this 
would 'rob our words of a good deal of their effect'. 31 
Henderson still believed he was in the right about this 
issue, as he demonstrated in private correspondence with 
Cadogan. 
The language he had been instructed to use to the 
German generals [he wrote to Cadogan on 10 May] 
is 
practically identical with what I use to all and 
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sundry who, in my opinion, are likely to repeat it 
in useful quarters. 
The record shows that Henderson's claim was accurate, 
and he went on to tell Cadogan that he would continue to 
pass on warnings to leading Germans, and instruct Mason 
MacFarlane to do the same. He would also speak to Keitel in 
such terms if he got the opportunity to see him in the near 
future. ' If, however, no such opportunity arose Henderson 
was prepared to take up Sargent's suggestion on 8 May that a 
warning be 'planted' 'on suitable Nazi agents'. " 
Ingeniously Henderson suggested to Cadogan that any message 
to the German military via the Embassy should be sent, as if 
by mistake in a telegram 'in a cypher which we know that the 
Germans can decode'. This suggestion was taken up by the 
Foreign Office and on 11 May the warning was telegraphed to 
Berlin in the 'R' Code (a code used to communicate with the 
British Embassies in Berlin and Warsaw at the time).; ` 
Nevertheless Henderson was still obliged to carry out 
his instructions, following Halifax's testy telegram on 
13 May. But both Halter and Keitel kept refusing invita- 
tions to lunch, and Henderson had to make do with Weizsäcker 
whom he saw on 16 May and to whom he gave the warning (he 
also passed on a warning to Haider when he saw him some 
weeks later on 30 May) . 
's 
This episode, which is not mentioned by Henderson 
in 
Failure of A Mission, 
Henderson the freedom 
time of the Nuremberg 
declined to pass on a 
But it also showed the 
showed that Halifax would not give 
of manoeuvre accorded to him at the 
Rally in 1938, when Henderson had 
warning to Hitler and got his way. 
at if Halifax exercised his authority 
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as Secretary of State fully, Henderson would comply as he 
was bound to do. 
As it was, the plan to use the German generals to 
receive a warning was a somewhat desperate Foreign Office 
expedient, devised to deal with the problem of the obdurate 
Ribbentrop, who was telling Hitler that the British would 
never fight. Sargent had been unenthusiastic about the 
tactic, as was Henderson, although the grounds for his 
objection are not entirely clear. He may have objected to 
Halifax's instruction purely on grounds of protocol, as it 
would be normal for MacFarlane to make such an intervention 
with the German military and not the Ambassador directly. 
Henderson had no objection in principle however, to using 
the German military as a conduit for warnings. He made this 
clear at the time of the von Hassell interview in September 
1938, when he had specifically asked von Hassell to relay a 
warning to Keitel. Sometimes Henderson could be a stickler 
for protocol, just as on other occasions he could ignore it. 
Or as stated in his letter to Cadogan, he may have felt that 
he was already giving enough warnings. 
The letter to Cadogan on 10 May also provides an 
insight into Henderson's behaviour over this, and many other 
aspects of Anglo-German relations. 'The PM said to me two 
years ago, ' he confided to Cadogan, that sometimes a calcu- 
lated indiscretion was a very useful expedience. (Hence my 
first speech in Berlin!! ). ý36 This advice from Chamberlain 
clearly made Henderson believe, and he had shown plenty of 
capacity for unorthodox diplomacy before he went to 
Berlin, 
that normal Foreign office rules did not apply 
to him. He 
would continue to query his instructions, and commit 
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'indiscretions', in carrying out his one-man mission to 
preserve the peace. 
Henderson did, though, inform the Foreign Office about 
German press attacks on the British Government (D. Cameron 
Watt wrongly claims that he did not). " He telegraphed on 
5 May that the British were being blamed, in the Nazi paper 
'Volkischer Beobachter', for encouraging the Poles to be 
obdurate . Goebbels, whom Henderson regularly identified as 
an 'extremist' in the Nazi leadership, was quoted in the 
paper as saying that 'the jingoism of the Polish Press ... 
comes from the stimulation it has received in England'. 
This particular remark was passed on by Henderson without 
comment. Henderson did not endorse the point about Polish 
jingoism, or a further accusation that the Poles were 
claiming East Prussia up to, and beyond, the line of the 
River Oder. " 
Nevertheless Henderson's anti-Polish line was consis- 
tently present in his telegrams and letters. It was there 
for example when Henderson wrote privately to Halifax on 
6 May about an interview with Göring. When Göring had 
hinted at 'the solution of a corridor over the corridor, ' 
Henderson wrote, 'I never even discussed it because I 
thought it too good to be true'. Kirkpatrick minuted 
crossly 'Where this argument goes wrong is in the assumption 
that Germany is in the right over Danzig', but Henderson 
focused his criticism on the Poles. Their chauvinism he 
argued in the same letter 'had made Colonel Beck overplay 
his hand over the issue of Danzig and the Corridor' . 
39 This 
reflected Henderson's view that Poland was refusing to make 
concessions when faced with reasonable German demands. 
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Henderson was also consistent in his view that Göring 
was a 'moderate', who might be used to influence Hitler, and 
Chamberlain shared this view (although Göring was not 
mentioned by name) when he spoke to the Cabinet Foreign 
Policy Committee on 16 May. There were still 'important 
moderate elements in Germany', Chamberlain told his 
colleagues, 'which it was desirable to foster and encourage. 
He greatly feared that an alliance with Russia would drive 
these moderate elements into Hitler's camp. '`° Henderson 
shared Chamberlain's anxiety about a Soviet alliance, but by 
mid-May Chamberlain had evidently come to recognise that 
Hitler himself was an extremist, and not a misunderstood 
dictator. 
Henderson kept the lines to Göring open, and saw him 
again on 8 June. He warned Göring that Britain would 
certainly go to war if Germany attacked Poland, but exceeded 
his brief by adding that Chamberlain would 'be ready to give 
a not unfriendly reply (I made it clear that I was speaking 
personally)' if Hitler would abandon his aggressive attitude 
to the Poles. Henderson went on to say that after all 
Danzig was a German city run by Germans, and there was no 
question of ethnic Germans being oppressed. 'I wanted to 
add, ' Henderson told Halifax, 'that the only people who were 
ill-treated in Danzig were Poles and Jews', but at that 
point Göring had interrupted to say that Danzig 'was not a 
matter of urgency'. 
Ironically Henderson was forced to defend his old 
mentor Vansittart, whom Göring singled out for mention as a 
focus for anti-Germanism in Britain. 'I retorted, ' Hender- 
son said, that people in England with probably 
far greater 
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justification regarded Ribbentrop as enemy No. 1 of the 
British Empire. ' Göring's reply was significant, for he 
told Henderson that 'neither Ribbentrop nor himself for that 
matter, had more power to influence Hitler than the pebbles 
we were standing on, ." This revealing insight should have 
been taken to heart by Henderson, who might then have 
invested less time and energy (and optimism) securing 
Göring's support to rein in Hitler in the weeks to come. ' 
Göring was clearly wrong in his assessment of Ribbentrop 
(influenced as it was by personal hatred) who did signifi- 
cantly influence Hitler's attitude towards Britain. " 
Hitler was profoundly ignorant about Britain, and relied on 
Ribbentrop for what proved to be disastrously inaccurate 
advice. Nevertheless Henderson was right in his assessment 
that Göring did not want war with Britain in 1939. " And he 
duly reported back Göring's comments to the Foreign Office, 
which should have been able to draw its own conclusions 
about the extent of Hitler's personal dominance. 
German illusions about the position in Britain were 
underlined by Göring's remarks about Vansittart, and his 
reference to 'a clique in the Foreign Office which wanted 
war at any price'. Henderson was forced to point out that 
Halifax and Chamberlain were the arbiters of Britain's 
foreign policy and that any false conceptions on this score 
only lead to disastrous mistakes'. " 
By June 1939 Henderson was becoming alarmed at the 
failure to reach a settlement over Danzig and the Corridor. 
He was convinced that if no solution was 
found by the end of 
August, Hitler would move against the Poles before 
the Party 
Rally in September. For once he found an ally 
in 
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Vansittart, who minuted on 30 June that 
Sir N. Henderson says, as I do that the German 
people are being prepared by a campaign of insults 
and contemptuous invective [recognition from his 
greatest critic that Henderson was briefing the 
Foreign Office fully about the hostility of the 
German press and propaganda machine] for war with 
this country. That the views of His Majesty's 
Ambassador in Berlin should accord with mine is an 
event so rare that I trust the conjunction will 
carry due weight. " 
It was not in fact the first time the two men had been in 
agreement (they were at one over the Soviet alliance), 
although as Vansittart's caustic remark acknowledged, they 
were more often at loggerheads. In this instance Henderson 
was carrying out his warning function to the British Govern- 
ment, and giving it an accurate picture of the mendacious 
Nazi propaganda campaign in the summer of 1939. " 
The sheer physical strain on Henderson at this time, 
sick as he was, must have been tremendous. 
He was increasingly operating at the limits of 
physical tolerance. His letters became increasingly 
intense as he discerned increasing insensitivity to 
the central fact that 'hundreds of thousands of 
British lives' were being risked. " 
The use of the word 'intense' by Maurice Cowling 
is kinder 
to Henderson, and more accurate, than the mere pejorative 
'hysterical' which censorious historians have 
favoured. And 
why was Henderson at fault for trying 
desperately in the 
last months of peace to avoid the conflict 
he dreaded so 
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much? Henderson was no physical coward (he had badgered the 
Foreign Office constantly to allow him to join the Army in 
the First World War), but he possessed, perhaps more imagi- 
nation and sensitivity than some Foreign Office colleagues 
about what such a conflict might mean, his agony being 
sharpened by his conviction that Danzig was not a cause 
worth dying for. He also knew that he had lost the 
confidence of Halifax and the Foreign Office, who added to 
his problems by hinting at a transfer, and then failing to 
do anything about it. Yet the 'crushing weight' of illness 
and departmental isolation only spurred Henderson to greater 
efforts. " There was nothing ignoble about Henderson's 
belief that 'War is such an appalling adventure that I have 
always felt, and still feel that everything else must be 
tried' . 
'- 
In essence Henderson was of course right about the 
Polish commitment. The British guarantee to Poland was a 
paper guarantee. The Chiefs of Staff would not give the 
Poles the arms they requested, and the Treasury would not 
give them the financial credits they required. "' Chamber- 
lain and his colleagues never had any intention of giving 
effective assistance to Poland, and their policy was open to 
exactly the same criticism that Cadogan had levelled at 
Vansittart at the time of the Anschluss. That is, of 
encouraging 'a small man to fight' when one wasn't prepared 
to help him. S2 Henderson saw the flawed logic in the 
British position. First of all Britain was putting 
its 
foreign policy at the mercy of Beck, and then 
it was making 
false promises to his government. As his correspondence 
with Lord Londonderry at the end of 1938 shows, 
Henderson 
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believed that Britain could avoid war only by rearming in 
depth, and negotiating with Germany from a position of 
strength rather than weakness. But he also remained 
convinced that the problem of Danzig could, and should, be 
solved. 
All that the British Government had to offer in 1939 to 
the Poles was bluff, and Henderson had always warned against 
the danger of threats which could not be backed up with 
adequate force. The Chamberlain Government did not want the 
Poles to slide into the German camp after 15 March, but it 
lacked the political or military will to assist the Poles if 
their courageous refusal to bow to Hitler's demands led to 
war. 
The military teeth which Britain needed could only 
really be provided by an alliance with the USSR, which (as 
has been seen) Henderson came around reluctantly to support. 
'Clearly, ' he wrote in 1940, 'the Russian negotiations were 
a form of encirclement, but in no offensive sense, and 
solely as a means to resist aggression. s3 But he had little 
confidence that the Anglo-French talks with the Russians 
which started in early August would be successful, espe- 
cially after the dismissal of Foreign Affairs Minister 
Litvinov in May who had been closely associated with a 
Soviet policy of anti-fascist collective security. 
Henderson was also anxious that Germany should not be 
provoked by sending the Anglo-French delegation to Russia 
across German territory by rail (as the French wished). He 
advised the Foreign office not to agree to this, and 
his 
advice prevailed with the delegation being sent on a 
lengthy 
sea journey (the Germans had already complained about 
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British service aircraft flying over Germany). S° Henderson 
however, could hardly be blamed for the fact that the ship 
could only travel at 13 knots and took a week to get to 
Leningrad. But the fact that his advice on this point was 
accepted by the Foreign Office is significant, given the 
comments by leading historians about the disdain with which 
he was allegedly regarded after his second return to Germany 
on 24 Apri1.95 
Henderson continued to hope for an accord with Germany, 
noting in a despatch to the Foreign Office that 'a settle- 
ment with Germany and Italy will be easier ... if the 
Russian negotiations end in some quite anodyne agreement'. 56 
This reflected Chamberlain's own view. At the meeting of 
the Cabinet Foreign Policy Committee on 16 May Chamberlain 
had told his colleagues that 'Rather than consent to a 
Triple Alliance to include Russia, he, the Prime Minister 
would prefer to extend our guarantee against aggression to 
the Baltic States' . 
s' Henderson as ever, was in agreement 
with Downing Street rather than with the Foreign Office. 
In the meantime Henderson was involved in day-to-day 
dealings with the Wilhelmstrasse, albeit in the knowledge 
that Ribbentrop would prevent him from seeing Hitler, and 
was telling Hitler that Britain would never fight. 
Henderson had two important interviews with Weizsäcker on 
15 May and 13 June. On the first occasion, according 
to 
Weizsäcker's minute, Henderson was anxious that the 
Germans 
should realise that 
England did not want war and wished to avoid 
it 
through a German-Polish agreement, 
but that she was 
ready and determined to keep 
her promise and come to 
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Poland's assistance should we try to change the 
status quo in Danzig and thereby make Poland go to 
war. 
Here is clear evidence that Henderson was carrying out his 
instructions and warning Weizsäcker about the consequences 
of aggression. Henderson went on to concur with Weizsäcker 
about Polish rashness, but told him that the German coup in 
Prague had 'produced a complete revulsion in London'. Yet, 
according to Weizsäcker, who was no friend of the Poles, 
Henderson then said that he believed that Beck too, was 
against war, but that 'like the British Government, he was 
convinced of the ultimate victory of the British-French- 
Polish arms'. Henderson was convinced that in the end, the 
Axis powers would be defeated by such a combination for the 
Axis was shorter of breath'. ` 
For his part Henderson recognised that Weizsäcker was 
, as bitter about the Poles as all of them' although he 
thought Weizsäcker 'a "thorough" German but ... an honest 
man and he is certainly not a firebrand'. 59 
Perversely, Lewis Namier used the Weizsäcker interview 
on 15 May as evidence against Henderson for failing to 
disguise his mixed feelings about the Poles. Any balanced 
reading of Henderson's remarks shows that he did carry out 
his instructions and even (contrary to his anti-Polish 
reputation) stated his belief that Beck did not want war. 
60 
Astonishingly, another historian C. Thorne, takes Hender- 
son's comment that any war would 'be conducted defensively 
the Western Powers' as evidence that Henderson chose 'a 
markedly personal interpretation of how best to serve 
his 
country'. " In fact Weizsäcker's text reads 
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In the war, added Henderson, the Western Powers 
would remain on the defensive. We would bomb each 
other's houses, but the final victory in the British 
view did not lie with Germany and Italy, for the 
Axis was shorter of breath. " 
Henderson was stating his opinion that the Allied side would 
win the war and for this is, as usual, unfairly castigated. 
When the two men met again on 13 June Henderson was 
recorded by Weizsäcker as saying that 'England desired to 
retain the sea; the European Continent could be left to 
Germany, "63 Even Namier finds this attribution 'astoni- 
shing' and needing 'substantiating'. 64 Henderson had never 
been so extreme in any of his other interviews with German 
leaders or officials. In his own version of the interview, 
Henderson recorded Weizsäcker as saying that it was 
Britain's task to see that the Poles behaved themselves. He 
telegraphed back to London that 
I may talk till I am hoarse that it is the German 
themselves who are to blame, but if I had the elo- 
quence of Demosthenes I would not have the slightest 
prospect of convincing them to the contrary. " 
It seems extremely unlikely that Henderson would have made 
such a massive indiscretion on 13 June as alleged by Weiz- 
sacker. Namier himself concedes that Henderson was 'firmly 
convinced' of Britain's determination to fight which 
'emotionally, he only half shared' . 
66 This comment in 
itself tends to confuse, for Henderson's doubts, which were 
genuine enough, did not prevent him from warning Weizsäcker 
and others that Britain would indeed fight 
if called upon to 
do so. He supported his warning by telling Weizsäcker on 
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15 May that Britain and France would win any such struggle, 
and his reference to blockade tactics (which had after all 
won the First World war) was perfectly proper. As was his 
expressed anxiety about the possibility of war on 13 June, 
and feeling 'the weight of responsibility which rests on him 
as Ambassador in Berlin'. " Weizsäcker professed surprise 
after the June interview that Henderson had no opinion about 
Anglo-French attempts to secure an alliance with the USSR, 
but this discretion seems entirely proper when the delega- 
tion was only to be sent to Russia six weeks later. It 
contrasts oddly with the alleged indiscretion earlier in the 
interview. As does the record of Henderson's comments to 
sympathetic Germans with no particular axe to grind like von 
Hassell and Spitzy, and officials in the employ of the Reich 
Government. " A possible explanation of the alleged 15 May 
gaffe may be that Henderson, frustrated by Ribbentrop's 
obstructive tactics against his aim of Anglo-German detente, 
perpetrated an 'indiscretion' to open the direct channel of 
communication to Hitler which had been closed to him. But 
he had never spoken in such defeatist terms before, and the 
accuracy of Weizsäcker's report must be in doubt. 
At the start of July Henderson was back in London for 
consultations with his doctor about his cancer condition. 
This had shown no improvement, and together with the 
gathering crisis over Poland, may have contributed to his 
darkening mood. He recognised, when telegraphing to Halifax 
on 11 July, that if Hitler 'persisted in forcible solutions 
... then we shall 
have to make the great sacrifice'. " 
Nonetheless he still thought as late as 8 August that 
Hitler's mind was not yet made up in favour of war, although 
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when he saw Weizsäcker again on 5 August, he found the 
German diplomat's belief that the Polish crisis was not as 
dangerous as the preceding Czech one 'complacent'. 70 
Henderson's anxieties were not allayed by the fact that 
despite the worsening Polish crisis, the Cabinet Foreign 
Policy Committee did not meet at all between 1 August and 
25 August. 
Henderson's hopes about Hitler's state of mind were 
steadily eroded. 'We cannot yield, ' he told Cadogan on 
15 August, 'and I am afraid that I do not believe Hitler 
will either. ' 7' And again on 24 August he conceded that 'if 
the British public cannot stand Hitler's fidgetiness [an odd 
choice of phrase] any longer there is nothing more to be 
said' .ý In the meantime the Poles were likely to be 
attacked if they did not meet Hitler's demand that a pleni- 
potentiary should be sent to Berlin to negotiate about 
Danzig and the Corridor. " 
In those last desperate days of peace. Henderson tried 
his hand again at personal diplomacy. He saw everyone he 
could, including Spitzy (who had left the Wilhelmstrasse), 
in a despairing attempt to stave off the unthinkable. 
Spitzy recorded that he met Henderson at the Dutch Legation 
and how 
Henderson put his hands on my shoulders and begged 
me to do everything I could to make it clear to all 
my influential acquaintances in Berlin that Britain 
would come in if Germany attacked Poland. 
[Henderson 
went on] You must tell all your old friends and all 
other reasonable people, I implore you. 
Spitzy promised so to do, writing that he had 'never 
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forgotten' Henderson's emotional appeal. " 
Henderson even wrote a letter to his old enemy Ribben- 
trop asking if, after Hitler had shown so much patience with 
the Poles, 'it is too much to ask that he should wait that 
little while more which may make all the difference'. 
Henderson made it clear that he was writing to Ribbentrop 
'quite personally' to prevent the greatest of all catas- 
trophes. " But by the time this letter was written on 
25 August it was already too late. Ribbentrop had already 
signed his notorious non-aggression pact with Molotov on 
22 August (an alignment which Henderson had foreseen) On 
the same day that Henderson wrote to Ribbentrop, Chamberlain 
transformed the guarantee to Poland into a full-blown 
military alliance. Hitler called Ribbentrop the 'second 
Bismarck', but the triumphant duo were shaken when the 
British were not intimidated by the agreement between 
Germany and the USSR into abandoning Poland. Only to the 
extent however that Hitler postponed 'Case White', the 
planned attack on Poland, until 1 September. An interview 
between Henderson and Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 23 August 
achieved little, although Henderson passed on a letter from 
Chamberlain to Hitler (the letter had been Henderson's idea) 
underlining Britain's commitment to Poland. 
Strange unofficial intermediaries now appeared on the 
scene in an attempt to save the peace. One was the Swedish 
amateur diplomat Berger Dalherus (who knew Göring and other 
Nazi leaders). After seeing Göring, Dalherus told Henderson 
that Hitler was 'fully alive to fact that Great Britain was 
not bluffing'. Göring however, told Dalherus that 
he feared 
that the Poles would make difficulties about sending an 
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emissary to Berlin as Hitler demanded. " Henderson could 
claim at least that Hitler now understood that Britain was 
not bluffing. He still hoped that Göring's influence could 
be used for peace. 
Henderson managed to see Hitler on 25 August and again 
on 29 August. On 25 August Hitler asked Henderson to come 
to the Reich Chancellery where Henderson found the Führer 
'calm and normal'. "- He told Henderson that the problem of 
Danzig and the Corridor must be solved, and then he would 
make Britain an offer to guarantee the British Empire, and 
even put German forces at the disposal of the British 
Government. 
Henderson tried to point out that Britain would never 
abandon the Poles, and that Hitler's 'plan' said nothing 
about a peaceful settlement with Poland. He offered none- 
theless, to take up Hitler's suggestion that he fly to 
London at once. 
The Foreign Office were outraged by Hitler's offer, but 
arranged for Henderson to attend a crucial Cabinet meeting, 
the second such meeting Henderson had attended since 
30 August 1938. Three Cabinet meetings were held between 
26 August and 28 August. Halifax seemed impressed by the 
fact that Hitler had put a German plane at Henderson's 
disposal, which he thought showed that Hitler's intentions 
were honourable. There was however, no backing away from 
the commitment to Poland. 
Henderson was cross-questioned at the Cabinet meeting 
on 26 August. He wanted Britain to sign an alliance with 
Germany, or a non-aggression pact. In answer to questions 
about Hitler's intentions, Henderson replied 
by saying that 
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'however little faith one might have in Herr Hitler's 
promises, one might at least test them out'. 78 As Sidney 
Aster has pointed out this 'seemingly fatuous advice '79 made 
good practical sense. This was because on 25 August the 
Chiefs of Staff had decided that if a British ultimatum had 
to be issued to Germany, war preparations would only be 
complete on 31 August. Time needed to be bought therefore. 
Henderson wanted Britain to arrange direct bi-lateral talks 
between Poland and Germany and the Cabinet agreed with this 
proposal. 00 Hitler wanted a Polish plenipotentiary to go to 
Berlin. Henderson had been urging his Polish counterpart 
Lipski to see Hitler about such a visit. His colleague in 
Warsaw Sir Howard Kennard, thought that it. would be too 
much like Canossa' . 
°1 And Cadogan agreed with him; a 
sanction from Beck in Warsaw was required if there were to 
be direct Polish-German talks. 
This sanction came on the afternoon of 28 August, and 
Henderson was soon on his way back to Berlin from Croydon 
Airport. When Henderson saw Hitler again at the Reich- 
chancery on the evening of 28 August he was 'once again 
friendly and reasonable'. '` He seemed prepared to accept 
British proposals for an international guarantee to Poland 
and the opening of direct conversations with Warsaw. Hitler 
undertook to give Henderson a written answer the next 
day, 
but it was to be almost midnight before Henderson got 
back 
to the British Embassy. He wrote later that it was the 
only one of my interviews with Hitler at which 
it was I who 
did most of the talking'. 83 
Henderson warned Hitler repeatedly that 
Germany had a 
stark choice. It could have friendship with 
Britain, or war 
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with Poland, Britain and France if it insisted on the use of 
force. If Hitler opted for the latter, then war with 
Britain and France would become inevitable. Henderson 
'succeeded admirably' in finding out what Hitler's immediate 
objectives were. " He wanted Danzig and the Polish Corridor 
along with frontier modifications in Silesia (another bone 
of contention between the two states). 
Even Vansittart, long Henderson's leading critic in the 
Foreign Office, had to concede that Henderson 'had conducted 
the interview very well '. as He was unhappy, however, that 
Henderson had stated that he personally did not rule out the 
possibility of Britain accepting an alliance with Germany. 
Henderson was subsequently to be instructed that he should 
not make any references to Anglo-German alliances in future 
interviews. " 
Credit however needs to be given to Henderson for a job 
well done, though some historians seem unwilling to give it 
even when it is due. °' But the Foreign Office made it clear 
that it wanted neither an alliance, nor a non-aggression 
pact (which Henderson had advocated at the Cabinet meeting 
on 26 August). The Germans would have known about such an 
instruction instantly, had it been telephoned, as their 
Forschungsamt (Research Office) was regularly monitoring 
telephone calls from the British Embassy. Henderson and his 
Embassy colleagues were criticised for indiscretions on the 
telephone. " It was normal practice, however, for documents 
which were to be handed over to foreign governments to be 
sent 'en clair' to avoid compromising the normal codes and 
ciphers by inadvertently providing foreign cryptographers 
with useful clues. Particularly secret instructions would 
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be encoded. 
On 29 August Henderson had his famous row with Hitler, 
who demanded that the British ensure that a Polish plenipo- 
tentiary arrived in Berlin on 30 August. As Henderson only 
received the German response to the British note at 7.15 pm 
on 29 August this was plainly impossible. When Henderson 
pointed out that this sounded like an ultimatum, Hitler 
became abusive. He shouted that 
I or His Majesty's Government did not give a row of 
pins whether Germans were slaughtered or not. I 
therefore proceeded to out-shout Hitler. I told him 
that I would not listen to such language from 
anybody ... I added a good deal more shouting at the 
top of my voice. 
Roger Makins minuted two days later, 'Sir N. Henderson's 
language has already been approved ... He was probably quite 
right to shout' . 
69 Henderson had shown his mettle in a 
crisis, especially as he had been taken aback by Hitler's 
rudeness after his polite behaviour on 25 August and 
29 August. His row with Hitler had been witnessed by the 
Führer's reliable interpreter Paul Schmidt, whose subsequent 
account of the interview tallies with Henderson's own. 
For Henderson's detractors this was a belated sign that 
the worm had turned at last. Yet Henderson had never 
been 
afraid to take on Ribbentrop, and he did so again on 
30 August. Ribbentrop produced the text of what purported 
to be German peace proposals to the Poles, but refused to 
hand them over to Henderson. There were sixteen points, 
which included the return of Danzig to Germany, while 
the 
nearby port of Gdynia (built by the Poles after 
1919) 
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remained in Polish hands. A plebiscite within twelve 
months, supervised by an international delegation, would 
decide the fate of the Corridor. An international 
commission of inquiry would then look into minority 
complaints from either the Germans or the Poles. 90 
Ribbentrop proceeded to read the sixteen points to 
Henderson, whose German was flawed, at what Henderson subse- 
quently called 'top speed'. ' When Henderson asked for the 
text of the document Ribbentrop refused, saying that it was 
now out of date. This had followed Henderson's complaint 
that a German demand that the British produce a Polish envoy 
in Berlin within twenty-four hours was 'unreasonable'. An 
undignified slanging match ensured, when Henderson the old- 
style diplomat took particular exception to Ribbentrop's use 
of the word 'damned' and lost his temper. Schmidt, who was 
present in his usual capacity as interpreter, feared that 
Ribbentrop would throw Henderson bodily out of the room. 92 
Henderson wrote later, 'I do not desire to stress the 
unpleasant nature of this interview'. " 
Diplomatic protocol had been breached by the abrasive 
Ribbentrop, in Henderson's view, but it was now too late for 
the diplomatic niceties on which Sir Nevile had been bred. 
Germany would go to war over a technicality. The Poles 
would negotiate directly with Germany, but they would not be 
bullied into sending an envoy to Berlin within the German 
timescale. Neither would Britain put pressure on the Poles 
to give way to this German intimidation. 
A telegram was sent to Henderson by the Foreign Office 
on 2 September, the day after Hitler finally attacked 
Poland. It suggested that if the Germans withdrew 
from 
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Poland, 'His Majesty's Government would be willing to regard 
the position as being the same as it was before the German 
forces crossed the Polish frontier . 
9' 
It was of no avail. Early in the morning of 3 September 
Henderson went to deliver the British ultimatum to Germany 
requiring her to withdraw her troops from Poland, and to 
begin that process by 11 am. Henderson arrived at 9 am 
precisely but was received not by Ribbentrop, who was well 
aware of its likely contents, but by Schmidt the inter- 
preter. Schmidt expressed his regret about the circum- 
stances to Henderson as he had 'always had the highest 
regard for the British Ambassador'. 9S Henderson also 
expressed regret. For him transmission of the ultimatum was 
recognition that his 'mission' had indeed failed. No 
response was ever received to the British ultimatum, and 
Britain and Germany were at war. 
No one could have tried harder than Henderson to 
preserve the peace in August and September 1939. He had 
fought physical exhaustion and deadly disease to do so, and 
he had stood up to the bullying of both Hitler and Ribben- 
trop. It was no fault of his that Hitler insisted on having 
his war, precipitated by his assumption (based on Ribben- 
trop's bad advice) that Britain would never go to war for 
Poland. The record shows clearly that Henderson did every- 
thing possible to ensure that the German leadership was 
aware of the consequences of its actions. And he succeeded 
in doing so. " 
Henderson was back in England by 7 September and he 
reported to Cadogan the following day. 97 His 
journey home 
had been largely uneventful although he noted the 
lack of 
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enthusiasm of the older generation of Germans for the war. 98 
He offered to go back to his old post in Belgrade, but his 
offer was turned down, presumably on health grounds. On 
25 January 1940, Cadogan noted in his diary that he had been 
to see Horace Wilson, the Head of the Civil Service, about 
Henderson 'who wants to retire on a health certificate'. 99 
Henderson had just over three years to live when he 
returned to England, his cancer condition worsening all the 
time. During this time he lived in hotels and country 
houses in London, Lincolnshire and Wales. The family home 
Sedgwick Park had been sold by his sister-in-law in 1931.100 
His main preoccupation was the publication of his account of 
his time in Berlin under the title Failure of A Mission, 
although subsequently Henderson wrote a second, more general 
memoir Water Under The Bridges, which was published post- 
humously in 1945. 
Halifax gave his authority for the publication of 
Failure of A Mission in January 1940, but Cadogan told 
Henderson that 'there is a difficulty raised by your mention 
of our colonial offer in March 1939'. This had never been 
made public, Cadogan told Henderson, and the Foreign Office 
was afraid of parliamentary reaction if the first reference 
to the offer appeared in Henderson's book. 101 The section 
was therefore omitted, but by 6 March Henderson's book was 
in sufficient favour for the Ministry of Information to want 
10 to make use of it for 'propaganda abroad' .2 
Oliver Harvey saw Henderson on 22 April, and Henderson 
told him that all the profits of his book, past and present, 
would be paid into a trust fund to help British refugees 
from Germany. Harvey's diary entry continues, 
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He expects it will bring in some £40,000. He has 
now retired from the Service and is going to the 
South of France to try to get fit. I am afraid he 
is not very well and also that he realises it 
himself. Rather sad. lo' 
The penchant for understatement of the age prevented Harvey 
from acknowledging the real tragedy of Henderson's 
situation. 
Henderson sent a copy of Failure of A Mission to Horace 
Rumbold, who wrote back thanking him on 15 April and 
described the book as an 'absorbing and vivid account of the 
progress of events'. But Rumbold thought the title of the 
book was inappropriate as 'nobody could have succeeded in 
Berlin'. The character of the regime made this impossible 
said Rumbold who thanked his 'lucky stars that I left Berlin 
before having social intercourse with those ruffians 
surrounding Hitler'., 04 There is no record of any reply by 
Henderson to Rumbold's letter, but as his book shows, he 
still believed in 1940 that appeasement had been the correct 
policy to follow. 
Even in retirement Henderson continued to make his 
views on Anglo-German relations known, and was anxious that 
Germany should not be obliterated from the map of Europe. 
Halifax wrote on 25 July to reassure him that 'we had no 
intention of destroying her or denying her a proper place in 
Europe'. '*' 
To the end Henderson retained his capacity for getting 
into scrapes with the Foreign Office. A speech which 
he 
made at Stamford in July 1941 at the time of Rudolf 
Hess's 
flight to Scotland, was seen by some as being too pro- 
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German. Henderson wrote to the Foreign Office on 19 July 
regretting that 'anyone at Stamford mistook what I said 
about Hess to be a panegyric of him'. 106 
Nevile Henderson died of the cruel cancer which had 
afflicted him since 1938, on 30 December 1942. His 'Times' 
obituary recorded that Henderson had 'striven hard, long and 
sincerely to bring about an understanding with Nazi 
Germany'. He would have accepted this judgement, although 
'The Times' assessment that 'he seems to have misunderstood 
or at least underrated what National Socialism portended for 
Germany and for Europe', 1" also contained some truth. 
Henderson had never been a Nazi sympathiser, and his 
striving for peace was both strenuous and heartfelt. But, 
like others, his fear and loathing of war sometimes blinded 
him to the intrinsic evil behind the forces he was dealing 
with. 
319 
1. Foreign Office to Ogilvie-Forbes 22/4/39, C6522/191/18, 
FO 371/22997; Cabinet Conclusions 23 (98) 19/4/39. At 
the Cabinet meeting Halifax told his colleagues that 
although Henderson should have returned to Berlin 
shortly after Easter 'events' had forced a postpone- 
ment. It was thought wiser that Henderson should 
return only after the Führer's birthday celebrations' 
(i. e. 20 April 1939). The British Press had been told 
that after reporting back to London Henderson had taken 
a short period of leave. 
2. Henderson to Halifax 6/5/39, DBFP, 3, V, No. 457; there 
were only 15,000 Poles in Danzig in 1939 out of a total 
population of 400,000. Although a free city under the 
auspices of the League, Danzig had been subjected to 
increased Nazi activity particularly after the 
denunciation of the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact 
on 5 May 1939. There were more parades by the Hitler 
Youth and the SA, and rumours of a Nazi coup. 
3. Failure of A Mission, P. 10; in Orme Sargent's 
contribution on Henderson in the Dictionary of National 
Biography (1959) he wrote that Henderson 'had no pre- 
conceived dislike of authoritarian government as such'. 
4. Henderson to Halifax 24/5/39, DBFP, 3, V, No. 281. 
5. Henderson to Halifax 2/8/39, FO 800/270, Henderson 
Papers, PRO; Henderson also protested to the Polish 
First Secretary at their Berlin Embassy that he was 
wrongly regarded as 'a sympathiser of Germany 
unfriendly to Poland ... this was not so ... 
He had 
many friends in Poland ... and 
he had grown fond of the 
country and its people'. Notes by Malhomme on 
conversation with Henderson 31/8/39, J. Lipski, 
Diplomat in Berlin 1933-9, W. Jedrejewicz (ed. ), 
Cambridge, 1968, p. 569. 
6. Water Under The Bridges, pp. 220,225; see for example 
A. Prazmowska, Britain. Poland and the Eastern Front, 
Cambridge, 1987, pp. 74-6. Prazmowska is critical of 
Henderson's anti-Polish prejudices and stresses how his 
despatches were 'avidly read' both in the Foreign 
Office and the Cabinet. This contrasts with Watt's 
view in Chamberlain's Ambassadors, p. 154. 
7. Cabinet Conclusions 29/3/39, CAB (15) 39, PRO; Tilea 
had spread these rumours (which were not supported 
by 
his Government in Bucharest) on 16 March. For further 
detail on the 'Tilea scare' see F. S. Northedge, The 
Troubled Giant; S. Newman, The British Guarantee to 
Poland, Oxford, 1976, pp. 107-113; A. J. Crozier, The 
Causes of the Second World War, London, 1997, pp. 149- 
150. For other factors behind the British 
decision to 
320 
guarantee Poland, see also B. Strang, 'Once More Into the Breach: Britain's Guarantee to Poland March 1939', JQH, No. 4, Oct. 1996, pp. 721-757. 
8. Water Under the Br do, p. 45; for Henderson's urgings about a Soviet alliance, see Henderson to Halifax 
28/5/39, DBFP, 3, V, No. 717, Henderson to Halifax 
17/6/39, DBFP, 3, VI, No. 706, Henderson to Cadogan 
13/6/39, No. 702. On the danger that if Britain and France did not reach a settlement, Germany would, see 
also Henderson to Halifax 18/7/39, DBFP, 3, VI, No. 385; 
Richard Lamb is severely critical of the failure of the Foreign Office Eastern Department to take warnings 
about a Soviet-German rapprochement seriously. The 
Drift To War 1922-1939, London, 1989, pp. 309-10. 
9. Henderson to Cadogan 31/5/39, FO 800/294, Cadogan 
Papers, PRO. Henderson's prescience is rather snidely 
acknowledged by Gladwyn Jebb in his memoirs Gladwyn, 
p. 93. The Germans had indeed been 'getting at Stalin' 
since mid-April 1939, Crozier, p. 154. A new Soviet- 
German trade agreement had been signed as far back as 
19 December 1938, How War Came, pp. 121-3. 
10. Henderson to Wilson 24/5/39, PREM 1/331A, PRO. 
11. Norton to Strang 27/4/39, DBFP, 3, V, No. 301. 
12. Coulondre to Bonnet 27/4/39, DDF, 2, XV, 16 March- 
30 April 1939, Paris, 1981, No. 507. 
13. Coulondre asked Bonnet to ensure that the contents of 
this particular telegram were kept secret within the 
Quai d'Orsay. 
14. G. A. Craig and F. Gilbert, The Diplomats, New York, 
1968, is the source for a comparative study of the work 
of Francois-Poncet and Coulondre, pp. 437-76,555-578. 
15. Water Under the Bridges, p. 109. 
16. D. Cameron Watt, How War Came, London, 1989, pp. 185-6. 
17. Failure of A Mission, p. 218. Henderson would have been 
unimpressed by the fact that the decision to guarantee 
Poland was triggered in part by a report from Ian 
Colvin of 'The News Chronicle'. Colvin warned Halifax 
that Germany was about to attack Poland on 29 March, 
but Cadogan's doubts about him were endorsed by Frank 
Roberts of the Central Department who minuted on 
14 April that Colvin's reports were 'sometimes highly 
coloured and imaginative'. Henderson himself was 
involved in a row with the Wilhelmstrasse about 
Colvin's behaviour, as the Germans did not wish to 
renew Colvin's visa in February 1939. His reward was 
to be castigated in Colvin's post-war writings, but 
Colvin contributed to the atmosphere of alarm which 
brought about the volte-face in British policy after 
15 March. Minute by F. K. Roberts 14/4/39, C5032/54/18, 
321 
FO 371/23016; see also minute by Roberts 21/3/39, 
C3568/16/18, FO 371/22988, PRO; Colvin is described by Simon Newman as 'an enigmatic character', The British 
Guarantee to Poland, Oxford, 1976, p. 182; How War 
fig, pp. 182-4; Harvey Diaries 29/3/39, p. 271. 
18. See for example, R. Spitzy, How We-Squandered the 
Reich, pp. 285-6, Spitzy tells of how 'poor Henderson 
wandered through Berlin telling everybody that this 
time Britain was absolutely determined to fight'. 
19. Henderson to Halifax 2/5/39, DBFP, 3, V, Nos. 330,333. 
20. ihi d., No. 328. Henderson's comments here contradict 
assertions by Professor Watt that he had not been 
reporting back accurately on German press campaigns. 
How War Came, p. 100. 
21. Henderson to Halifax 2/5/39, DBFP, 3, V, No. 328. 
22. For an analysis of Beck's diplomacy in 1938-9, see 
Craig and Gilbert, The Diplomats, pp. 566-79; How War 
Came, pp-58-9; Prazmowska, pp. 14-17,33-4,49-50,59- 
61; Newman, pp. 145-6. 
23. B. Strang, Once More Into the Breach, p. 739; D. C. Watt, 
'Misinformation, Misconception, Mistrust Episodes in 
British Policy and the Approach of War' in M. Bentley 
and J. Stevenson (eds. ), High and Low Politics in 
Modern Britain, Oxford, 1983, p. 235. For a scathing 
assessment of the Poles, see M. Gilbert, Sir Horace 
Rumbold, London, 1973, pp. 182-218. 
24. Strang, p. 740. 
25. Neither had Henderson believed the various 'scare' 
stories about German attacks while he was on sick 
leave. Even Strang has to admit that 'virtually none 
of the specific predictions that members of the Berlin 
Embassy made regarding Hitler's future plans came to 
pass', B. Strang, 'Two Unequal Tempers: Sir George 
Ogilvie-Forbes, Sir Nevile Henderson and British 
Foreign Policy 1938-9', Diplomacy and Statecraft, 
Vol. 5, No. 1, March 1994, p. 126. 
26. Henderson to Cadogan 26/4/39, FO 371/23018, PRO; see 
also DBFP, 3, V, No-365; the Foreign Office approved 
of a speech made by Colonel Beck on 5 May, a minute 
stating that it was 'unprovocative in tone on Danzig', 
FO 371/23018, PRO. 
27. Ogilvie-Forbes to Foreign Office 11/4/39, C5384/15/18, 
FO 371/22969, PRO. Forbes wrote that because Oshima 
had close links with the German military his views 
'very possibly reflect informed German opinion'. 
28. S. Aster, The Making f the Second World War, p. 202; 
R. Spitzy, How We Squandered the Reich, pp. 285-6. 
322 
29. Makins minute 23/5/39, C7317/7324/54/18, PRO, Makins had been critical (see Chapter Seven) of Ogilvie- Forbes' behaviour on the International Commission in October 1938, and he subsequently came to have a low opinion of Mason MacFarlane. Remarkably, given his willingness to give away the Ukraine to Germany early in 1939, Gladwyn Jebb thought the Polish guarantee 'less hazardous' after a visit to Poland in June 1939. Memorandum by Jebb 9/6/39, C8336/15/14, PRO. 
30. Minutes by Kirkpatrick, Jebb, Strang, Cadogan and Sargent, all 8/5/39, C6861/154/1118, FO 371/23018, PRO. Jebb had also noted that it would be a waste of time talking to Henderson's bete noire Ribbentrop who was stupid and vain. 
31. Henderson to Halifax 11/5/39; Halifax to Henderson 
11/5/39 and 13/5/39, C6914/54/18, FO 371/23018. 
32. Henderson to Cadogan 10/5/39, ibid. 
33. Sargent minute 8/5/39, C6861/154/18. 
34. Aster, p. 201; Henderson to Cadogan 10/5/39; Halifax 
to Henderson 11/5/39, DBFP, 3, V, Nos. 471,475,489. 
35. Henderson to Halifax 16 and 30/5/39, ibid., Nos. 525, 
671. 
36. Henderson to Cadogan 10/5/39; Failure of A Mission, 
p. 17. The speech referred to was the one made by 
Henderson to the Deutsche-Englische Gessellschaft in 
May 1937, ibid., p. 69. 
37. How War Came, p. 100. 
38. Henderson to the Foreign Office 5/5/39, C6722/54/18, FO 
371/23066. 
39. Henderson to Halifax 6/5/39, Strang minute 16/5/39, 
C7096/54/18, FO 371/23018. Vansittart had minuted in 
his usual acerbic fashion, 'This letter contains some 
gems as usual,. Vansittart minute 16/5/39, ibid. 
40. Foreign Policy Committee (36) 47th Meeting 16/5/39, FO 
371/23066. Chamberlain's anxieties about a Soviet 
alliance were demonstrated by the Cabinet's refusal to 
send a Cabinet minister on a visit to Moscow. This 
idea had been put forward by the Labour MP Mander in a 
parliamentary question to R. A. Butler, the Under 
Secretary at the FO. Mander wanted Eden to go, but 
Makins put forward the FO view that the British 
Government should not 'give the Russians the impression 
that if only they are sufficiently obstinate a Cabinet 
or ex-Cabinet minister may go to Moscow'. A British 
mission was to go to Russia in August. 
41. Henderson to Halifax 8/6/39, DBFP, 3, VI, No. 8. 
323 
42. His faith in or naivety about) Göring being strongly demonstrated in Chapter VI of Failure of A Mission 
43. This hatred being most famously demonstrated in an 
undignified outburst just after the attempt on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944, A. Bullock, Hitler. A Study in 
, ranny, 
London, 1952, p. 745, fn. 1; Spitzy, p. 284. 
44. Spitzy, p. 146. 
45. Henderson to Halifax 8/6/39, DBFP, 3, VI, No. 8; 
Henderson to Halifax 5/6/39, ibid. 
46. Vansittart to Halifax 30/6/39, Vansittart Papers 2/41, 
Churchill College Cambridge. 
47. Professor Watt's suggestion that Henderson was failing 
in this function, which improved only when Ogilvie- 
Forbes was in charge, has already been referred to. 
48. M. Cowling, The Impact of Hitler, Oxford, 1977, p. 289; 
Henderson to Halifax 17/7/39, FO 371/800/316, Halifax 
Papers, PRO. 
49. Aster, p. 201; A. Prazmowska's contrary view is 
referred to in footnote 6. 
50. Henderson to Halifax 17/5/39, DBFP, 3, V, No. 542. 
51. Just 44 planes and 5,000 Hotchkiss guns were sent to 
Poland in September 1939. The Poles asked for up to 
£66.5 million in loans, plus a further £24 million in 
convertible currencies or gold to purchase materials 
outside Britain. They were given just £5 million in 
credits by the Treasury. A. Prazmowska, Britain. Poland 
and the Eastern Front, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 115-118,190 
52. Cadogan Diaries 11/3/38, p. 60. 
53. Failure of A Mission, p. 219. 
54. Henderson to Halifax 31/7/39, DBFP, 3, VI, No. 495. 
55. Aster, pp. 202-3; D. Cameron Watt, Chamberlain's Ambas- 
sadors, p. 154. Vansittart's comment on 30 June also 
rather refutes Watt's suggestion that Henderson 'had 
placed himself in a position beyond all usefulness'. 
56. Henderson to the Foreign Office, 4/5/39, DBFP, 3, VI, 
No. 589. 
57. Conclusions of the Cabinet Foreign Policy Committee 
(36), 47th Meeting, 16/5/39. 
58. Weizsäcker minute 15/5/39, DGFP, D, VI, No. 385. 
59. Henderson to Halifax 16/5/39, FO 800/270, Henderson 
Papers, PRO. Makins was more critical of Weizsäcker 
minuting on 17 August that it must be remembered 
that 
324 
Baron von Weizsäcker is a Prussian with an inbred dislike of the Poles and that if he was last year opposed to taking extreme measures against the Czechs, he is probably this year by no means so averse to 
taking action against the Poles', C11375/15/18, FO 
371/22976; for Weizsäcker's anti-Polish prejudices, 
see also Weinberg, p. 560. 
60. L. B. Namier, Diplomatic Prelude, London, 1949, pp. 221-2 
61. C. Thorne, The Approach of War 1938-9, London, 1967, 
p. 162. 
62. Weizsäcker minute 15/5/39, DGFP, D, VI. 
63. Weizsäcker minute 13/6/39, DGFP, D, VI. 
64. Namier, p. 221, fn. 1. 
65. Henderson to Halifax 16/5/39, FO 800/270. 
66. Namier, p. 221. 
67. ibid., p. 222. 
68. It should be noted that both von Hassell and Spitzy had 
left the Wilhelmstrasse by the summer of 1939. 
69. Henderson to Halifax 11/7/39, FO 800/270, Henderson 
Papers. 
70. Henderson to Halifax 8/8/39, DBFP, 3, VI, Nos. 609,610; 
Henderson to Halifax 5/8/39, ibid., No. 626. 
71. Henderson to Cadogan 15/8/39, DBFP, 3, VI, No. 16. 
72. Henderson to Halifax 24/8/39, FO 800/316, Halifax 
Papers, PRO. 
73. ibid., 22/8/39,24/8/39. 
74. Spitzy, pp. 285-6. 
75. Henderson to Ribbentrop 26/8/39, C. 12238/15/18, FO 
371/22975. 
76. How War Came. Ibid., 28/9/39, C12338/15/18; Orme 
Sargent minutely accurately that 'we ought to beware of 
considering him [Dalherus] as an impartial inter- 
mediary'. Kirkpatrick saw no reason 'why the Poles 
should have to go to Berlin'. 
77. Henderson to Halifax 25/8/39, DBFP, 3, VII, Nos. 283-4, 
288; Statement by Hitler to Henderson 25/8/39, DGFP, 
D, VII, No. 265. 
78. Cabinet Conclusions 26/8/39, CAB 43 (39). 
79. Aster, p. 341. 
325 
80. ibid., CAB 43 (39). 
81. Kennard to Cadogan 26/8/39, DBFP, 3, VII, No. 357. 
82. Failure of A Mission, p. 262. 
83. ibid 
84. Aster, p. 351. 
85. ibid., p. 351. 
86. How War Came, p. 519. 
87. The contrast here between Aster and watt is sharp, the 
latter being more concerned with showing that when 
Henderson claimed in a telegram to be drinking 
champagne he was in fact on the telephone to his French 
colleague Coulondre. All this to show what Henderson 
was doing in the half hour before his interview with 
Hitler on 28 August. 
88. How War Came, p. 510. 
89. Henderson to Foreign Office, C12401/15/18, FO 
371/22975; Failure of A Mission, pp. 2682-9; Makins 
minute 31/8/39, C1240/15/18 FO 37/122975; P. Schmidt, 
Hitler's Interpreter, London, 1951, pp. 150-52; Aster, 
pp. 354-55; How War Came, pp. 513-15. Watt makes a 
belated reference to 'the cancer from which he was to 
die', but it is critical of the drafting of telegrams 
from Berlin to London which did not convey the full 
fury of Hitler's verbal assault on Henderson. 
Henderson's Papers at the PRO contain a draft of an 
article by William Hillman, a journalist who inter- 
viewed Henderson after the event. Under the title the 
Man Who Shouted at Hitler' it describes Henderson as 'a 
fashion plate diplomat' who showed signs of 'extreme 
sensibility and intelligence, gentleness and irony'. 
Henderson told Hillman that the people governing 
Germany today are utterly worthless', FO 371/800/270, 
Henderson Papers. 
90. Paul Schmidt was surprised by the moderation of the 
German proposals. 'It was a real League of Nations 
proposal. I felt I was back in Geneva, ' Schmidt, 
p. 150. 
91. Henderson's account suggests that Ribbentrop read the 
proposals at speed but this version is denied by 
Schmidt who wrote that Ribbentrop 'elaborated on some 
of the points'. Schmidt, p. 152. It has also 
been 
suggested that Henderson should have waited 
for a 
translation because his German was less fluent than 
he 
imagined, Aster, p. 359; for other descriptions of the 
inter ie, %: see Failure of A Mission, pp. 270-1; 
How War 
fie, pp. 520-2; J. Weitz, Hitler's Diplomat, 
London, 
1992, p. 206. 
326 
92. Schmidt, p. 1'5''; Failure of A Mission, pp. 283-4. 
91. Failure of A Mission, p. 271. 
94. Foreign Office to Henderson 2/9/39,012323/15/18, FO 371/22975. 
95. Henderson would have derived some pleasure from 
Hitler's response to the news of the British ultimatum. Turning to Ribbentrop, the conveyor of soothing 
messages about British effeteness, Hitler asked 'What 
now? '. Schmidt, p. 158. 
Henderson's desperate desire to save the peace has 
been underlined by a private letter from a surviving 
member of the British Embassy staff, Gordon Etherington 
Smith (a third secretary in September 1939) . According to Etherington Smith when he brought Henderson the 
telegram instructing him to pass on the British ulti- 
matum, the Ambassador said, 'they are only doing this 
to give them the satisfaction of kicking a dictator in 
the pants'. G. Etherington Smith to writer 2/5/97. 
96. Dalherus had told Henderson on 29 August that Göring 
had told him that 'Herr Hitler was fully alive to fact 
that Great Britain was not bluffing'. Henderson to 
Foreign Office 29/8/39, C12338/15/18, FO 371/22975, 
PRO. 
9*. Cadogan Diaries 8/9/39, p. 215. Cadogan recorded that 
Henderson had been 'rather excitable and silly... ' But 
Cadogan, could be excitable himself when pressurised, 
becoming quite tetchy when Henderson wanted him to read 
his manuscript for Failure of A Mission. His diary 
entry for 12 December read 'He wants an opinion by 
Thursday. He damned well won't- get-, it. Do people 
think i lead a life of leisure? ' 
98. Failure of A Mission, p. 290. 
99. Cadogan Diarie. 25/1/40, p. 249. 
100. Water Under the Bridges, p. 176. 
101. Cadogan to Henderson 4/1/40, FO 800/270, PRO. Cadogan's 
reference is rather mysterious. Chamberlain had made a 
reference to the possibility of colonial concessions in 
a speech he made at Blackburn on 23 February 1939, so 
this matter was already in the public domain. R. A. C. 
Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, p. 196. There is 
no reference to any such offer in Failure of A Mission. 
102. ibid., 6/3/40. 
103. Harvey Diaries 22/4/40, p. 350. 
104. Rumbold to Henderson 15/4/40, FO 800/270, Henderson 
Papers. 
105. Halifax to Henderson 25/7/40, ibid. 
327 
106. Henderson to Foreign Office 19/7/41, i bid. 
107. 'The Times', 31/12/42. 
328 
NPvile HPndprsön's career is a paradox. He was a 
career diplomat who was so highly regarded by his Foreign 
Office superior's in 1937 that he was appointed to the all- 
important Berlin Embassy. By the time he returned from 
Berlin in sepremher 1919, he was isolated and unpopular in 
the Foreign Office. He has subsequently attracted such 
negative comments from historians, that any favourable 
reference to him has become regarded as a form of heresy. 
The record suggPsrs that the degree of castigation to 
which Henderson has been subjected has been unfair. The 
main grobem in assessments of his career hitherto has been 
the tendency to take his time in Berlin out of context, and 
regard his behaviour as ambassador as a surprise. Thus Lord 
Avon could write in the 1960s that no one foresaw the 
opinions that he was to hold'. ' This view is no longer 
sustainable, if indeed it ever was. Walford Selby, a senior 
diplomat and long-term colleague of Henderson's, was well 
aware of Henderson's views on Germany when the latter was 
Minister in Belgrade between 1929 and 1935.2 Vansittart, 
and Orme Sargent, were similarly aware of Henderson's views. 
There was also the clearest evidence from Henderson's 
earlier service that he was prone to take the side of the 
government to which he was accredited, and to query 
his 
instructions. In Constantinople in the 1920s he was pro- 
Turk, as his colleague Andrew Ryan noted, and 
in Belgrade he 
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was pro-Yugoslav. ' Yet Henderson could also be loyal as his 
support for the Foreign Office against George Lloyd over the 
issue of the Egyptian treaty showed. Nevertheless, this 
tendency towards partiality was the cause of the reprimand 
Vansittart gave him over the question of his personal letter 
to the Yugoslav Regent Prince Paul on Italian-Yugoslav 
relations. And it was not an isolated example. 4 Just as 
Henderson was pro-Yugoslav in Belgrade he was to be pro- 
German in Berlin. But he was never pro-Nazi, and there is 
an important difference. 
Henderson has been so severely criticised that it is 
easy to forget the golden opinions that he had obtained from 
Austen Chamberlain and George Lloyd in the 1920s. These 
were endorsed in 1935 by Vansittart, who knew Henderson well 
and thought hp should be a member of the 'First Eleven', 
worthy of a top diplomatic posting. ' He was regarded as a 
coming man, both by his Foreign Office superiors and by 
leading politicians of the day like Hugh Dalton and Sir 
Samuel Hoare, both of whom were Foreign Office Ministers 
during Henderson's time in Belgrade. 6 Hence Henderson's 
bitter disappointment when the Foreign office proposed to 
send him first to Lisbon (a decision later rescinded after 
Henderson's protests) and ultimately to Argentina. 
The Berlin appointment, on Vansittart's recommendation, 
was predictable in the context of Henderson's whole career. 
He was an able, and up to that point, well thought of career 
diplomat who had also supported vansittart 
loyally over the 
' 
controversial Hoare-Laval pact in 1935. 
The other point to make about Henderson's early 
career 
is that he was not a natural appeaser. 
In Constantinople he 
330 
had advocated a tough line against the Turks, and in 
Belgrade he had wanted the British Government to take a 
stronger position against Italy. 
Did the Foreign Office loyalist, and career diplomat, 
then suddenly become a heretical non-conformist in 1937? 
Clearly he did not. Although loyal Henderson was never an 
orthodox diplomat, as he admitted himself, and on occasion 
he acted more forcefully than was acceptable in the Foreign 
Office. ' One occasion was when Henderson expressed his 
dissatisfaction with Britain's unassertive position on 
Italian-Yugoslav relations to Eric Phipps in 1935.9 He also 
tended to exceed his brief by offering personal opinions 
which had not been cleared by the Foreign office first. 
These views were also influenced by Henderson's high regard 
for individuals, like King Alexander of Yugoslavia (and 
later Göring) which verged on hero worship . 
1° Henderson's 
appointment to Berlin therefore, was made in the knowledge 
that he would be an unorthodox ambassador who would be 
likely to hold and express strong views. 
Henderson's strengths and weaknesses would have been 
taken into account when he was appointed to Berlin. Oliver 
Harvey's comment that 'there really is not anybody else 
obvious to send' is unconvincing. " There were alternatives. 
And while it is right to say, as D. Cameron Watt 
does, that 
'one can only speculate how any of the alternative candi- 
dates would have coped', the available evidence 
does not 
necessarily suggest that Sir Miles Lampson or 
Sir Percy 
Loraine would have fared better than 
Henderson. 12 
It is important to recall Nhy Henderson was appointed. 
Rumbold and Phipps had made known their 
distaste for the 
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Nazi regime between 1911 and 1937, but by the time of 
Henderson's appointment Baldwin wanted a more emollient 
approach. His adviser Tom Jones wrote in his diary on 
15 January 1937 that 'Phipps, our ambassador "has no 
telephone line" to Hitler who despises him' . 
l' Henderson 
went to Berlin to change the atmosphere, and to try to build 
bridges to the Nazi leaders. His success with the authori- 
tarian King Alexander- suggested that he might be better able 
to achieve this than his two predecessors. Ironically the 
evidence shows that Hitler disliked Henderson, and his 
relationship with Ribbentrop was to be very poor. But a 
change of approach was felt to be needed in 1937, and the 
Foreign Office did not want to send another Phipps to 
Berlin, or to have a political appointee foisted on them. 
Henderson, then, was not appointed to Berlin without careful 
scrutiny of his previous record, and his known strengths and 
weaknesses. ThP alternatives to serving diplomats, Halifax 
and Willingdon, were rejected, and Vansittart would not 
leave the Foreign Office himself to take up the post despite 
attempts by Eden to ease him out of the office as Permanent 
Under Secretary ." 
This raises the crucial issue of Henderson's interview 
with Chamberlain in 1937, before he became Prime Minister in 
May 1937. It is impossible to verify the exact date of the 
interview of which there is no record in Chamberlain's 
personal papers, but Henderson set great store by it. 
I think I may honestly say that to the last and 
bitter end I followed the general line which 
he set 
me, all the more easily and faithfully since 
it 
corresponded so closely with my own private 
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conception. 
It was during this interview, Henderson recorded, that 
Chamberlain told him that 'a calculated indiscretion was 
sometimes a very useful form of diplomacy' . 
'S He followed 
this advice to the letter when he reached Berlin, to the 
discomfort-tire of colleagues like Vansittart and Orme 
Sargent. And Henderson's line was to be unrelenting in 
Berlin in pursuing Chamberlain's policy. War must be 
avoided at all costs because Britain needed to rearm in the 
air. Certainly it was to be avoided over issues which 
Henderson (like Chamberlain) deemed to be morally dubious, 
like the Sudetenland. Germany's claim to territory where 
the Germans were in a majority must be recognised. Hender- 
son's disapproval of the territorial clause of Versailles 
Treaty had been evident since his period in the Paris 
Embassy in 1919. 
Henderson would be working to do the job he had been 
appointed to do, to secure an accommodation with the Nazi 
regime. Britain's interests must be paramount in relation 
to France's, not least because Henderson's experience with 
the French at Chanak made him suspicious of allies who might 
dictate Britain's foreign policy. It has been too easily 
forgotten that Henderson stressed the need for overall 
rearmament. He told Chamberlain in the 1937 interview that 
'British rearmament should be relentlessly pursued since no 
argument would count with the Government of Hitler except 
that of force'. 16 Throughout his career Henderson 
had 
always stressed the need to avoid pointless threats which 
could not be backed up with force. He was an advocate 
of 
'the velvet glove on the iron hand'. 
17 
5 
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The significance of the Chambeºlain-Henderson interview 
was that Henderson came away from it convinced that he was 
the personal agent of the Prime Minister, rather than of the 
Foreign Office. His subsequent behaviour in Berlin should 
be seen in this light; and in this context his initiatives 
over the Maxwell Garnett letter, the Anglo-German fellowship 
speech, and the Nuremberg Rally in 1937, should cause no 
surprise. Henderson was trying both to re-establish a 
relationship with the Nazi leadership and to avail himself 
of Chamberlain's permission to commit purposeful indiscre- 
tions. These infuriated Vansitrart, and exposed Henderson 
to Foreign Office charges of disloyalty. Henderson accepted 
this risk: before going to Berlin, and had already told Eden 
that he might make himself unpopular because of his 
behaviour r. here. 
Even if it is conceded that Henderson committed indis- 
cretion_s in Berlin, and he obviously did, there are still 
strong grounds for saying that he has been unfairly treated 
by historians. First and foremost, there is the evidence in 
the published British documents which, as Desmond Williams 
suggested as long ago as 1958, were edited in such a way as 
to present Henderson in a negative light. " This charge has 
been completely ignored by other historians, but it has some 
substance. 
Secondly, the published documents themselves show quite 
clearly that Henderson did not favour the Anschluss, unless 
it was by peaceful means, and did not want the fragmentation 
of the Czechoslovak state in 1938. His first preference, as 
his personal letters to Halifax and Cadogan also make clear, 
was always to preserve the integrity of Czechoslovakia. 19 
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Only after the May Scare did Hendorrson, by now understan- 
dably desperate to ivoi(i war-, abandon his support for the 
preservation of Czechoslovakia and support the cession of 
the suderenland to Germany. Henciei , on was right in his 
assessment that Hitler was not bluffing after the may Scare, 
and would indeed invade Czechoslovakia if necessary. 
Evidence from German sources like von Hassell and 
Spit .. v" also makes it clear that, contrary to the received 
wisdom, Henderson did his ut-most to warn the Germans about 
the consequences of an invasion of Czechoslovakia and 
Poland. His problem was that Hitler, heavily influenced by 
Ribbentrop, chose to believe that Britain would not fight. 
Henderson may have been indiscreet in private conversa- 
tons in 1938 during the Czech crisis, but more attention 
should have been paid to the reliability of eyewitnesses 
like C'nlvin, whom Henderson's superior Cadogan found 
excitable and not totally reliable. ' Col\rin accused 
Henderson of making anti-Czech statements at a party, and 
censorious historians have always been inclined to take the 
word of Henderson's critics, rather than his admirers like 
von Hassell. 
The same point must be made about Henderson's alleged 
undermining of the German opposition to Hitler. Only by 
making a British diplomat responsible for the opposition's 
inactivity (and even Vansittart became disillusioned with 
anti-Nazis like Gordeler, as has been shown) can this 
accusation be sustained. The case against Henderson was 
devastatingly dismissed by his own arch-critic Orme Sargent 
on 15 April 1939. 
Last year [Sargent minuted] we were reportedly told 
'If 
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that moderate opinion wa:: disappointed and diRcoura- 
ged because HMG was not standing up to Hitler. Now 
that HMG are standing up to Hitler we hear this same 
moderate opinion is disgusted with us and can't 
understand why, HMG are standing up to Hitler. `1 
In September 1938 it was a member of the German opposition, 
von Hassell, who passed on to Keitel Henderson's warning 
about the consequences of German aggression. The subsequent 
failure of Beck and his Col leaglnes to rake action against 
Hitler was, in the last analysis, a matter for them. 
The occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by the Germans on 
15 March 1939 obviously marked a major turning-point in 
Anglo-Cerman relations during Henderson's period in Berlin. 
Henderson recognised this himself, and thought he should 
have been transferred elsewhere. He also indicated after 
Munich that he wanted a transfer, but Halifax would not 
accommodate him. " But the case for moving him after the 
Prague coup was surely overwhelming, because Henderson had 
identified himself so strongly with the appeasement policy 
and found himself ill at ease in the post-Prague period. 
The fact, that hp was not moved, also questions the extent to 
which Chamberlain and Halifax had really abandoned 
appeasement. 
Wh;, Henderson was not moved at this point is the major 
mystery of his career. He was suffering from a serious 
cancer, which surgery during his sick leave had failed to 
alleviate, and had been led to believe by Halifax after 
15 March that he would indeed be moved. Yet no action was 
taken, and one explanation is serious executive weakness on 
the part of Halifax. The other explanations for Halifax's 
-: 'ts14irqa .1 .' 
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failure to act are unconvincing, especially in the light of 
his avowed loss of confidence in Henderson after Munich. " 
Unless of course Halifax's revolt against appeasement since 
Godesberg was much less wholehearted than has recently been 
suggested. 
Halifax himself allowed Henderson a great deal of 
freedom of manoeuvre during the Czech crisis, while creating 
obfuscation about the precise nature of Britain's obligation 
to the Czechs. Hence Hendi? rson's complaint in his telegram 
of 11 September 1918 about the watering down of Britain's 
commitment, for which he was rebuked by Halifax. " In 
contrast Henderson retained Chamberlain's confidence 
throughout his period in Berlin. Evidence that he was 
losing it early in 1919 is inconclusive. Henderson was 
Chamberlain's man, and behaved like the political appointee 
that Vansittart had so dreaded in 1937, when he supported 
Henderson's appointment. 
Those historians who have been prepared to look at 
Henderson's career in an objective fashion have found that 
even after 15 March 1939 he stuck to his task manfully, in 
the last days before the outbreak of war. He 'would succeed 
in making the British position clear', " but Henderson has 
received precious little credit for carrying out his final 
instructions. If Hitler continued to believe that Britain 
was bluffing, it was not for want of effort on Henderson's 
part. 
Henderson's unwillingness to repent over his support 
for appeasement clearly played a part in influencing the 
historiography. Failure of A Mission appeared far more 
quickly than the memoirs of his colleagues or superiors 
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(such as Halifax or But 1or) , for the obvious- reason that 
Henderson knew he had very little time to live. By 
contrast, in the 1960s and l q70, -,, col leagues like J? bb 
developed convenient memory lapses about their role in 
events, or simply failed to address the issue of appeasement 
at all (as in the case of Owen O'Malley). It is significant 
that the memoirs of Sir Frank Roberts, who had experience of 
being an ambassador in a totalitarian state, were less 
censorious about Hei, drrson than those of the Whitehall-based 
Je . 
36 Henderson's own memoirs are generous to his 
Colleagues, even in instances (as with George Lloyd over 
Egypt) where he had sharply disagreed with them. 
Henderson's vices, such as they were, have been writ 
large. His anti-Slavism and alleged anti-Semitism have 
often been -, ingled out, and it is true that there are 
prejudiced references to Czech and Poles in Henderson's 
despatches. Yet this was in a context where there was 
little sympathy for either nation at the Foreign Office, or 
for leaders like Benet or Beck. Henderson's own prejudice 
against a Soviet alliance were held even more strongly by 
Sargent, who did not seem to understand that if Britain was 
to deter Germany an alliance with the USSR was essential. 27 
Henderson's anti-Semitism was not of a virulent 
variety, and it did not prevent him being a friend of the 
Rothschilds. The contrast here with his mentor Rumbold is 
striking. Rumbold is a hero of the anti-appeasement camp, 
so his blatantly anti-Semitic remarks in Berlin have been 
overlooked, even though they have been on the record for 
twenty five years . "' 
The argument in this instance is not just about 
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Henderson being no worse than hi:; Forei'Jn Off ice colleagues 
and superiors, but about a serious case of scape-goating. 
Henderson could be an awkward ('Olleague, being both a 
querulous subordinate and an overexarr i ng boss. He would 
have done xe11 to remember Sir Francis Bertie's comment 
about an ambassador being nothing more than 'a d ..... d 
marionette', whose strings were pulled in 10 Downing 
Street. '' (-Prtainly (buoyed up by his interview with 
Chamberlain) he seemed to suffer from delusions of grandeur 
when he was sent to Berlin. But he did not make policy, and 
although he tried to influence it over Germany, it was for 
Eden, Halifax or Chamberlain to take his advice or reject 
it. His reluctance to pass on a warning to Hitler at the 
1938 Parr-, - Rally for example, could have been dealt with by 
a more decisive Halifax. Six months later Halifax was far 
more assertive in insisting that Henderson see Keitel or 
Haider, to pass on a warning, and Henderson complied. " 
Henderson cannot be held responsible for the executive 
weakness of the Foreign Secretary. Neither was he the only 
source of information available to Secretaries of State; 
yet the impression has been created that Henderson exerted a 
unique, decisive and catastrophic influence on Halifax. 
The paradox is that having been supposedly identified 
by Halifax and Cadogan as someone who was failing in his 
post, Henderson was left in Berlin for another six months 
during the crucial Polish crisis, which led to war. Or was 
this a virtual admission that the post of Ambassador was not 
as significant as Henderson himself believed, or his 
detractors subsequently suggested? If the French could move 
Francois-Poncet, why could the Foreign Office not move 
CA 
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Henderson? If Halifax had moved decisively away from 
support for appeasement, why did he not move Henderson on? " 
Halifax was in a strong position in the Cabinet after Godes- 
berg, and could have overridden Chamberlain's objections. 
Henderson's critics have tried to argue on the one hand that 
he was a disastrous influence before Prague, and then that 
he had no influence at all after it. ' 
Throughout Henderson's time in Berlin he was bedeviled 
by executive weakness, policy obfuscation and internal 
Foreign Office feuds. Eden mistrusted Vansittart, while 
Cadogan wanted Vansittart dismissed as Chief Diplomatic 
Adviser. Chamberlain distrusted the Foreign Office as a 
whole, and used Horace Wilson as his foreign policy adviser. 
Halifax fluctuated between slavish support for Chamberlain, 
and crises of conscience over the treatment of the Czechs 
and the validity of appeasement. Little wonder that Hender- 
son stuck by the most determined, and consistent star in 
this uncertain universe, the Prime Minister. 
Ultimately, however, a completely revisionist defence 
of Henderson is not possible. His assessment of Nazism, and 
particularly of the real nature of Hitler's foreign policy 
with its ideological imperative (even though he had read 
Mein Kampf) was flawed. He put too much faith in the 
alleged moderation of Göring, although he saw accurately 
enough how futile Anglo-French threats might drive Hitler 
'off the deep end'. He was right in his assessment of the 
inept Ribbentrop, but too willing to be taken in by 
Weizsäcker's moderate assessment of Hitler's foreign policy 
objectives. And he showed insufficient concern for the non- 
German races like the Czechs and Poles, who also had rights, 
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however flawed Henderson believed the post-war peace 
settlement to be. 
Yet Nevile Henderson was a man of honour. He tried 
valiantly and unsuccessfully to reach an accommodation with 
what, he had ultimately to concede, was a gangster regime. 
He did not of course live to see the exposure of the horrors 
perpetrated by the Third Reich, and we can only speculate 
about whether the opinions put forward in Failure of A 
Mission would have been substantially revised in the light 
of such knowledge. Even at. the time, some of his Foreign 
Office colleagues could not accept the evidence confronting 
them. " 
Henderson believed in adopting moral positions in 
international relations, and righting acknowledged wrongs. 
T^ this sense he can be described as a Wilsonian idealist. 
But he was also a firm believer in protecting British 
interests. Above all else, he detested the prospect of a 
war which could destroy the British Empire. Henderson 
provided his own epitaph for the time he spent in Berlin. 
I had gone to Berlin without illusion. It was my 
duty to understand them and their view point. I 
talked frankly, and listened freely and was listened 
to freely. I went to bless and ended up cursing. " 
The failure of his mission was the failure of a policy of 
accommodation with a ruthless, totalitarian regime which 
nothing in Henderson's previous career could have prepared 
him for. Very few people in Britain understood the real 
nature of Nazism, and Henderson was not alone in perceiving 
Hitler as a traditional, albeit rabid German nationalist who 
could be satisfied by territorial revision. 
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